Reconocer y resistir es real: el primer aniversario de la reacción histórica contra Fiducia Supplicans

 

El resurgimiento ortodoxo

 por Serre Verweij
Para Rorate Caeli

Hace un año, Víctor Manuel Fernández publicó un comunicado de prensa que pretendía aclarar  la Fiducia Supplicans  (o aplacar a sus numerosos críticos).  La Fiducia Supplicans  había logrado ser el documento vaticano más controvertido desde la Humanae Vitae, 55 años antes. De hecho, fue más controvertido. La supuesta aclaración terminó anulando «de facto» muchas partes clave de la  propia Fiducia Supplicans  . Ahora, un año después, el documento se ha convertido en gran medida en letra muerta. ¿Qué sucedió exactamente?

Una aclaración, en realidad una retractación

El comunicado de prensa del 4 de enero de 2024 sirvió como una forma obvia de control de daños. No solo difería de  Fiducia Supplicans  en cuanto a su tono o énfasis, sino que también contradecía abiertamente su contenido real en varios puntos. 

Algunos ejemplos incluyen: 

  • *Su propia existencia  (Fiducia Supplicans  dejó en claro que sería la  respuesta final  a las preguntas sobre bendiciones para parejas del mismo sexo. Sin embargo, este comunicado de prensa se publicó menos de tres semanas después).
  • *Permitió a los obispos proporcionar pautas restrictivas para la interpretación del documento, contrariamente al texto del documento mismo, que prohibía explícitamente tanto a las conferencias episcopales como a los obispos individuales proporcionar pautas claras. 
  • *Afirmó  que FS  es consistente con un  Responsum  de 2021 de la Congregación para la Doctrina de la Fe, que descartaba explícitamente cualquier bendición de las uniones homosexuales.

Fue el último punto el que destripó por completo el potencial revolucionario de  Fiducia Supplicans , menos de un mes después de su publicación.  La propia Fiducia Supplicans  ha sido vaga precisamente en ese tema. Hablaba de bendiciones para las «parejas» del mismo sexo y era ambigua sobre si esto implicaba bendecir las uniones/relaciones de esas parejas.

Tras el comunicado de prensa, el Papa Francisco repitió varias veces que se podía bendecir a las personas homosexuales, pero no a sus uniones o grupos activistas, llegando incluso en una entrevista a calificar la bendición de las  uniones homosexuales de contraria a la ley natural. Las declaraciones de apoyo de los obispos liberales se acabaron rápidamente e incluso el padre James Martin eliminó una publicación que apoyaba la bendición de las uniones  homosexuales   y la sustituyó por una publicación sobre la bendición  de las parejas .

Ahora, el documento se ha convertido en un capítulo vergonzoso del pontificado del Papa Francisco. Un documento que puso a muchos obispos y cardenales en su contra, al tiempo que eclipsó su Sínodo plurianual sobre la sinodalidad y los últimos días de su pontificado. Para entender correctamente este error político, es importante conocer los antecedentes y el contexto.

El preludio de  la Fiducia Supplicans 

Los progresistas moderados atacaron el  Responsum , en gran medida no negando su reafirmación de las enseñanzas de la Iglesia sobre el matrimonio, o su intento de evitar la confusión en esta cuestión, sino rechazando su prohibición total de cualquier bendición de las relaciones homosexuales, ya que son relaciones sexuales pecaminosas. Este era el elemento que los progresistas esperaban sobre todo que se abandonara. 

Fernández sugirió que estaría abierto a esto, ya que solo se mantuvo fiel a la definición tradicional del matrimonio, mientras se negaba a reafirmar completamente el  Responsum  en una entrevista con  InfoVaticana , poco después de que se anunciara su nombramiento como nuevo prefecto del Dicasterio para la Doctrina de la Fe. Después de eso, el Papa Francisco (posiblemente escrito por Fernández) en realidad proporcionó una respuesta a los nuevos dubia de los cardenales ortodoxos, en los que se negó a descartar categóricamente la bendición de las uniones del mismo sexo, siempre que no se equipararan con el matrimonio. Parecía haber una apertura. Luego, poco después del sínodo, los obispos del mundo se quedaron ciegos por la repentina publicación de  Fiducia Supplicans , sin ninguna base sinodal, con el sínodo de hecho todavía en curso.

Los disidentes presionaron por un cambio durante la primera sesión del Sínodo sobre la sinodalidad en octubre de 2023, pero la mayoría de los obispos defendieron firmemente la ética sexual de la Iglesia. 

Los puntos de vista disidentes pueden dividirse aproximadamente en cinco posiciones, que van desde las radicalmente heréticas hasta las doctrinalmente ambiguas y pastoralmente irresponsables:

1. Las relaciones homosexuales son normales y deberían recibir algún tipo de reconocimiento, ojalá que en algún momento se reconozca el matrimonio homosexual. La adopción por parte de homosexuales también es normal. Ésta es la postura adoptada por las iglesias protestantes más radicalmente liberales en los últimos años. Una perspectiva que pocos obispos profesan abiertamente en la actualidad, siendo el obispo Bonny de Amberes (Bélgica) uno de sus defensores poco conocidos. 

2. La definición que la Iglesia da del matrimonio como la unión entre un hombre y una mujer es correcta y debería permanecer clara (al menos oficialmente por ahora), pero las relaciones homosexuales y otras relaciones extramatrimoniales también son (un bien menor). Deberían recibir alguna forma de reconocimiento y las enseñanzas de la Iglesia sobre el sexo fuera del matrimonio son obsoletas y erróneas, o idealistas y vale la pena ignorarlas. Este es el intento de compromiso impulsado dentro del anglicanismo, que resultó en cisma, así como la postura adoptada por el Camino Sinodal de Alemania y los obispos más liberales de Austria y Suiza.

3. Las relaciones homosexuales contienen elementos pecaminosos (contacto sexual ilícito), pero las relaciones (supuestamente) «estables», «amorosas» y «comprometidas» también tienen elementos buenos. La Iglesia debería centrarse más en esto y menos en los aspectos pecaminosos. Como resultado:
3a. La unión puede ser bendecida.
3b. Los aspectos positivos de la unión pueden ser bendecidos (de tal manera que para la mayoría de las personas esto parezca una bendición para las uniones).

 

Esta es la postura adoptada en los últimos años por el cardenal Schönborn, así como por Scicluna de Malta y por Mons. Hervé Giraud, arzobispo de Sens-Auxerre en Francia.

4. El hecho de que las uniones homosexuales sean malas (o buenas) es irrelevante, ya que una bendición imparte el bien de Dios incluso sobre el pecado y, por lo tanto, no afirma el pecado, sino que lo bendice. Esta (o algo similar, dada la ambigüedad) fue la extraña postura adoptada por Philippe Bordeyne, presidente del Pontificio Instituto Teológico Juan Pablo II para las Ciencias del Matrimonio y la Familia. 

5. Bendiciones para todos (excepto quizás para los reaccionarios “terribles”), pues muestran el “rostro maternal de la Iglesia”. Las bendiciones son importantes, aunque provoquen confusión doctrinal, porque es esencial ser  pastoral y también lo es bendecir a individuos o a grupos más grandes de personas en cualquier situación. Ésta es la tradición liberal latinoamericana.

Fiducia Supplicans , como obra de Fernández, terminó basándose en gran medida en la posición 5, pero hace alusiones a la posición 4 y puede ser (y rápidamente fue) vista como un apoyo a las posiciones 3a y 3b también. El ejemplo más importante es:

“se puede impartir una bendición que no sólo tiene un valor ascendente, sino que implica también la invocación de una   bendición que desciende de Dios sobre aquellos que, reconociéndose desposeídos y necesitados de su ayuda, no reivindican una legitimación de su propio estado, sino que imploran que todo lo que hay de verdadero, de bueno y de humanamente válido en su vida y en sus relaciones sea enriquecido, sanado y elevado por la presencia del Espíritu Santo.”

El hecho de que  FS  hablara de bendecir «parejas», en lugar de «uniones» o «relaciones», parecía poco más que una elección arbitraria de palabras, que daría a los «papaexplicadores» el nivel más básico de negación plausible contra las afirmaciones de que Roma había cambiado la doctrina católica sobre las relaciones homosexuales.

Sólo los progresistas más radicales tenían motivos reales para estar molestos por ello e incluso ellos podían sentirse felices, sabiendo que se estaban dando pasos que podrían llevar a que sus posiciones extremistas fueran aceptadas en el futuro. Bonny expresó su felicidad por el documento. 

La reafirmación de que las relaciones homosexuales no podían ser bendecidas de una manera similar al matrimonio ofreció poco consuelo a los fieles ortodoxos, ya que finalmente parecía que se abría la puerta a la bendición de las uniones sexuales extramatrimoniales. El hecho de que la actividad sexual en estas uniones todavía se calificara de pecaminosa  en la Fiducia Supplicans  pronto se convirtió en letra muerta, y tanto los medios de comunicación dominantes como los obispos modernistas de Alemania y Bélgica reaccionaron ante el documento como tal.

Un cambio radical

El comunicado de prensa intentó desesperadamente hacer   realidad  la distinción entre parejas y sus uniones/relaciones (que los Fiducia Supplicans no habían descrito directamente, sino que habían dejado como una posible interpretación ortodoxa). Las parejas homosexuales no solo no pueden recibir ninguna bendición que se parezca remotamente a una ceremonia de matrimonio , sino que no pueden hacer que  su unión  sea bendecida, punto, tal como decía el  Responsum de 2021.  También se añadieron más limitaciones, ya que la bendición no solo está prohibida en relación con una unión civil o cualquier forma de rito similar al matrimonio, sino que debe tener lugar  lejos del altar  y de formas que  eviten por completo el escándalo .

Sólo los dos  individuos  que forman la pareja pueden ser bendecidos, como pueden serlo todos los pecadores. Se ha objetado con razón que cuando una pareja homosexual pide ser bendecida como pareja y se presenta como tal, es prácticamente imposible bendecirlos como pareja, pero no su unión. La distinción entre “parejas” y la “unión” que los une  como pareja  puede ser interesante para los filósofos, pero no existe en el mundo real.

Sin embargo, Fernández dejó claro en el comunicado de prensa que los sacerdotes sólo podían hacer la señal de la cruz sobre cada individuo por separado, no sobre los dos juntos. Además, la oración descrita por Fernández en la «aclaración» no se centraba en ningún supuesto elemento positivo de las relaciones extramatrimoniales u homosexuales, sino que hacía una referencia más clara a que dichas relaciones son problemáticas y requieren la gracia para cambiar a los pecadores.

Esto plantea la pregunta de por qué el Vaticano necesitaba publicar un documento para declarar el hecho, conocido por casi todos, de que la Iglesia puede bendecir  a los pecadores, pero no el pecado  , y que los sacerdotes pueden orar por los pecadores que luchan y desean recibir el apoyo de Dios. También plantea la pregunta de si la bendición de los pecadores es de alguna manera posible como algo no litúrgico. ¿Es la bendición que las personas reciben durante la comunión cuando se acercan al sacerdote con los brazos cruzados una «bendición no litúrgica», aunque tenga lugar durante la liturgia? Como preguntó hace un año un querido sacerdote holandés, el padre Elias: 

¿Qué define una «bendición» de un clérigo? ¿No es la diferencia entre un gesto personal de benevolencia natural y una bendición de un sacerdote ordenado que esta última bendición no sólo es reconocible como tal por una forma específica, palabras específicas o un signo, que fueron transferidos por la Sagrada Tradición, sino también por el hecho de que se da con un mandato específico de, y referencia a, Dios como Fuente trascendente de autoridad? ¿Lo cual tiene que ser reconocido, así como intencionado, tanto por la persona que recibe el mandato, como por la persona que busca la bendición? ¿No es, entonces, el caso de que una bendición clerical  es  en esencia un «ritual», por su propia naturaleza, con un significado objetivo? Analizar el significado y el origen de una bendición sacerdotal hace que una bendición «no litúrgica» por definición sea una contradicción sin sentido, que niega la esencia de la bendición dada por el mediador de la gracia de una autoridad superior.  

¿Por qué fue importante un “desarrollo único” respecto de las “bendiciones no litúrgicas” cuando pareció resultar en un retorno al status quo?

El repentino retroceso en materia de relaciones homosexuales fue provocado por la reacción generalizada a  la Fiducia Supplicans . A los pocos días de su publicación, supermayorías de obispos en varios países africanos desafiaron abiertamente al Vaticano e indicaron que se oponían al documento. En aproximadamente 24 horas, los obispos de Malawi rechazaron el documento, seguidos por los de Zambia, Namibia, Benin, Togo y Angola y Santo Tomé (este último rechazó un  Responsum  anterior de Fernández que permitía que los homosexuales y transexuales practicantes también sirvieran como padrinos). Luego, el cardenal Ambongo, considerado durante mucho tiempo como un prelado más centrista y un aliado importante del papa Francisco que incluso forma parte de su consejo de asesores cardenales, se volvió contra la FS y pidió a los obispos africanos de todo el continente que brindaran una respuesta unida contra ella.

Los obispos de Polonia y Hungría (entre los que se incluyen varios cardenales) también rechazaron el FS, junto con los ritos católicos ucraniano y caldeo. Los obispos de Haití, incluido el cardenal Langlois (nombrado cardenal por el Papa Francisco), lo rechazaron. Incluso en América del Sur, el cardenal Sturla, otro designado por Francisco y considerado durante mucho tiempo como un liberal, rechazó abiertamente el documento durante una entrevista en la que también señaló una postura más firme contra el aborto y la eutanasia.

Irónicamente, los obispos estadounidenses, a menudo retratados por los medios liberales como los oponentes más feroces del Papa Francisco, se mantuvieron en gran medida neutrales durante todo el asunto. 

Además, el documento enfrentó un rechazo significativo tanto de las iglesias ortodoxas orientales como de las iglesias ortodoxas orientales, que publicaron declaraciones oficiales en las que lo condenaban e incluso congelaron el diálogo ecuménico como resultado. Si bien algunos prelados liberales podrían preferir fingir que las órdenes anglicanas son válidas y comenzar la intercomunión con los protestantes liberales, el Papa Francisco no parece dispuesto a renunciar al sueño de la reunificación con las iglesias cismáticas orientales y orientales.

El Vaticano, bajo el liderazgo de Francisco, claramente cedió ante los conservadores y ofreció aclaraciones, lo que representó exactamente lo opuesto de lo que había sucedido después de la publicación de  Amoris Laetitia . Si bien la facción modernista radical en el Vaticano probablemente estaba preparada para ignorar las críticas de los mismos cardenales dubia que había ignorado durante casi una década, claramente no estaba lista para enfrentar una revuelta abierta de todo un continente. 

Aunque el rechazo de los obispos africanos se centró principalmente en las relaciones homosexuales, tampoco aprobaron que la  Fiducia Supplicans  se aplicara a los divorciados vueltos a casar o a las parejas no casadas. Los obispos católicos polacos y rusos fueron más allá y rechazaron explícitamente la bendición de las parejas heterosexuales en relaciones extramatrimoniales y de los divorciados vueltos a casar, mientras que los africanos no aplicaron  la Fiducia Supplicans  a las parejas polígamas, a pesar de la presión para implementar un enfoque pastoral local para los polígamos. 

Los obispos africanos fueron incluso más allá del comunicado de prensa. Si bien permitía a los obispos restringir la implementación local, prohibía la prohibición total de que los sacerdotes bendigan a las parejas en situaciones irregulares. Sin embargo, la declaración continental africana hizo exactamente eso. Y aún más sorprendente, esta declaración fue aprobada por el Papa Francisco y Fernández. Vale la pena señalar, también, que tanto esta declaración continental como el comunicado de prensa dejaron la autoridad con respecto a la implementación de la  FS  en manos del obispo local y no de la conferencia episcopal nacional, lo que confirma aún más que el Papa Francisco se había alejado de una postura de apoyo a la autoridad doctrinal para tales organismos eclesiales.

Algunos comentaristas predijeron que el Vaticano podría adoptar un enfoque de dos velocidades para la reforma, respaldando una interpretación liberal radical de  la Fiducia Supplicans  poco después de aprobar el rechazo africano. Sin embargo, nada de eso terminó sucediendo. Ni el Papa Francisco ni Fernández respaldaron nada parecido a una bendición de parejas homosexuales, no casadas o divorciadas y vueltas a casar después de la controversia, ni públicamente ni en privado. Ningún obispo, ya sea en Austria, Suiza o Luxemburgo, afirmó que el Papa Francisco hubiera respaldado en privado ninguna bendición para homosexuales después de la controversia en torno a  la Fiducia Supplicans .

Las peticiones de bendición de parejas homosexuales terminaron siendo poco frecuentes; y las fotos escandalosas fueron aún más raras después de las primeras semanas posteriores a la publicación de FS. Aunque el padre vicentino liberal Joseph S. Williams en Chicago brindó una escandalosa bendición de una unión gay en la primavera de 2024, terminó teniendo que disculparse, a pesar de servir bajo el cardenal ultraliberal Cupich. El papa Francisco, Fernández y Cupich terminaron imponiendo la práctica ortodoxa con respecto a la homosexualidad.

Hay varios factores que pueden ayudar a explicar la reacción casi universal africana (y en cierta medida europea del este) contra  Fiducia Supplicans  que forzó este cambio de actitud sin precedentes por parte del Papa Francisco.

  • Amoris Laetitia  pretendió estar basada en las dos sesiones del Sínodo sobre la Familia (aunque fue más allá en puntos clave y reutilizó propuestas radicales rechazadas en forma diluida), mientras que  Fiduia Supplicans  representó una flagrante elusión del sínodo en curso.
  • La creciente conciencia del florecimiento de vocaciones y del número de fieles en África ha envalentonado a las iglesias locales.
  • La falta de autoridad discrecional de los obispos locales para decidir sobre la implementación de  la Fiducia Supplicans  que  Amoris Laetitia  sí proporcionó.
  • El hecho de que el acceso a los sacramentos para los divorciados adúlteros vueltos a casar en ciertos países occidentales liberales es algo en lo que los prelados africanos pueden «acordar estar en desacuerdo» más fácilmente que en cualquier aparente aprobación de las relaciones homosexuales.
  • Un cansancio general respecto al pontificado del Papa Francisco, los escándalos, las decisiones controvertidas en política exterior, la falta de una comunicación adecuada antes de  la imposición de la Traditionis Custodes  , que se ha percibido en la tibia respuesta del Vaticano al controvertido Camino Sinodal. 
  •  

Cualquiera sea el motivo, la ambigüedad armada popularizada por  Amoris Laetitia  finalmente enfrentó una refutación que no podía ignorar.

Conclusión: La sinodalidad socava la oligarquía sinodal

Los prelados ortodoxos de África, Europa del Este e incluso los Países Bajos rechazaron colegialmente  la Fiducia Supplicans . Utilizaron mecanismos y lenguaje sinodales para rechazar propuestas radicales impulsadas por una ruidosa minoría liberal, que predica mucho sobre la sinodalidad, pero rara vez la practica. La descentralización de la autoridad a las conferencias episcopales y a los obispos individuales, la sinodalidad a nivel continental, el tercer mundo y el ecumenismo, todos ellos han sido promocionados como temas importantes por los modernistas, pero todos ellos terminaron trabajando en contra de la agenda homosexualista.

Los liberales han promovido repetidamente la colegialidad y las periferias, mientras que en realidad promovían la agenda de una élite occidental minoritaria durante los diversos sínodos del papa Francisco. Ahora, la hipocresía y las contradicciones finalmente terminaron por deshacer la campaña liberal para normalizar la homosexualidad dentro del catolicismo.

Si  la Fiducia Supplicans  tiene algún efecto duradero real, probablemente será que los obispos africanos son conscientes de su creciente influencia y que muchos de los cardenales del Papa Francisco están ahora cansados ​​de otro Papa como él.

Recognize and Resist is Real: The First Anniversary of the Historic Backlash to Fiducia Supplicans

Recognize and Resist is Real: The First Anniversary of the Historic Backlash to Fiducia Supplicans

 

The Orthodox Resurgence

 by Serre Verweij
for Rorate Caeli

A year ago, Victor Manuel Fernandez came out with a press release that was meant to clarify Fiducia Supplicans (or to placate its numerous critics). Fiducia Supplicans had managed to be the most controversial Vatican document since Humanae Vitae, 55 years earlier. In fact, it was more controversial. The alleged clarification ended up ‘de facto’ annulling many key parts of Fiducia Supplicans itself. Now, a year later, the document has become largely a dead letter. What exactly happened?

A clarification, in fact a retraction

 

The press release on January 4 2024, served as an obvious form of damage control. It did not just differ from Fiducia Supplicans in terms of its tone or emphasis, but it also outright contradicted its actual content at various points. 

Examples include: 

  • *Its very existence (Fiducia Supplicans made clear that it would be the final response to questions regarding blessings for same sex couples. Yet, this press release followed less than three weeks later).
  • *It allowed bishops to provide restricting guidelines for the document’s interpretation, contrary to the text of the document itself, that explicitly forbade both bishops’ conferences and individual bishops to provide clear guidelines. 
  • *It affirmed FS as consistent with a 2021 Responsum by the Congregation of the Doctrine of Faith, that explicitly ruled out any blessing of homosexual unions.

It was the last point that completely gutted revolutionary potential of Fiducia Supplicans, less than a month after it was published. Fiducia Supplicans itself has been vague precisely on that issue. It spoke of blessings for same sex ‘couples’ and was ambiguous on whether this involved blessing the unions/relationships of such couples.

After the press release Pope Francis repeated several times that homosexual people could be blessed, but not their unions or activist groups, in one interview even describing the blessing of gay unions as contrary to natural law. Supportive declarations by liberal bishops quickly dried up and even Father James Martin removed a post that supported blessing gay unions and replaced it with a post about blessing couples.

Now the document has largely become an embarrassing chapter in the pontificate of Pope Francis. A document that turned many bishops and cardinals against him, while overshadowing his multiyear Synod on Synodality and the final days of his pontificate. To properly understand this political blunder, it is important to know background and context.

The prelude to Fiducia Supplicans 

Moderate progressives attacked the Responsum, largely by not denying its reassertion of the Church’s teachings on marriage, or its attempt to avoid confusion on this issue, but by rejecting its complete prohibition of any blessing of homosexual relationships, since they are sinful sexual relationships. It was this element that progressives hoped above all to see abandoned. 

Fernandez suggested he’d be open to this, as he only stood by the traditional definition of marriage, while refusing to fully reaffirm the Responsum in an interview with InfoVaticana, shortly after his appointment as the new prefect for the Dicastery for the Doctrine of the Faith was announced. Following that, Pope Francis (possibly ghostwritten by Fernandez) actually provided a response to new dubia by orthodox cardinals, in which he refused to categorically rule out blessing of same sex unions, as long as these weren’t equated with marriage. There appeared to be an opening. Then, shortly after the synod, the bishops of the world were blind-sighted by the sudden release of Fiducia Supplicans, without any synodal basis, with the synod in fact still ongoing.

The dissidents pushed for change during the first session of the Synod on Synodality in October 2023, but the majority of bishops stood firmly for the Church’s sexual ethics. 

The dissenting viewpoints can be roughly divided into five positions, ranging from radically heretical to doctrinally ambiguous and pastorally irresponsible:

1. Homosexual relationships are normal and should receive a form of recognition, hopefully with gay marriage getting recognized eventually. Gay adoption is normal, too. This is the stance taken by the most radically liberal Protestant churches in recent years. A perspective that few bishops currently profess openly, with bishop Bonny from Antwerpen in Belgium being a rare, notorious proponent. 

2. The Church’s definition of marriage as the union between one man and one woman is correct and should remain clear (at least officially for now), but homosexual relationships and other extramarital relationships, are (a lesser) good, too. They should receive some form of recognition and the Church’s teachings on sex outside of marriage is either outdated and wrong, or idealistic and worth ignoring. This is the attempted compromise pushed within Anglicanism, that resulted in schism, as well as the stance taken by Germany’s Synodal Path and the more liberal bishops in Austria and Switzerland.

3. Homosexual relationships do contain sinful elements (illicit sexual contact), but (supposedly) ‘stable’, ‘loving’ and ‘committed’ relationships have good elements, too. The Church should focus more on this and less on the sinful aspects. As a result either:
3a. The union can be blessed.
3b. The positive aspects of the union can be blessed (in a way that to most people it looks like blessing the unions).

 

This is the stance taken by Cardinal Schönborn in recent years, as well as by Scicluna from Malta and Archbishop Hervé Giraud of Sens-Auxerre in France.

4. Homosexual unions being wrong (or right) is irrelevant, as a blessing imparts the good of God even on sin and therefore does not affirm sin, while blessing it. This (or something along these lines given the ambiguity) was the odd position taken by Philippe Bordeyne, President of the John Paul II Pontifical Theological Institute for Marriage and Family Sciences. 

5. Blessings for everyone (except maybe ‘awful’ reactionaries), as they show the ‘motherly face of the Church’. Blessings are important, even if they cause doctrinal confusion, because being pastoral is essential and so is blessing individuals or larger groups of people in whatever situation. This is the liberal Latin American tradition.

Fiducia Supplicans, as the work of Fernandez, ended up being largely based on position 5, but makes allusions to position 4 and can be (and quickly was) seen as supportive of positions 3a and 3b too. The most important example being:

“a blessing may be imparted that not only has an ascending value but also involves the invocation of a  blessing that descends from God upon those who—recognizing themselves to be destitute and in need of his help—do not claim a legitimation of their own status, but who beg that all that is true, good, and humanly valid in their lives and their relationships be enriched, healed, and elevated by the presence of the Holy Spirit.”

The fact that FS spoke of blessing ‘couples’, as opposed to ‘unions’ or ‘relationships, seemed like little more than arbitrary word choice, which would give ‘popesplainers’ the most barebone level of plausible deniability against assertions that Rome had changed Catholic doctrine on homosexual relationships.

Only the most radical progressives had real reasons to be upset about it and even they could feel happy, knowing that steps were being made that could lead to their extremist positions being embraced down the line. Bonny expressed happiness regarding the document. 

The reaffirmation that homosexual relationships couldn’t be blessed in a way that seemed similar to marriage offered little consolation to the orthodox faithful, as the door finally seemed to be opened to blessing extramarital sexual unions. The fact that the sexual activity in this unions was still called sinful in Fiducia Supplicans was soon to become a dead letter, and both the mainstream media, as well as the modernist bishops in Germany and Belgium reacted to the document as such.

A radical reversal

The press release attempted to desperately make the distinction between couples and their unions/relationships (which Fiducia Supplicans had not outright described, but left as a possible orthodox interpretation) into a reality. Not only can’t gay couples receive any blessing that even remotely resembles a marriage ceremony, they can’t have no their union blessed, period, just as the 2021 Responsum said. Further limitations were also added with the blessing not only being forbidden in connection to a civil union or having any form of rite similar to marriage, but with it needing to take place away from the altar and in ways that completely avoid scandal.

Only the two individuals who form the couple can be blessed, as all sinners can be. People rightfully objected that when a homosexual couple asks to be blessed as a couple and presents themselves as such, it is practically impossible to bless them as a couple, but not their union. The distinction between ‘couples’ and the ‘union’ that binds them as a couple might be interesting to philosophers, but does not exist in the real world.

Fernandez however made clear in the press release, that priests could only make the sign of the cross over each individual separately, not over the two together. Additionally, the prayer described by Fernandez in the ‘clarification’ did not focus on any alleged positive elements in extramarital or homosexual relationships, but instead made a more clear reference to such relationships being problematic and requiring grace to change sinners.

This raises the question why the Vatican needed to release a document to state the fact, known to virtually all, that the Church can bless sinners, but not sin and that priests can pray for struggling sinners who desire to receive God’s support. It also raises the question whether the blessing of sinners is somehow possible as non-liturgical. Is the blessing that people receive during communion when they approach the priest with their arms crossed a ‘non-liturgical blessing’, even though it takes place during the liturgy? As a beloved Dutch priest, Father Elias, questioned, a year ago (loosely translated): 

What defines a ‘blessing’ by a cleric? Isn’t the difference between a natural benevolent personal gesture and a blessing by an ordained priest, that the latter blessing not only is recognizable as such by a specific form, specific words or a sign, which were transferred by Sacred Tradition, but also by the fact it is given with a specific mandate of, and reference to, God as transcendent Source of authority? Which has to be recognized, as well as intended, by both the mandated person, as by the person seeking the blessing? So isn’t it the case, that a clerical blessing is in essence a ‘ritual’, by its very nature, with an objective meaning? Looking at meaning and origin of a priestly blessing makes a ‘non-liturgical’ blessing per definition a meaningless contradiction, denying the essence of the given blessing by the mediator of grace from a higher authority.  

Why was a ‘unique development’ regarding ‘non-liturgical blessings’ important when it appeared to result in a return to the status quo?

The sudden backtracking on homosexual relationships was prompted by the widespread backlash to Fiducia Supplicans. Within days of its release, supermajorities of bishops in various African countries blatantly defied the Vatican and indicated they opposed the document. Within roughly 24 hours the bishops of Malawi rejected the document, followed by those in Zambia, Namibia, Benin, Togo and Angola and São Tomé (the latter rejecting an earlier Responsum from Fernandez that allowed practicing homosexuals and transsexuals to serve as godparents, as well). Then Cardinal Ambongo, long viewed as a more centrist prelate and an important ally of Pope Francis who even serves on his council of cardinal advisers, turned against FS and called on African bishops from across the continent to provide a united response against it.

The bishops from Poland and Hungary (who include several cardinals) also rejected FS, along with the Ukrainian Catholic and Chaldean Catholic rites. The bishops of Haiti, including Cardinal Langlois (named cardinal by Pope Francis), rejected it. Even in South America, Cardinal Sturla, another Francis appointee long viewed as a liberal. openly rejected the document during an interview where he also signaled a stronger stance against abortion and euthanasia.

Ironically the American bishops who are often portrayed by liberal media as Pope Francis’ fiercest opponents stayed largely neutral during the whole affair. 

On top of that, the document faced significant pushback from both the Eastern Orthodox and the Oriental Orthodox churches who released official declarations condemning it and even froze ecumenical dialogue as a result. While some liberal prelates might prefer pretending Anglican orders are valid and starting intercommunion with liberal Protestants, Pope Francis does not appear ready to give up on the dream of reunion with the Eastern and Oriental schismatic churches.

The Vatican under Francis, clearly giving in to conservatives and providing clarification, represented the exact opposite of what had happened after the release of Amoris Laetitia. While the radical modernist faction in the Vatican was likely prepared to ignore criticisms from the same dubia cardinals it had ignored for nearly a decade, it clearly was not ready to face an open revolt of an entire continent. 

While the rejection by African bishops centered primarily on homosexual relationships, they did not approve of the permissive approach of Fiducia Supplicans being applied to divorced and remarried or to unmarried couples, either. The Polish and Russian Catholic bishops went further and explicitly rejected the blessing of heterosexual couples in extramarital and divorced remarried relationships, too, while the Africans did not apply Fiducia Supplicans to polygamous couples, in spite of pressure to implement a local pastoral approach for polygamists. 

The African bishops went even beyond the press release. While it allowed bishops to restrict the local implementation, it forbade a total prohibition on priests to bless couples in irregular situations. Yet, the African continental declaration did just that. And even more surprising, this declaration was approved by Pope Francis ánd Fernandez. Worth noting, too, is that both this continental declaration and the press release left authority regarding the implementation of FS with the local bishop and not the national bishops’ conference, further confirming that Pope Francis had moved away from a stance supportive of doctrinal authority for such ecclesial bodies.

Some commentators predicted that the Vatican might follow a two speed approach to reform, endorsing a radical liberal interpretation of Fiducia Supplicans shortly after approving the African rejection. Nothing of the sort ended up happening, however. Neither Pope Francis, nor Fernandez, endorsed anything resembling a blessing of gay, unmarried or divorced and remarried couples after the controversy, neither publicly nor privately. No bishop, whether in Austria, Switzerland or Luxembourg claimed Pope Francis had privately endorsed any gay blessings after the controversy surrounding Fiducia Supplicans.

Requests for blessings of homosexual couples ended up being rare; and scandalous photos were even more rare after the initial few weeks after FS was released. Though liberal Vincentian Father Joseph S. Williams in Chicago provided a scandalous blessing of a gay union in the spring of 2024, he ended up having to apologize, in spite of serving under arch-liberal cardinal Cupich. Pope Francis, Fernandez and Cupich ended up enforcing the orthodox practice regarding homosexuality.

There are various factors that can help explain the near universal African (and to some extent Eastern European) backlash against Fiducia Supplicans which forced this unprecedented about-face by Pope Francis.

  • Amoris Laetitia gave the pretense of being based on the two sessions of the Synod on the Family (even though it went beyond this on key points and re-used rejected radical proposals in watered down form), while Fiduia Supplicans represented a blatant sidestepping of the ongoing synod.
  • Increasing awareness of the flourishing vocations and number of faithful in Africa, which has emboldened the local churches.
  • The lack of discretionary authority for local bishops to decide on the implementation of Fiducia Supplicans which Amoris Laetitia did provide.
  • The fact that access to the sacraments for adulterous divorced remarried in certain liberal Western countries is something African prelates can more easily ‘agree to disagree’ on than any seeming approval of homosexual relationships.
  • A general weariness regarding Pope Francis’ pontificate, scandals, controversial foreign policy decisions, the lack of proper communication before Traditionis Custodes was imposed, which has been perceived at the Vatican’s lukewarm response to the controversial Synodal Path. 
  •  

Regardless of the reason, the weaponized ambiguity popularized by Amoris Laetitia had finally faced a rebuttal it couldn’t ignore.

Conclusion: Synodality undermining the synodal oligarchy

Orthodox prelates from Africa, Eastern Europe and even the Netherlands collegially rejected Fiducia Supplicans. They used synodal mechanisms and language to reject radical proposals pushed by a loud liberal minority. Who preaches a lot about synodality, but rarely practices it. Decentralization of authority to episcopal conferences and individuals bishops, synodality on the continental level, the third world and ecumenics, all have been touted as important issues by modernists, yet these all ended up working against the homosexualist agenda.

Liberals have repeatedly touted collegiality and the peripheries, while actually pushing the agenda of a minority Western elite during the various synods under Pope Francis. Now, the hypocrisy and contradictions finally ended up undoing the liberal campaign to normalize homosexuality within Catholicism.

If Fiducia Supplicans has any real lasting effects it will likely be that African bishops are aware of their growing influence and that many of Pope Francis’ own cardinals are now weary of another Pope like him.

Data about the ____

The Bad Arolsen Archive is the world’s only reliable central database for all Holocaust death and Holocaust survivor records. In 1979, a summary was published by the International Red Cross working at the Arolsen archive of their total mortality figures for the German wartime labour camps where the total dead from 13 of the biggest camps added up to 271,000.

In 1984 the Arolsen archive stated their records showed the total deaths in 16 German-controlled labor-camps (15 major ones plus “others” p.82) amounted to 282,000.

In 1993 that number was updated to 296,000, of whom 60,000 in Auschwitz.

The almanac of the “American Jewish Committee”, which appears new every year, announced the following numbers of Jews in the world:

in the 1945 edition on page 367: 15,192,089;

for 1946, this number increased by 516,549 to 15,753,638;

1947 (on page 748), 1948 (page 572) and 1949 (page 289): ~ 15.5 million

1950: 11,500,000. Why? Who eliminated about 4,000,000 Jews between 1949 and 1950?

As for the homicidal gas chambers:

The 3-volume Report of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) on its Activities during the Second World War, Geneva, 1948 states:

«The delegates of the ICRC found no evidence whatever at the camps in Axis occupied Europe of a deliberate policy to exterminate the Jews. In all its 1,600 pages the Report never hints at any human gas chambers.»

Mr. U. Jost, the then-manager of the Bad Arolsen Archive, declared in 2006 that amongst its millions of documents it had no record suggesting death by cyanide – evidently it was safe for them to make such a statement.

Nowhere in a huge, permanent “Holocaust exhibition” spanning 2 floors in the London War Museum in Lambeth does it say or imply that cyanide gas chambers had people in them.

A can of the Zyklon insecticide is on display – and visitors are informed it was used in the delousing chamber (its only mention of the delousing chambers).

Jewish Holocaust survivor Primo Levi, according to his “If This Is a Man” (1957), neither saw nor heard of any evidence for human gas chambers during his spell at Auschwitz-Monowitz.

Guest Article: “The Great Loss: Or, the Pontificate of Jorge Bergoglio”

The following analysis, originally in German (here) and submitted to Rorate Caeli in an authorized English translation, is the finest synopsis of the pontificate and the theology of Pope Francis that I have yet seen. We are very pleased to present it here. ~ PAK
 
The «Abrahamic Family House» promoted by Pope Francis
The Great Loss: Or, the Pontificate of Jorge Bergoglio
By Vigilius[1]

Jorge Bergoglio’s pontificate is characterized by numerous ambivalences. For example, the Pope speaks out against the woke ideology, but continually receives representatives of this very milieu; he opposes “faggotry” in the seminaries and at the same time is the greatest promoter of the Church’s gay movement; he calls abortion murder and yet has his Curia Archbishop Paglia disseminate conspicuously restrained statements on this serious matter; he sends critical letters to the Synodal Way, but finally lets everything go with the Germans, while he dismisses Bishop Strickland, actively prevents the practice of the Ordo Antiquus and destroys conservative spiritual movements; he makes relativistic statements about religion and then retracts them, gives Eugenio Scalfari several interviews of extremely dubious theological content while giving catecheses that formulate opposing positions—and so on.

These ambiguities and the fact that the Pope has never formally claimed his magisterial primacy for the formulation of a heresy have often caused confusion in the conservative camp and – along with the concern not to damage the papal office—have encouraged the tendency to remain apparently nuanced despite all criticism of individual points. One of the frequently heard relativization narratives is that Francis is erratic in nature, primarily politically and practically oriented, not at all a systematic-theoretical mind and, incidentally, surrounded by bad advisors.

Now I do not wish to deny that these contradictions and inconsistencies exist. Nevertheless, I am not of the opinion that no systematic approach can be discovered in this pontificate.

There may be ambiguities in the personality of the pope himself and vestiges of tradition that emerge again and again, as well as irritatingly divergent Vatican pronouncements. I would like to leave open the question of whether and to what extent the strange incoherences are of a planned, tactical nature in order to reassure the conservatives from time to time and to contain the resistance to this pontificate. Presumably this is occasionally the case. On the whole, however, it seems to me that these are genuine confusions, but of the kind that do not happen simply due to a lack of an organizing center; they are precisely the intrinsic consequence of the system that I assume wants to completely redefine the existence of the Church and whose next consequences in an institution as old as the Catholic Church must be chaotic.

It is significant that Francis himself said that he “makes a lot of messes”, and at the same time called on others to create unrest and chaos.[2] Ultimately, however, chaos is not an end in itself, but both an inevitable consequence of the revolution and its means of self-realization. Thus, in a way, there is a revolutionary current beneath the ambiguities and the momentarily emerging traditional relics, a spiritual primary tendency that forms the actual defining center of the Bergoglian era – sometimes more, sometimes less openly apparent. One must not allow oneself to be blinded by documents such as Dignitas infinita.

“Any great thought is unjust,” says Nicolás Gómez Dávila. This is because one could of course always differentiate more, claim further accentuations, nuances and ambiguities. Nevertheless, its constitutional injustice does not invalidate the fundamental truth of the idea. Moreover, we need such thoughts, because without them we would lose our perspective and lose ourselves in the thicket of that eagerness to differentiate that is widespread in the academic field and is quite capable of differentiating until the phenomenon has disappeared and we can no longer see anything at all. It is the task of thinking to make the phenomenon as clear-cut as possible.

In the following, I would like to deal with the Bergoglian system, of whose existence I am convinced. This is by no means to say that Francis is an important theologian. He is certainly not; in truth, Jorge Bergoglio has never formulated any propositions of note. In fact, the most impressive feature of this pontificate is precisely the insistence with which Bergoglio, unscrupulous and self-assured as only mediocre minds can be, pushed an old project that he by no means invented towards its completion. Ironically, his only historical significance lies precisely in this merely catalytic effectiveness, which will weigh on his memory like a dark curse.

Fratelli tutti

There is a remarkable little speech by Francis from the early phase of his pontificate, which he spoke to his friend, the Anglican-Episcopalian clergyman Tony Palmer, who later died in an accident in 2014, on his cell phone so that Palmer could present this message to the participants of a Pentecostal congress[3]. At the beginning of this video, which presents itself as spontaneous but is nevertheless systematically planned, the Pope apologizes for not speaking English but Italian, only to follow up with a deliberate sentimental change of category, saying that he did not want to speak English or Italian at all, but “heartfelt” with “the grammar of love”.

This is brilliantly staged. Instead of rational-distinctive theological terms, which could enable an argumentative dispute and thus legitimate opposition for the sake of the question of truth, the emotional level is used, which is a clever tactical manoeuvre with which possible opponents of the substantive position advocated by Francis are delegitimized a priori and eliminated from the field. The emotionalized coordinate system established by the speaker without further ado opens up a highly moral discourse in which all objections must immediately appear hard-hearted and hurtful. Francis sets the rules of the game even for his opponents. At the same time, this “speech from the heart” corresponds precisely to the core concern presented, which is both secured and realized through the chosen rhetorical method: unity across borders and unconditional fraternity. According to the Bishop of Rome, he is already realizing both of these with what he explicitly calls his “bishop-brother Tony Palmer”. In this scenario, the critic of such emphases of unity can no longer be anything other than a villain. In his hardening, the critic disregards Pope Francis’ explicitly stated “longing to embrace” the brethren of other denominations, preferring instead those theological distinctions that the Pope explicitly and without differentiation identifies as sinful divisions.

In the further course of his speech, which is governed by the grammar of love, the Pope turns to the Old Testament story of Joseph, which forms the organizing center of his entire address. Joseph’s brothers, driven by hunger, go to Egypt to buy bread. Their money, Francis remarks with a loaded expression, is not enough for them to eat. But then they find something even more important than bread, namely reunion with their brother. “All of us have currency,” says Francis, “the currency of our culture, our history, we have a lot of cultural riches, and religious riches, and we have diverse traditions.” And now comes the big confrontation: “But we have to encounter one other as brothers.” According to the Pope, it is the “tears of love,” longing for communion, that bring us together and which are much more important than the aforementioned secondary riches of particular religious traditions, which form the inauthentic sphere of theological questions of truth and the corresponding lines of conflict. To put it more precisely: The “tears of love” do not make us brothers first and foremost, but allow us to discover the actual treasure hidden beneath the doctrinal propositions of particular traditions, namely, that we have always been brothers already.

This formulates the simple and yet extremely consequential basic axiom of the Bergoglian world view. It is dominated by the idea that universal brotherhood, beyond secondary religious traditions, is the most important principle of all for morality and concrete political action, but also for the theology and spiritual practice of individuals and the Church as a whole.

During his term of office to date, Pope Francis has expanded the guiding category of universal fraternity to include the aspect of ecological responsibility for “Mother Earth”. However, both motifs are only two sides of the same coin. In his two writings “Laudato Si” and “Laudate Deum”, concern for the planet becomes the central focus of the Church’s attention. Once again, apart from the serious problem that the Pope is here making himself the custodian of scientifically highly controversial economic and climate-ecological positions and is thus definitely overstepping the precisely defined area of magisterial competence, Francis is attempting to give the ecological paradigm theological centrality—far beyond its merely natural and ethical relevance.

This is why the Pope’s famous statements at a Focolare meeting celebrating the international day of action to raise awareness against environmental pollution, known as “Earth Day”, are so significant. When Francis proclaims here that our common humanity is the decisive factor—as when he says: “‘But I belong to this religion, or to that other one …’ That is not important!”[4]—this sentence is not remarkable because it claims that the specific religious affiliation is insignificant when it comes to the fight against environmental pollution. That would be trivial. Rather, it is relevant because Jorge Bergoglio fundamentally and unambiguously assumes that the fight against environmental pollution as an integral part of the fight for a better, i.e. a socialist world of brotherhood, is the most important concern of religion in general and that, consequently, the other differences between religious traditions are of marginal relevance.

The commitment to the idea of universal fraternity beyond particular religious traditions, established as the theological core of the church’s self-understanding and enriched by the socio-ecological idea of world transformation, forms the defining center of the Bergoglian universe. In the eyes of Jorge Bergoglio, it is, so to speak, the articulus stantis et cadentis ecclesiae that justifies the existence of the Church in the first place. The implications of this paradoxical position—that the essence of a particular tradition, i.e. the differentia specifica, consists in relativizing itself and thus negating it as such—are so monstrous for the Catholic Church that we must examine them separately in a next step. First, however, we need to make the phenomenon sufficiently visible.

How little exaggerated the assertion of this definitional center is, is shown by the fact that it has persisted throughout the entire pontificate even in such a way that—not least for political reasons—it has increasingly emerged as an all-impregnating principle. The most recent example is the Pope’s last Lenten message, in which he interprets Israel’s liberation from slavery in Egypt, returning allegorically to the Orient as he did ten years ago. The text, the reading of which can be called a true work of penance, bears the title “Through the Desert God Leads us to Freedom”.[5]

You can already guess everything, and you guess right. Pharaoh and the slave house stand for those “oppressive bonds” that deny “the brotherhood that originally binds us together”, while this brotherhood itself forms the “promised land”. There it is again, the “fraternità universale”, which is translated into German as “Geschwisterlichkeit” on the Vatican website itself and which forms the articulus stantis et cadentis ecclesiae bergogliensis. Accordingly, Francis deciphers the longing of the grumbling Israelites for the fleshpots of Egypt and the lingering reign of Pharaoh as a desire to return to “oppressive bonds”, which desire is identical to the “globalization of indifference” that, as Pope Francis explicitly reminds us, was criticized by him on his trip to the migrants in Lampedusa.

According to Jorge Bergoglio, Lent is about asserting the “dream of the promised land”—repeatedly referred to as such—against a “growth model that divides us” and “pollutes the earth, the water and the air”. However, Pharaoh’s kingdom, which is opposed to the promised land, is not only determined by economic ties and eco-ethical misconceptions, but at least as much by those ties that relate to “our position”, “tradition” or socio-cultural group. The “Lenten season” is intended to make us recognize these particular relationships that lead to inequalities, so that we can then abandon the economic, social, and religious-traditional “security of what we have already seen” in favour of moving out into the new world of “worldwide brotherhood and sisterhood”.

According to Jorge Bergoglio, this dream of the “new world” and “new humanity”, which is no longer “tied to money, certain projects, ideas, goals, our position, a tradition, or even certain people”, is nothing less than the “dream of God” himself: a dream of the “Promised Land towards which we are heading when we leave slavery”. God dreams the socialist dream of the rediscovery and reawakening of the universal fraternity that has always existed, in which the “darkness of inequalities” is dispelled and all become “companions”. It is a dream in which exclusivist claims to truth, religious dogmatics, distinctive religious community identities, and all circumscribed cultural and ethnic affiliations have lost their supposedly oppressive binding force. Freedom, on the other hand, is defined as being beyond the shackles of particularity, as identity with the generality of the cosmos of boundless brotherhood and sisterhood.

The Promised Land is realized in a processual way; we must work for it with all our strength and overcome our fixation on particular identities, which are considered to be egotistical. This means, not least, that we must fight against our temptation, coming from our need for security, to make a particular creed absolute beyond the universal fraternity that has always existed. The papal theory of fraternity makes it unavoidable that all the traditional theological beliefs must submit to it and be redefined accordingly. Any martyrdom for the sake of a creed must also be dissolved, as must any mission related to a specific creed; both will be transformed into the categories of “social commitment” and “listening dialog”, which will become the new guiding spiritual dimensions. The overcoming of “our ideas” and “our tradition” as well as the correlating classical-religious activities—in short: the overcoming of everything “backwardist” (“indietristic”) is declared to be the central religious commandment, God’s own will and mission.

It is an obvious fact that Pope Francis is an authoritarian man of power. However, my thesis is that his rule is exercised far less irrationally than is claimed in many descriptions of this pontificate. Pope Francis has a basic agenda, and it is the one I have described, which he is implementing in the Church with remarkable consistency. Francis is primarily neither a pragmatist nor a politician; in his own words, he is above all a “dreamer”. To put it less romantically: Jorge Bergoglio is primarily an ideologue.

The great loss

In the following, my aim is to shed light on the theological depth of the theory that religious traditions are only of secondary relevance, a theory that is held now even by a pope. It would presumably be difficult for many religious convictions to accept the Bergoglian theory of relativity; it is probably most compatible with Asian spiritualities. For the Catholic Church, however, it is devastating.

Crucially, it is the essential characteristic of the Catholic tradition that it does not see itself as a mere context of tradition. The tradition of the Church fundamentally understands the Church not as a structure of tradition-formations, i.e. of conscious ideas, formulas of faith, and symbolic practices, but as an inner moment of an ontological event from which these tradition formations logically emerge in the first place. Already with the texts of the New Testament, the ecclesial consciousness affirms and testifies to this decisive event of being, with which the Church stands and falls. If this traditional faith were to be replaced by faith in tradition itself, nihilism would have already taken hold and even the traditional context would disappear à la longue. If the reference to tradition is not supported by faith in the truth, i.e. in the very being of the object of Church tradition, tradition degenerates into a purely formal “traditionalism” that cannot sustain itself. It feeds on a faith that it has already lost. I know priests who were traditionalists with inquisitorial verve and enthusiastically celebrated the Old Rite, until their long-standing unbelief, which was obscuring itself in their own eyes, broke through so massively that they gave up their office and became equally hardened ideological gay activists. The two phenomena are only seemingly contradictory. In truth, they are merely different manifestations of identical nihilism.

The event to which the traditional faith of the Church fundamentally refers is that God has constituted a new, and therefore supernatural, context of being in Christ in an undeducible act of grace that reaches infinitely beyond the mere possibilities of created nature. “If anyone is in Christ, he is a new creature” (2 Cor 5:17). The novelty of this new being was described with great boldness by the Church Fathers as the theosis of man, in which man remains a creature, but in grace is lifted infinitely beyond the sphere of mere creation and receives such an inwardly transforming share in divine life, in God’s own holiness, that the mystic St. John of the Cross can compare man transformed in Christ to a log of wood which, when placed in a blazing fire, can hardly be separated from the ambient glowing embers. In the more prosaic language of scholastic theology, this means that the Holy Spirit becomes the principle of our spiritual acts and, in the visio beatifica, even of the human body.

As Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, and John Duns Scotus already asserted[6], the human spirit is constitutionally characterized by an “appetitus innatus” that is oriented towards the supernatural life, which finds its inner completion in the unveiled contemplation of God. Although the desiderium in visionem beatificam is inherent in the human being, created nature is never able to achieve this supernatural goal of its own natural longing by itself. Moreover, nature has no right to its perfection; the gift of the goal remains pure grace, also in the sense of complete lack of entitlement. In other words, it is precisely part of man’s essential nature to be so dispossessed of himself and so lacking in autonomy that he is completely dependent, materially and formally, on an external, unavailable freedom for the perfection of his own nature, which may have mercy, but can also refuse this mercy. A relationship of dependence is formulated here that cannot be conceived in a more radical way.

What is of great relevance in our context is that the Catholic Church does not assume an extrinsic stance toward the supernatural being-in-Christ to which she bears witness. In her proclamation, she does not simply deal with something that is essentially different from herself, but rather, as I said earlier, understands herself as an inner moment of the ontological event outlined above. The new being-in-Christ is the Church herself. As his Spirit-filled body, she is nothing less than the supernatural communion of life with the incarnate Son, from whom, as her congregating supernatural head, she is the One, Holy, and Catholic, in which God’s Trinitarian communion of life is revealed to us. “Extra Christum nulla salus” is factually convergent to “extra ecclesiam nulla salus”.

Accordingly, human fraternity and the “unity of the human race” are indeed central topoi of the Christian faith, but they are so only in the context of this supernatural connection, which must be strictly observed. Leaving aside once again the question of whether it makes sense to say that we are always already brothers qua human beings and form a human family for reasons of original sin theology alone, the category of brotherhood becomes a substantially relevant dimension for the Catholic only under the supernatural consideration of the ecclesiologically formed being-in-Christ. It is entirely consistent with the New Testament that, for John of the Cross, even the bodily brotherhood of mankind is ontologically a radically secondary dimension.

Against this background, it becomes understandable why the Bergoglian position is destructive for the Church. It is destructive because the Pope wrongly determines the ontological status of tradition, and he wrongly determines it because he wrongly determines the actual object of faith. Francis allows the Church of Tradition to fall seamlessly into the category of logical subordination, because for him it is nothing other than a tradition—one among many. In this reductionistic sense, Bergoglio is a radical “traditionalist”: there is no reality that corresponds to the traditional confessions. For Jorge Bergoglio, they are all mere ideas and, in principle, arbitrary practices; one could also say that the tradition of the Church is a mere self-circulating discourse whose claim to truth was invented by people who, due to psychologically explainable needs for demarcation, like to lull themselves into a sense of security and construct detached clerical special worlds in which they perform liturgical operas in lace rochets.

The modern project of naturalizing Christianity

As a result of this pontificate, the immanentist propaganda of natural fraternity theology has become unrestrained and ubiquitous in the Church. Nevertheless, Jorge Bergoglio did not invent it. The project of naturalizing Christianity goes back to the 18th century and extends from the Enlightenment through German Idealism and liberal Protestantism as well as the various modernist propositions of the 19th century and politicizing theologies of the 20th century to the present day. One of its current manifestations is the idea, which has long been popular in theological circles, of viewing the New Testament as a mere internal continuation of the Old Testament and—as the Freiburg fundamental theologian Magnus Striet significantly likes to do—speaking primarily of the “Jewish Jesus”[7].  One could call this the Old Testamentization of the New Testament.

The punchline of this process is to strip the promises of salvation in the New Testament of their supernatural and therefore Christological character and to make Israel’s primarily this-worldly religious relationship absolute. In the Old Testament, God’s saving action essentially refers to inner-worldly dimensions: the one blessed by God has a long earthly life and has male offspring; the people of Israel are given a certain geographical territory as their homeland; the people’s lives are ordered by the divine will made into a legal code; God inflicts physical punishment on Israel when it is disobedient, just as he also frees Israel from earthly bondage; he stands by the people in battle with other peoples, and so on. Accordingly, Yahweh is identified as the true God in Jewish theology by the fact that, unlike the gods of the other nations, he actually helps—he proves his power empirically.

It was above all the Church Fathers who developed a pioneering Christological hermeneutic of the Old Testament. The Old Testament texts were primarily read prefiguratively and allegorically, as the Church still does today, for example in the liturgy of the Easter Vigil: the sacrifice of Abraham refers to the sacrifice of Christ, the crossing of the Red Sea is a symbol of baptism, the Promised Land is the eternal communion of life with the Risen One—and so on. In other words, this interpretation raises the theology of Israel and the covenant made at Sinai to that actually supernatural level of the relationship between God and the world, which is ontologically constituted exclusively in Christ, i.e. in the “unio hypostatica”. Israel as such is thus lifted into the Church as the mystical body of Christ. There is a context of reference between the two testaments, but it is organized in a strictly Christocentric way.

The much-vaunted sublimation of the Old Testament image of God in the discourse of the New Testament therefore does not mean that the New Testament God no longer bears any dark traits. In essence, the sublimation consists rather in the described process, namely, that the theological sphere of the Old Testament becomes a truly supernatural and mystical one: The center of the salvific action is the inner communion of life of man with God opened up by the gratia Christi, which has the visio beatifica as its essential goal. At the same time, from an epistemic point of view, this means that the Old Testament cannot be adequately understood by itself, but that Christ alone is its decisive hermeneutical approach.

In the course of the development of modern theology, this interpretative relationship has now been reversed insofar as the determination of Jesus’ salvific action and that of Jesus’ very being is undertaken in a merely linear continuum with the basic theological approach to salvation in the Old Testament. This means that the prefiguration context described above, which forms a peculiar complex of continuity and discontinuity, is abandoned in this new hermeneutic. However, this means nothing less than the loss of the theology of supernaturalism that has characterized the Church’s tradition of interpreting Holy Scripture, as seen especially in the liturgy. However, the intention behind this operation is by no means a specifically sought proximity to the faith of Israel. Rather, the Old Testament is strategically used for the sake of a general axial shift in the definition of the actual object of Christian faith. The aim is an inner-worldly Christianity whose focus is on empirical, natural-moral, psychological, and political contexts. As in the Pope’s Lenten address, God appears on this horizon only as the one who wants to bring about a changed world among us through our commitment, and to improve life in this world.

Recently, the blogger “Caminante” published a text entitled “They have robbed us of religion.”[8] Caminante refers directly to the new Archbishop of Buenos Aires, Jorge García Cuerva, recently appointed by Pope Francis, who formulates an Easter greeting in a video published on the website of the Argentinian Bishops’ Conference. This episcopal sermon is characterized above all by the fact that he indiscriminately conflates the theological definition of Easter with the Old Testament Exodus and Passover. Caminante states that the bishop “does not mention the Lord Jesus Christ at all. He has been erased from the horizon of religion because He is politically incorrect. The Primate speaks only of a humanistic God, to which Voltaire and the fiercest representatives of anti-Christianity would have consented without hesitation.”

This episcopal address is one of the countless manifestations of the naturalization theology described above. It is only logical that the bishop, who is theologically very close to the incumbent pope and did not come to his post by chance, no longer speaks of Christ’s substitutionary atoning death, but only of “liberation” and the advent of a more just world, which he sees symbolized in Israel’s exodus from Egypt and, merely in a very vague sense, in Easter.

The extent to which this program has already been implemented in the Church through Pope Bergoglio’s catalytic effectiveness can be seen, to take some examples, in the equally emblematic events I would like to mention briefly. For example, the chief organizer of last year’s World Youth Day in Portugal, whom Francis has since made a cardinal, said that he did not want to convert anyone to Christ and the Church, but that the only essential thing was that everyone should simply be there and be accepted as they are in their natural state of existence. The decisive aspect is natural, boundless fraternity, which, according to Francis, implies ecclesiological inclusionism: “all, all, all” belong. The newly appointed Bishop of Hong Kong speaks in a similar vein, denying any proselytizing and missionary work, i.e. any Christocentric ambition of the Church, and instead speaks of only wanting to proclaim the all-encompassing divine love and mercy that extends unconditionally to all—just as Jesus supposedly did.

And since Mariology has been a function of Christology since the beginnings of the Church, the Vatican’s chief Mariologist, Father Cecchin, has now also demystified the Mother of God and, following the current magisterium of Pope Francis, adapted her to the emancipatory parameters prevailing today and to the transcultural ideal of reconciliation. Overall, according to Cecchin’s view, the essence of the figures of Jesus and Mary is to serve us fraternally as friendly models for a happy and fulfilled life, beyond disturbing messages[9]. The supernatural cosmos, from the talk of Mary’s mediation of grace to the theology of atonement, no longer appears in substance here. Thus, in all these phenomena, the same basic process of naturalization and secularization of originally supernaturally understood theological beliefs always appears, which have long since become embarrassing to those who would be called ex officio to proclaim and defend them.

Agere contra ecclesiam

Calling Jorge Bergoglio an ideologue may be a correct predication, but it is an objectifying attribution. It should never be overlooked that Francis does not see himself as an ideologue, but rather as an executor of the divine will, as Gladius Dei, who must take up arms against the enemies he has identified of the divine dream of the promised land. The pharaoh-like, divisive “backwardists” with their stubborn claims to truth must be fought. It is not without irony: Jorge Bergoglio believes he has a divine mission, and one that consists precisely in the abolition of the mission. Bergoglio is fighting the last of all wars, which consists precisely in the eradication of the enemies of peace, i.e. the tradition-obsessed enemies of universal fraternity, and this war to end all conflicts of truth and inequalities is, according to Carl Schmitt, the cruelest of all, because it must declare the opponent of unconditional, total harmony to be a moral monster[10]. It is a papal jihad, which alone can explain the constant rage against the representatives of religious dogmatism. That these representatives are the true enemies of God follows necessarily from the Bergoglian orthodoxy of natural fraternity universalism, which must now regard everything that was previously considered orthodox in the Church as heresy contrary to God and burn it at the stake of tenderness.

It seems to me that only the concept of Jorge Bergoglio as this Gladius Dei can adequately explain his political acts. The theological accusation made by opponents of this pontificate—that Francis is acting against the Church—is raised by Bergoglio himself, and intentionally seriously, against his critics. This is the “great inversion” of which Caminante spoke.[11] That is why I do not share Archbishop Viganò’s view that Jorge Bergoglio, on assuming the papal office, personally refused his consent to desire, with the office, what the Church desires: that it be used for the Church’s good. In no way does Francis deliberately want something bad for the Church. For that to be the case, Francis would have to be aware of the correct concept in principle, and consciously act against it. The opposite is true: he only wants the very best for the Church as he understands it, and to this end he makes full use of the possibilities of his office. He wants to save the Church precisely from the hands of those whose faith he, like Dom Hélder Câmara, considers to be nothing more than an ideological superstructure, an anti-Jesuanic invention of elitist, rigorist people who like to float in baroque worlds instead of taking care of global socialism, the promotion of gay conditions, environmental protection and climate change, as well as shipping as many Muslim migrants as possible to Europe, as the Gospel supposedly demands in the interpretation of universal fraternity theology.

Conversely, against this background, it not only becomes clear why Francis so vehemently campaigns against people like Cardinal Burke or Bishop Strickland, while Bishops Georg Bätzing and Franz-Josef Overbeck are still in office and can basically implement their agenda unhindered, but it also makes the Pope’s solidarity with the global financial elites more plausible. Recently, José Arturo Quarracino published a text in which he pointed out that Francis is not a Peronist, but rather a partisan of globalists such as George Soros.[12] Whatever the truth may be about Bergoglio’s repeatedly claimed Peronism, it is undeniable that Bergoglio has collaborated with the globalist elites. This is evidenced not only by the various political acts, such as the establishment of a rigid Vatican vaccination regime during the so-called “coronavirus pandemic” and the relevant appointments to the papal academies, but above all by Bergoglian theology itself. Whether Bergoglio’s assessment of these globalists and alleged “philanthropists” is correct remains to be seen. However, he obviously assumes that these people, with their global programs of inclusive capitalism, the ecological turnaround, climate protection, overcoming national borders, the promotion of a one-world religion, etc., are working on precisely the same project that is formulated in his own theory of universal fraternity and in his understanding of the Church as the custodian of the “promised land” of this natural fraternity.

The abandoned Christ

If one takes the Pope’s statements seriously, the conclusion is unavoidable that in his spiritual cosmos there is no longer that supernatural being-in-Christ for which the martyrs went to their deaths; for which the missionaries, starting with Paul, traveled the world under the harshest privations; for and by which the hermits turned their backs on the world and founded the contemplative religious life; that supernatural being-in-Christ that brought forth the sacramental priestly ministry as well as the liturgies and magnificent church architecture in which the supernatural context of life is communicated and celebrated. However, this also inevitably means that for Jorge Bergoglio, not only does the Church no longer exist as the mystical body of Christ, but fundamentally Christ himself no longer exists.

Eugenio Scalfari claimed after one of his interviews with Francis – nor was it denied by the Vatican—that the Pope did not believe in the divinity of Jesus Christ. In the context of Jorge Bergoglio’s actually verifiable statements, I consider it highly plausible that Scalfari is reporting correctly here. How could Francis believe in the divinity of Jesus if it is precisely this theological predicate that decisively makes the theology of universal natural brotherhood beyond secondary religious traditions impossible?

If Jesus is the Christ, the second divine person incarnate, then his work cannot be aimed at anything other than the constitution of that supernatural relationship of life which consists in the mystical unity with himself opened up by sanctifying grace. Then he himself, and he alone in person, is the divine truth; then his death is a vicarious act of atonement to make this very unity possible; then the question of eternal salvation and perdition is decided by him alone; then he himself is the central object of worship, and before him every knee must bow. If he is the Christ, then the sacraments are indispensable as his own action on man for salvation; then the Church is both the central mediator of salvation and the supernatural communion with Christ himself; then there must be a mission aimed at converting all men to him as the Christ. If he is the Christ, then there can be no ecclesial discourse on God without Christology, because he is the only way to the divinity, which, in its inner mystery of life, is revealed and made accessible only in him. If he is the Christ, then Mary is the Mother of God and has the sole task of leading us to her Son.

No one-world religion can be made with this Christ; in his absolutist claim about himself, he refuses to be relativized in any way. He is absolutely incomparable. In short: if Jesus is the Christ, then all the articulations, from the sentences quoted from Jorge Bergoglio to the countless statements by Bergoglian bishops, are logically impossible. Conversely, this means that these statements presuppose the conscious, albeit explicitly unacknowledged, negation of classical Christology, provided the gentlemen are still reasonably sane. The whole rhetoric of mercy and apparent closeness to Jesus in the Bergoglian interpretation of the New Testament cannot conceal this. Basically, in these exegeses Jesus appears—as he did with Goethe—as the authoritative opponent of Christ.

This brings us to a shocking finding. In contrast to popes such as John XXII or Honorius, who misunderstood individual elements of church dogma, Francis has the chutzpah to take on the whole of church tradition—to change the sign before the equation. Under such an ideology, the Catholic Church must completely collapse. The church of Jorge Bergoglio no longer has anything to do with the Church of which the tradition speaks; it is, in substance, something radically different.

From the perspective of the original Church, Francis should never elevate the natural fraternity category above the tradition of the Church, because in doing so he would only perpetuate a context that Paul calls—explicitly also with regard to questions of interpersonality—the “schemata tou kosmou toutou” (1 Cor 7:31). However, these forms of the old world are destined by God to become in Christ that supernatural context of brotherhood, that is, that new creation which the Catholic Church mediates in its sacramental acts and is already itself in intenso. Only She is the “promised land”. The work of a pope should be directed with all his strength precisely towards this dimension. While God himself is concerned with divinizing man in supernatural grace and bringing forth a new heaven and a new earth, the narrow-minded papal view focuses on the old world and degrades the new world—which has been the subject of Church tradition for two millennia—to a matter of secondary relevance. This is truly grotesque.

At the same time, the Church must draw the Pope’s attention to the fact that the deconstruction of Her mission, which the Pope places under the suspicious term of “proselytism,” fixates man on the old world, thus inhumanely depriving him of that supernatural sphere towards which he is precisely ordered in order to fulfil his humanity. Natural fraternity theology does not satisfy the aforementioned “appetitus innatus,” i.e. the actual hunger that is proper to man as man. This is why only the classical mission of the Church truly loves man.

However, after long attempts at repression and whitewashing, we must now finally admit that the theological tradition in which Francis stands has always intended precisely this transmutation. Incidentally, it would be an important undertaking to examine precisely what role the three relevant predecessor popes actually played in this process. This is much more complex, especially with regard to Joseph Ratzinger, than the conservative idolatries of Benedict would like to admit. One only has to ask oneself how it can be explained that after the joint pontificate of John Paul II and Benedict XVI, which lasted well over three decades, what we have now been suffering for 11 years could happen. This cannot be due only to poor personnel policy decisions and a lack of psychological judgment.

Whatever the reason, the Church has reached a state in which Christ has become offensive and embarrassing, and not just to many ministers. The spirit of the supernatural mystery has—with strong papal assistance—largely disappeared from the Church, which has degenerated into a pigsty. The Lord will not put up with this denial by his own Church on earth.

 

[1] Starting soon, the author runs his own blog, where essays on theological and philosophical topics will appear regularly: www.einsprueche.com

[2] https://katholisches.info/2024/04/02/der-abschied-von-franziskus-hat-begonnen-und-auch-das-erinnerungsnarrativ/; https://www.herder.de/communio/theologie/wie-geht-es-weiter-wenn-das-franziskus-pontifikat-endet-die-unruhe-waechst/; https://www.katholisch.de/artikel/2537-ich-hoffe-es-gibt-ein-durcheinander

[3] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NHbEWw7l_Ek

[4] https://katholisches.info/2016/04/29/earth-day-und-eine-welt-religion-papst-franziskus-religionszugehoerigkeit-ist-nicht-wichtig/

[5] https://www.vatican.va/content/francesco/de/messages/lent/documents/20231203-messaggio-quaresima2024.html

[6] Cf. Rupert Johannes Mayer: «Zum desiderium naturale visionis Dei nach Johannes Duns Scotus, and Thomas de Vio Cajetan: Eine Anmerkung zum Denken Henri De Lubacs,» in: Angelicum 85 (2008), 737-763.

[7] Striet is an excellent example of the theological tendency described here. There is nothing left of the classical Christology of the Church in Striet’s work. In Striet’s bleak attempts at theory, it, like all traditional convictions in general, is leveled into the Enlightenment flatlands. Cf. e.g. Walter Homolka, Magnus Striet, Christologie auf dem Prüfstand, Jesus der Jude—Christus der Erlöser, Freiburg 2019.

[8] https://caminante-wanderer.blogspot.com/2024/04/nos-robaron-la-religion.html

[9] https://katholisches.info/2023/10/16/bestimmte-bilder-von-maria-sind-heute-nicht-mehr-nachvollziehbar/

[10] Carl Schmitt, Der Begriff des Politischen, Berlin 92015, 35.

[11] https://caminante-wanderer.blogspot.com/2023/10/la-gran-inversion.html

[12] https://katholisches.info/2024/01/31/das-politische-engagement-von-jorge-mario-bergoglio-ad-maiorem-soros-gloriam/

THIS IS WHY AFRICA GETS THE LEADERS IT DESERVES !!!!!!!!!

THIS IS WHY AFRICA GETS THE LEADERS IT DESERVES !!!!!!!!!
Author: Matthew Parris

17 August 2002

There was a woman who had whipped her hair into a sea of caramel spikes, which is hard to do with tight black African curls. There was a woman who had achieved a chemical blonde. There was a man in zips and a black leather coat – black on black – a batik skirt and new trainers, [ = sneakers (US)] top of the range. There were men who had decorated their heads by mowing lines around the cranium, one in a crinkly, multicoloured crepe-cotton shirt and rainbow plastic winkle-picker shoes, impossibly tight, cap worn backwards. He was trying to get upgraded into business class, inventing ludicrous stories.

The Englishwoman doing the check-in for Air Gabon at Gatwick was having none of it, and stood her ground. She had 36 passengers to check in for the flight from London to Libreville, via Brussels. It took her little more than three hours.

This was not her fault. Her passengers were waBenzi , the term used across West Africa to describe the successful: the people with money, power or influence; the people who drive Mercedes-Benzes. There being few roads surfaced or properly maintained outside the squalid towns and cities, they do not drive far, but they drive big.

My fellow passengers at Gatwick struck me as worth describing less as an excuse in travel writing (we all have our airport stories) than as an object lesson in the politics of development. For this was the elite, the commercial and administrative class through whom (short of the re-impositon of colonial rule) both aid and advice from countries such as ours must be channeled. These were the rich. They must have been. They were able to fly to and from Europe. Some were from Gabon, many from Congo, and all had been shopping.

The word “shopping” hardly does justice to the industrial scale of this little crowd’s acquisitions. I have seldom in one place seen a collection of luggage at the same time so ostentatious, so expensive and so gross. They were leather or fabric-covered suitcases as high as a child, and more cube-shaped than case-shaped.

And everyone kept pushing in. We started in a queue – three whites scattered among the Africans – but by the time the whites got anywhere near the check-in desk we were the last three in the line. The man in skirt and trainers and his enormous wife simply barged. Others sidled. Some struck up loud conversations with those at the front of the queue, then pretended to be positioned there.

A man in dark glasses (indoors at night) and two noisy female companions held up the whole check-in for about half an hour with an argument about how much excess baggage his party had (a mountain) then, failing to fool the check-in agent, affected to saunter off with his women and talk to someone else – to show he didn’t care – leaving his documents half-processed on the counter. This delayed the agent’s work until she coolly shoved his documents aside and received the next passenger – whereupon Dark Glasses, alarmed, pushed in front of a middle-aged man of scholarly demeanor and his unpushy wife – infuriating the couple to the point of pushing back in again. Meanwhile Crinkly Shirt, having succeeded in pushing in so brutally that Decorated Head protested, came over all loud-laughs-and-hand-shakes and “what a card-I-am, eh!” – which, such was its swagger and sudden bonhomie, worked. Suddenly, everyone was wreathed in smiles. Another cheater got away with it.

At last they were all ready for passport control. And of course after that they all got lost again in the duty-free shops. The flight was delayed while missing passengers were paged, latecomers sauntering up to the departure gate with yet more purchases in big bags, leading to more arguments about hand luggage and more attempts to cheat.

Found out, the capacity of these people to affect innocent shock and apparent ignorance of every rule was astonishing. The airline attempted a staggered boarding procedure but nobody took any notice, stampeding at the gate and onto the plane, whereupon a handful more passengers tried to pretend that they were business class and had to be moved from these seats, each professing the same total surprise at their eviction as they had shown at the news that flying involves weight restrictions.

The Dutch crew handled this with bemusement. Though our airline was called Air Gabon, the plane and its captain and crew seemed to have been hired from a Netherlands charter company. All the stewards looked like Tintin and showed as amused a command of Third World chaos as Herve’s young Belgian journalist.

One sensed among this European crew an unvoiced – professionally unvoiceable – scorn for these passengers. The crew was resigned to such behaviour and they were paid to handle it. One sensed, too, the calm confidence we have when observing the vanity of fools, that they will not have the last laugh.

We took off, landing in Brussels 38 minutes later. Decorated Head complained loudly, to the admiration of his women, that there had been no refreshments: “Ce ne’est pas gentil,” he said to a stewardess. Dark Glasses was prevented from disembarking with the departing passengers to get some beer. On his behalf, Crinkly Shirt began a huge row, storming up and down the aisle, shouting and swearing that Belgium was a racist country and lunging at the stewardess as if to hit her. At one point, he yelled that he would get a gun “and blow this plane up”, and soon had a faction among the passengers muttering and interjecting in his support; but the Tintins were unmoved, everybody calmed down, and we were soon airborne.

Truculence turned back to docility as suddenly as it had flared up, supper was served, Crinkly Shirt banged his tray and demanded more beer, and soon everybody was asleep. When we landed six hours later, all the passengers clapped. We escaped into Libreville, a gentle mess of a place. Anger, jollity, meekness, swagger, obedience, had passed across these waBenzi like sun and rain racing along an island, with such speed: momentarily warm, momentarily cruel, suddenly kind, suddenly innocent, suddenly corrupt…. I tried hard not to quote to myself that famous line of Kipling’s and I won’t here. These were only the regular waBenzi, perhaps trying too hard. The super-waBenzi would have been flying on Air France, business class, from their boltholes in Paris and Nice. They are less conspicuous. Those are the waBenzi with whom governments deal. These – economy clas on Air Gabon with me – were the ones whom businessmen, aid workers, doctors and travel agents must face.

From the picture, the object lesson, I have tried here to paint. I would like to draw your attention to a detail I think important. With the broad view – of the volatile, sometimes brutal and sometimes rapacious people who have an unfortunate habit of getting to the top in Africa – I think we are pretty familiar. With the warmth and talent – the fortitude, the ingenuity and the huge likeability of the little people, the common people, of Africa – no-body who travels there can fail to be familiar. So we tell ourselves that by some tremendous mischance this most worthwhile of human races is persistently badly led.

But is it mischance? I had watched Crinkly Shirt barging the queue with growing fury. When he succeeded I hardened my heart against him. Any European would. It would be hard thereafter ever to like or trust this man again. This was a white man’s reaction. His cheating and bullying had also annoyed and disadvantaged his fellow Africans.

But when, having won, he turned to his black victims, all smiles, joshed with them and held out an arm to shake hands, their frostiness melted. This fellow was a winner. He was behaving in a kingly manner. They were on his side again – what a bloke! Resentment fled, to be replaced by a wish to be part of the top dog’s gang. That is how the common people of Africa let themselves down; by letting their own leaders let them down. I’m afraid an instinct for justice requires a certain meanness of spirit, an ungenerosity, an unwillingness to forgive. It may also involve a resentment or begrudging of power. Such qualities are not entirely likeable.

The passengers on Air Gabon forgave their friend. He will therefore do it again. I am not confident about the New Partnership for Africa’s Development in which the Prime Minister is putting so much trust. I wish he and Clare Short had been with me in that queue.

Sobre por qué la cultura occidental es adolescente

(Original en inglés aquí)

Me gusta mucho «El código cultural» de Clotaire Rapaille. Este es un libro divertido y revelador sobre las culturas del mundo y, principalmente, sobre la cultura estadounidense. Nunca he olvidado su observación de que la cultura estadounidense es una cultura adolescente. Lo explica de una manera que es demasiado larga para escribirla aquí pero es muy convincente. Si quieres una buena lectura, te la recomiendo totalmente.

He pensado mucho en eso porque la cultura americana ha exportado esta adolescencia a toda la cultura occidental y lo veo en mi país. Mientras que los niños no tienen libertad ni responsabilidad, los adultos tienen toda la libertad y toda la responsabilidad. Los adolescentes quieren toda la libertad sin ninguna responsabilidad. Por eso se rebelan contra sus padres mientras asumen que sus padres los ayudarán si las consecuencias de su libertad salen mal.

Esta es la etapa de nuestra cultura occidental y proviene de la Ilustración. La Ilustración habla de libertad y derechos pero no de deberes y responsabilidades. ¿Cuántos políticos o gente normal conoces que hablen de derechos? ¿Cuantos conoces que hablen de deberes? La proporción es de aproximadamente un millón a cero. Así que la Ilustración es una ideología/religión adolescente. Fueron necesarios dos siglos para que se afianzara, porque el pueblo estadounidense siguió el cristianismo, que es una religión con deberes. Estos deberes cristianos impregnaban la sociedad, del mismo modo que el énfasis confuciano en los deberes impregna la sociedad china. El cristianismo y el confucianismo son religiones/ideologías para adultos.

Pero, desde los años 60, las élites lograron lo que habían deseado durante siglos: desarraigar el cristianismo de la población estadounidense y sustituirlo por la ideología de la Ilustración (en su última versión: el progresismo). Desde entonces, la población occidental ha revertido a un estado de perpetua adolescencia.

La gente habla de infantilización pero no es así. Los niños están felices de hacer lo que les dicen. Los occidentales quieren derechos sin deberes. La sociedad occidental está estructurada para favorecer esta adolescencia, desempeñando el Estado el papel de los padres. Por ejemplo, «¡Sé libre! ¡Fornica! ¡Es tu derecho! ¿Estás embarazada? ¡No tienes responsabilidad! Aborta»

En la mayoría de las sociedades la adolescencia no existe. Se pasa de ser un niño a ser un adulto con todos los derechos y responsabilidades, a través de un rito de iniciación (por ejemplo, perseguir un león). En el caso de las mujeres, el rito de iniciación es el matrimonio. En nuestra sociedad occidental la adolescencia va desde los 10 años hasta los 40 años como mínimo, pero yo he visto a gente con 80 años ser mentalmente adolescentes. Estos son los frutos de la Ilustración.

About why the Western culture is adolescent

I really like «The Culture Code» by Clotaire Rapaille. This is a fun and insightful book about world cultures, and, mostly, about American culture. I have never forgotten its observation that American culture is an adolescent culture. He explains it in a way that is too long to write here but it is very convincing. If you want a good reading, I fully recommend it.

I have thought a lot about that because American culture has exported this adolescence to the entire Western culture and I see it in my country. While kids have no freedom and no responsibility, adults have all the freedom and all responsibility. Teens or adolescents want all the freedom without any responsibility. So they rebel against their parents while assuming their parents will help them if the consequences of their freedom go wrong.

This is the stage of our Western culture and comes from the Enlightenment. The Enlightenment talks about freedom and rights but not about duties and responsibilities. How many politicians or normal people do you know that speak about rights? How many do you know that speak about duties? The score is about one million to zero. So the Enlightenment is an adolescent ideology/religion. It took two centuries for it to take hold, because American people followed Christianity, which is a religion with duties. These Christian duties permeated society, like the Confucian emphasis on duties permeates Chinese society. Christianity and Confucianism are adult religions/ideologies.

But, since the 60s, the elites achieved what they had wanted for centuries: uproot Christianity from the American population and replace it with the Enlightenment ideology (in its last version: liberalism). For then on, Western population has returned to a state of perpetual adolescence.

People talk about infantilization but it is not so. Children are happy to do what they are told. Western people want rights without duties. Western society is structured to encourage this adolescence, with the State taking the role of parents. For example, «Be free! Fornicate! It is your right! You are pregnant? No responsibility! Abort»

In most societies, adolescence does not exist. You go from being a kid to being an adult with all rights and responsibilities, through a rite of passage (for example, chasing a lion). In the case of women, the rite of passage is marriage. In our Western society, adolescence goes from the age of 10 to the age of 40 at least, but I have seen 80 years old to be mentally adolescent. These are the fruits of the Enlightenment.

Why the West did go to hell (IV): The political cause

What should be explained

Restlessness

Opposition to natural law

Script

Not talking about spiritual things

Leftism works for the powerful. In other societies, powerful were restricted because of a rigid justification.

It is sold as an expansion of rights. But it is an slavement.

The cause as a moral crusade.

Overton window

Benefits that a cause brings

Why causes go in a unique direction

The new religion is a cemetery of causes

Summary of the previous installments

We have seen in previous installments that the official religion of the Western civilization is leftism: a religion with absolute goods (feminism, multiculturalism, diversity, etc.) and absolute evils (patriarchy, white supremacism, sexism, racism, homophobia).

Although liberalism (the religion of freedom, equality and rights) is often mentioned as the official ideology of the Western society, this is only a rhetorical ploy. Liberalism, as a relativistic religion, can  justify anything but it is only used to justify leftism.

Western society is composed by the financial rulers, the managers (or clerks) and the serfs. The managers and the serfs who adhere to leftism are called «the clients» (in a Roman sense). Leftism is only the rationalization of the parasitical behavior of the rulers and the clients. It exists to justify taking good things from the general population and giving good things to the rulers and the clients.

These «good things» are money, power and psychological well-being. We will call them «benefits». So this change means the impoverishment, enslavement and mental health decline of the general population. We will call this «the disempowerment of the population».

But some things have been left unexplained: why this direction towards parasitism coincides with the direction towards the opposite direction of obvious reality and natural law.

Of course, some explanation given by some bloggers is that the rulers are, in reality, controlled by evil spiritual entities, and I agree with this. But Satan often uses other people and material processes to do evil (the same way God uses secondary causes to do good). Here we are interested in these processes: how demons use the weakness of people and society to take society farther and farther away from obvious reality and the natural law.

The political cause

How do Leftism justifies this taking of good things from the general population and giving good things to the rulers and the client. This justification is based on the concept of «the political cause».

A «political cause» is an initiative to introduce a new dogma into the leftist religion. Since the leftist religion is a religion about society, a political cause is  an initiative to change society in some aspect. This change takes benefits from the general population and gives benefits to the rulers and the clients of leftism.

As we have seen, most of the population gets along with this because this change is sold as something good and justified based on liberalism (it is said that this change will produce more freedom, more equality and more rights). The «political cause» is perceived by its supporters as a «moral crusade»: a fight of good against evil. That is, a fight of the good people to remove some aspect of society that is considered evil.

The goal is to remove this aspect of society so the society works the same way but without this alleged evil. There is no understanding of Chesterton’s fence. There is no concept that some things perceived as evils can be preventing greater evils. Almost always, if the cause succeeds and that aspect of the society is removed, greater evils are produced, which can be addressed by new political causes in a cycle of destruction of the society.

The most important causes have been: the abolition of slavery, the social gospel, the feminine suffrage, the illegalization of alcohol, the second-wave feminism, civil rights movement, LGBTI causes, the cause for the uncontrolled immigration and its legalization and  the environmental cause. The movement to restrict movement and rights under Covid can be seen as a short-lived cause: it was expressed in moral terms and as a fight of good against evil, altruism against egoism.

Some of these causes span other smallest causes. So feminism has a cause about equality in the workplace, removing of social stigma of female promiscuity, divorce, abortion, etc. And some other movements can be political cause in the future: incest, pedophilia, polyamory or reparations for black people.

The process of introduction of a political cause

Political causes involve finding a behavior that is marginalized by the society (normally, for good reason) and mainstreaming it and eventually making it desirable.

In a society, there are always marginalized behaviors and the definition of a political causes begins when intellectuals (working in universities, think tanks, writers, humanitarian funds, etc.) create a theory that justifies the people doing these behaviors as «oppressed» groups. The organizations and projects where the  intellectuals work are paid by the financial rulers, who have the veto power through the simple method of not funding ideas that go against them .

Then, the ones working or studying in these organizations (especially, the graduates of the universities) get hired by the government, NGOs, schools, corporations and media and propagate this political cause to the rest of society. This is a simplified description but you can find a real example of this propagation mechanism here

Phases of implementation of a political cause

Since political causes involve the mainstreaming of a marginalized behavior, this behavior goes through all the phases of the Overton Window:

Inexistent or marginal. The cause does not exist for citizens (LGBTQ in the Middle Ages) or it only exists among marginal groups (LGBTQ in the 60s)

Growing. The cause is adopted by the powers that be and starts conquering society. It goes through all the phases of the Overton window. Starts being a minority cause but increases until ending up as a cause publicly adopted by the majority of the population.

Indisputable. The cause is publicly adopted by the entire society. It does not mean that everybody supports it. In fact, the majority of society may privately reject it: this is the phenomenon of the “law of silence” or “preference falsification”. However, the ones that don’t support it have to be silent, since publicly going against the cause implies being marginalized, persecuted and labelled as an evil person.

There are two kinds of indisputable causes:

Finished. The cause has obtained all its objectives. For example, the legalization of divorce. Being indisputable and having reached all its objectives, the cause stops being a cause and its effects are integrated in the normal functioning of society.

Chronic. The cause is indisputable but it has not obtained all its objectives, because these objectives are not possible. For example, equality between men and women, because science shows that there are biologically different. Of course, societies try to convince themselves that chronic causes are achievable, even if it is a matter of centuries.

We won’t enter here about the techniques to manipulate this Overton window because they are well know. Use of education, government, corporations and media are paramount. Elevating the political cause as an obvious reality and moral good (that is, the opposite from the truth) is necessary.  As a result, the ones that oppose to the political cause are labelled as ignorant and/or evil.

Why the political cause succeeds

The political cause succeeds because it produces many benefits (money, power and psychological benefits) to the ones that support it (the rulers and the clients). The rulers have the power to define the political cause but the managers have to implement it in the public realm. The clients in general (managers and leftist serfs) are going to ensure that the political cause is present in the private realm.

Los beneficios que proporciona una causa se dividen entre beneficios tangibles (materiales y legales) y beneficios intangibles (psicológicos).

Los beneficios tangibles (materiales y legales) que se derivan son obvios:

1. [Partidarios] [No indiscutible] En la clase alta, está el deseo de poder y dinero. Esto incluye a políticos que defienden la causa, empresarios que se benefician de ella, élites que la usan para aumentar su poder. Para esto, estas personas deben presentarse como los que luchan por que una causa triunfe, por lo que esta no puede ser indiscutible.

2. [Partidarios] [No finalizada] En las clases media y baja, está el deseo de subvenciones, ayudas económicas y puestos de trabajo justificados por la causa (por ejemplo, como Director General de la Mujer o trabajadora social para mujeres inmigrantes). También se incluyen aquí los beneficios de audiencia obtenidos por los medios de comunicación, aunque estos últimamente son más aparatos ideológicos que empresariales. Esta causa no puede estar finalizada para que esto sea posible, pues si se han conseguido los objetivos ya no hay motivo para invertir más dinero en intentar implementar la causa.

3. [Beneficiarios] [No finalizada] Obviamente, los beneficiarios directos reciben beneficios materiales y legales de una causa, como beneficiarios. Así, las mujeres pueden recibir ayudas de una causa feminista u obtener leyes que las benefician. Obviamente, sólo puede darse si la causa no está finalizada. Una causa finalizada (por ejemplo, la legalización del divorcio) no puede obtener estos beneficios, pues no se ve la necesidad de impulsarla. De hecho, ya no se ve como una causa sino como un hecho de la vida.

Pero tan importantes como los beneficios materiales son los beneficios psicológicos, que se detallan a continuación. 

4. [Beneficiarios] [No indiscutible] Lo más obvio: los beneficiarios reciben lo que estaban buscando: una relajación de las convenciones sociales que permita que la sociedad acepte su estilo de vida. Estas convenciones sociales suelen estar basadas en la ley natural, por lo que suele pasar que lo que se acepta es una violación de la ley natural (caso de la promiscuidad sexual) o, incluso de la realidad fáctica (caso de los trans).

Se trata de usar la aprobación social para luchar contra el sentimiento de vergüenza o deshonor (que es social) así como intentar apagar el sentimiento de culpa o de reconocimiento de la realidad (que son individuales).

(El hecho de que la conciencia (la culpa) y el reconocimiento de la realidad no se puedan apagar definitivamente, hará que los beneficiarios busquen la aprobación social y eviten la desaprobación más y más, como formas de apagarlas temporalmente. Si tienen acceso al poder, los beneficiarios acabarán implantado un estado de cosas totalitario, en el que la aprobación de su conducta contraria a la ley natural o la realidad fáctica es obligatoria y la desaprobación está prohibida, como se explica en otro escrito.)

Los beneficios de los puntos 3 y 4  los llamaremos «beneficios oficiales» pues son los que se usan para impulsar una causa. Los otros beneficios (del punto 1 al 2 y del 5 al 12) se llamarán «beneficios ocultos», pues no suelen considerarse al defender o atacar una causa.

5. [Beneficiarios] [No indiscutible] Validar la trayectoria vital. Muchos de los que apoyan las causas son gente que no le ha ido bien en la vida, a veces por las circunstancias, pero, la mayoría de las veces, por sus propias decisiones. La izquierda fomenta esas malas decisiones y las justifica una vez se han tomado. La responsabilidad de los errores personales se transfiere a la sociedad y la persona queda libre de culpa (esto viene directamente de Rousseau).

Así, esta gente no se siente culpable por sus errores ni toma la responsabilidad de enmendarlos o intentar no volverlos a cometer. Es la responsabilidad por los propios errores lo que define la adultez, por lo que las masas de la izquierda se encuentran infantilizadas, en un estado de desarrollo detenido. Se trata de luchar contra el sentimiento de responsabilidad: reconocer los propios errores y luchar para no volverlos a cometer.

Es decir, las causas son los medios por los que la izquierda transmite a la sociedad  la culpa de los fracasos personales. Veamos, por ejemplo, la causa de «fat acceptance». Si uno no tiene una enfermedad rara, para ser un obeso mórbido (en comparación a un gordo normal), uno se lo ha tenido que trabajar durante años con una falta de autocontrol que lleva a unos patrones de alimentación insanos. La causa de «fat acceptance» hace que la persona piense que la culpable es la sociedad por no acceptar los cuerpos obesos mórbidos como atractivos, en vez de aceptar su responsabilidad e intentar adelgazar para tener una buena salud.

De nuevo, es una forma de escapar de la culpa, del sentimiento doloroso de que uno lo ha hecho mal. De nuevo, la causa es útil mientras no es universalmente aceptada. En un caso de una persona que se sienta mal por un divorcio, la causa no es útil, pues todo el mundo acepta el divorcio, así que uno no puede decir que el problema del divorcio es que hay gente divorciofóbica.

También esto permite conllevar una baja autoestima que tienen estas personas que han fracasado en algún aspecto de la vida (en este caso, el control de peso).

6. [Partidarios] [No indiscutible] La causa permite sentirse buena persona ante uno mismo. El objetivo es eliminar la culpa (parte de la conciencia) de comportarse mal en la vida privada (en otras áreas), justificándose ante uno mismo que uno es bueno, porque apoya una causa supuestamente noble (uno es bueno porque es antirracista, antifascista, etc.).

7. [Partidarios] [No indiscutible] La causa permite sentirse a uno mejor que los demás. En este caso, no se trata de evitar el sentimiento de culpa (como en el punto 6), sino que es un sentimiento de orgullo. El orgullo es una de las drogas más adictivas para el hombre y, aunque se puede conseguir de diversas formas, el orgullo porque uno apoya una causa es una de las formas más fáciles de conseguirlo. Este orgullo se debe a dos motivos. Primero, apoyando la causa uno se siente «especial», diferente a los demás (autoexpresión, como ponerse un tatuaje). Segundo, apoyando la causa uno experimenta ese sentimiento de ser mejor que los otros que se da en la parábola del fariseo y el publicano.

8. [Partidarios] [No indiscutible] La causa permite presumir de buena persona ante los demás. Esto se llama «señalar virtud», «postureo moral» y es lo que los fariseos hacían en el Nuevo Testamento (por ejemplo, dando limosna en público). Esto aumenta el estatus social ante la comunidad (siendo la búsqueda del estatus) y también elimina la «vergüenza», el estigma social, en el caso de la conducta privada. Mientras los puntos 6 y 7 son interiores y privados, el punto 8 se refiere a la imagen público del individuo.

(A los puntos 6, 7 y 8 podemos darle el nombre común de «fariseísmo». Estos beneficios psicológicos están prohibidos en el Nuevo Testamento. Sin embargo, Lutero progresó hacia la desactivación de esta prohibición, diciendo que la gente se justificaba por la fe y no por las obras. Lo importante no es lo que hagas, sino que tengas las opiniones correctas, lo que hizo el costo del fariseísmo prácticamente nulo y muy difícil de combatir. La opinión calvinista de distinguir entre gente que ya sabe que está salvada y gente que está condenada potencia el fariseísmo. La modernidad deriva de esta postura calvinista a través de los movimientos puritanos de Estados Unidos).

9. [Partidarios] [No indiscutible] La causa permite descargar las frustraciones de la vida dirigiendo el odio y la indignación contra los no partidarios, que se conceptualizan como los enemigos. El hombre moderno tiene pocas ocasiones socialmente aprobadas de descargar sus frustraciones con ira de forma catártica, lo que se ha demostrado de forma científica que es bueno para su bienestar psicológico. La causa proporciona un motivo aceptable para comportarse con odio e indignación, descargando toda esa ira acumulada por las frustraciones de la vida contra un enemigo que se conceptualiza como el mal. Las manifestaciones que acaban en vandalismo público son un ejemplo de esto, así como gente gritando violentamente en nombre de la tolerancia y la paz.

10. [Partidarios] [No indiscutible] La causa permite alimentar la necesidad de trascendencia. El hombre tiene un deseo de trascendencia, de buscar algo superior a uno mismo. Esto tiene un aspecto religioso (buscar el bien) y comunitario (buscar ser parte de una comunidad donde todos se ayudan). Estos dos aspectos se dan frecuentemente unidos y están cubiertos con las religiones tradicionales.

Con la decadencia de la religión tradicional, el liberalismo o progresismo se ha convertido en la nueva religión. Sin embargo, el liberalismo es todo lo contrario al sentido de trascendencia: es radicalmente individualista y tiende a arrastrar al hombre al egoísmo más feroz. En realidad, la máquina que hace moverse al liberalismo es el egoísmo humano.

El hombre moderno está inundado de liberalismo: no puede concebir otra cosa, ni puede concebir renunciar a su egoísmo, pero necesita la trascendencia. Las causas son, en realidad, partes del liberalismo y, por lo tanto, avanzan el egoísmo. Sin embargo, el hecho de que se expresan con lenguaje noble y que se conciben como una lucha por el bien y contra el mal permite usarlas como sustituto de la verdadera trascendencia.

Así, las causas permiten dedicarse al egoísmo mientras uno siente que está luchando por algo justo. No estamos hablando aquí de un sustituto de sentirse bueno (puntos 6 y 7) o de una forma de presumir de bueno sin serlo (el punto 8) sino de un sustituto de buscar el bien y buscar al prójimo.

De nuevo, este beneficio sólo se produce si la causa no es indiscutible. Si la causa es aceptada por todos, no hay manera de imaginar una comunidad en torno a ella y no se puede conceptualizar como la lucha del bien contra el mal.

Obviamente, los beneficios del 5 al 10 sólo se producen si la causa no es indiscutible. Uno no puede sentirse más bueno que los demás o presumir de bueno ante los demás con una causa indiscutible (como la igualdad de hombres y mujeres), porque todos la comparten y uno no sería mejor que los demás. Sería alguien normal.

11. [Beneficiarios] [Partidarios] [No indiscutible] Finalmente, las causas permiten servir de vía para el resentimiento (entendido de la forma que lo definió Nietzsche y lo analizó Scheler en su libro «Ressentiment»). El resentimiento forma muy enquistada de envidia, con características propias.

El resentido siente que le podía haber ido mejor en la vida o en un área de la vida, pero no es su culpa. Se siente injustamente tratado por la sociedad. A veces, tiene una buena posición pero envidia a aquellos que están todavía mejor.

En suma, siente que él debería estar mejor en el juego social. Si no lo está, es porque la sociedad lo oprime.

La sociedad moderna fomenta el resentimiento, pues nos dice que todos somos iguales. Con este dogma de la igualdad, las desigualdades en la vida son injusticias, fruto de la opresión. Es una injusticia que los negros tengan más dinero que los blancos, que los hombres tengan más dinero que las mujeres, que los nativos tengan más dinero que los inmigrantes, que los heterosexuales tengan una vida más fácil que los homosexuales, que los hombres prefieran a las guapas que a las feas…. La sociedad moderna es una máquina de crear resentimiento.

El resentimiento produce dos tipos de acciones:

a. [Beneficiarios] [No finalizada] El resentido aboga por cambiar los valores sociales. Para ello apoya una causa que intenta invertir los valores, de forma que los ganadores sean los perdedores y al revés. Si la causa triunfa completamente, el resentido mejoraría su posición en el juego social. Por ello, el resentido sería uno de los beneficiarios de esta causa. Así una mujer que se le conoce como promiscua, intenta cambiar los valores sociales para que la promiscuidad se vea bien y, por lo tanto, ella ascienda en la escala social.

b. [Partidarios] El resentido descarga su frustración con la sociedad apoyando otras causas de las que él no es beneficiario, como forma de rebeldía. Esta causa no debe ser indiscutible.

En cuanto a la primera acción, que es la que requiere más explicación, el ejemplo tradicional del resentido es el del intelectual que se dedica a la política de izquierdas clásica porque está resentido de no ser rico. El piensa que es superior a los ricos, porque es más inteligente y debería ganar más que los ricos, pero gana mucho menos. (El chiste del 10 por ciento). Apoya la causa de redistribución de la riqueza con el fin de obtener más dinero para él. Es el típico que siempre está clamando con que se aumenten los impuestos a los ricos. La causa de redistribución de la riqueza es una inversión de valores: no deben obtener dinero los miembros más productivos de la sociedad sino los menos productivos.

Otro ejemplo es la mujer obesa mórbida que está clamando porque las revistas de moda acepten modelos obesas, dentro de la causa de «fat acceptance». Se siente resentida porque la mujer delgada obtiene todo tipo de atención y beneficios. Ella piensa que es injusto y que la sociedad debería darle ese reconocimiento. Piensa que los cuerpos bellos y sanos son los obesos mórbidos y que los cuerpos delgados son  insanos, feos y que la gente sólo le considera bello porque ese modelo de cuerpo es impuesto de forma opresiva por los poderosos a través de los medios de comunicación. Lucha para que los cuerpos obesos estén cada vez más presentes en la vida pública.

Vemos aquí también la inversión de valores: lo obeso es bello y sano mientras lo bello y sano es feo e insano.

Es decir, el beneficiario resentido es un (relativo) perdedor que quisiera ser el ganador en el juego social y aboga por invertir los valores sociales, de forma que él sea el ganador.

Los puntos 10 al 22 de este escrito de Ted Kaczynski analizan con más detalle los aspectos psicológicos del resentimiento.

El resentimiento es un estado psicológico que lo impregna todo. No sólo requiere lo que acabamos de ver en este punto, sino que requiere varios puntos que ya se han visto. Por ejemplo, la necesidad de validar la trayectoria vital puede ser un efecto del resentimiento, así como la necesidad de expresar ira de forma catártica. El resentido siente ira por la sociedad por tratarlo injustamente.

12. [Beneficiarios][Partidarios][No indiscutible] Identidad. Cada ser humano debe preguntarse «¿Quién soy?» y debe responder a esa pregunta ante sí y ante los demás.

Definir la identidad de uno es siempre definirse como parte de una comunidad.  En el pasado, esta respuesta se basaba en las comunidades de la familia, el pueblo, la nación y la religión. Soy un católico español, de Artana, un Rodríguez, el hijo del maestro, el padre de Juanito.

Sin embargo, conforme el individualismo avanza, este tipo de respuestas dejan de ser factibles para todo el mundo. Con la destrucción de la familia, mucha gente ya no tiene familia o está distanciada de ella. Mucha gente considera la nación como una rémora y se proclama «ciudadano del mundo». Mucha gente se proclama sin religión y esto es algo común.

Una causa da un sentido de identidad: soy una lesbiana antifascista trekkie que está interesada en los gatos y en el vino.

Fíjense como la identidad ya no está basada en las comunidades de religión, nación y familia sino que está basada en falsas comunidades de orientación sexual (forma parte de las comunidades de lesbianas), falsa comunidades de las causas (comunidades de antifascistas) y falsas comunidades de los hobbies (amantes del vino, gato y Star Trek).

(Se dice que estas son falsas comunidades porque no son como las comunidades tradicionales, en qué la gente se conocía entre ellos y creaba estructuras de relación. Son simplemente grupos de personas atomizadas que tienen los mismos gustos. La comunidad de Artana es una comunidad: es más grande que los individuos porque tiene relaciones sólidas entre ellos. La comunidad LGBTI o de trekkies son gente que ni se conoce entre ellos. Es una falsa comunidad).

La parte de esta autodefinición que nos interesa aquí es la de las causas, que se aplica tanto a los partidarios de la causa. Los partidarios pueden sentirse que su identidad es luchar por el bien, contra el fascismo, a favor de la inmigración, etc.

En los partidarios que también son beneficiarios, esto puede llegar al extremo. Por ejemplo, hay homosexuales que han hecho de la lucha a favor de la causa gay todo el centro de su vida y se definen antes que todo como gays.

Pero prácticas homosexuales las ha habido toda la vida y nunca alguien se ha definido por sus prácticas sexuales. Si hubieras preguntado al Emperador Adriano quién era, no hubiera dicho que era un homosexual, aunque tuvo un amante homosexual durante años. Si le hubieras dicho «Tú eres un homosexual», no lo hubiera entendido, de la misma forma que una persona que está sola y se masturba continuamente no se define como «Yo soy un masturbador».

 

The political cause succeeds because it produces

Why political cause is towards more entropy

The result of the political cause

After the political succeeds, the end result is a society which is farther away from obvious reality and the natural law. A society with less order and more entropy. More chaotic and less free (anarchotyranny). A society with

 

 

 

 

 

Why did the West go to Hell (IIc)? The return of the self GOOD (c)

Summary of previous installments

In previous installments, we have seen that the the ideology/religion of liberalism (the religion of freedom, equality and rights, which is a form of relativism) is the ultimate justification of behavior and public policy in Western civilization and it is an ideology that can be used to justify anything. So it is as if it did not exist. It is a rhetorical ploy.

Its void is filled by another official ideology: leftism, which is the base of the law and culture in Western civilization. Leftism is an absolutist ideology with absolute goods (feminism, multiculturalism, diversity, etc.) and absolute evils (patriarchy, white supremacism, sexism, racism, homophobia) and it is justified because of liberalism, because liberalism can justify anything..

In this absolutist sense, leftism is not different from any other official religion. But there are several properties that make Leftism unique between the official religions of societies:

Property A. Its restlessness. Leftism is always evolving and incorporating new absolute goods and evils in a process that has been accelerating. Some things that were common sense only five or ten years ago, now they are the evilest of evil things and they cannot be disputed.

Property B. Its direction. Leftism does not evolve in random directions but getting farther and farther away from obvious reality and natural law.  Leftism is a reality inversion and a moral inversion, which constantly increases.

Property C. Its popularity. As we will see, Leftism is a religion whose goals are enslavement, impoverishment and mental health decline of the vast majority of the population. However, it is  very popular among the majority of the population.

This text will try to explain property A and C while the next installment will try to explain property B and deepen the understanding of property A.

Evolution of modern society

The evolution of leftism is clear if we see it from a non-ideological perspective. Modern society always evolves in a direction where more and more good things are taken from the general population and good things are transferred to the powerful and to the people that support leftism.

These «good things» are money, power and psychological well-being. We will call them «benefits». So this change means the impoverishment, enslavement and mental health decline of the general population. We will call this «the disempowerment of the population».

It is tempting to see this change as a transfer of benefits but this would be inaccurate. The good things taken from the population are bigger and different than the good things given to the powerful and the people that support leftism.

For example, let’s suppose a bank reduces the number of their offices by forcing people to do most transactions online (true story). The good things taken from the population are: people without computer skills find their lives a bit harder, many employees lose their jobs, their families are destroyed or have a difficult life because of economic hardships, the communities where these families live are impoverished, etc.

The good things given to the powerful is that the owner of the bank has more amount of money that he doesn’t need and he can’t spend in a thousand lives. But now, he is the number 51 in the Forbes list of wealthy people (instead of number 47). In addition, this excess of money can help this guy to play God and try to implement a «better world» according to his half-baked ideas that create more chaos, but nobody tells him they are asinine because he has so much money.

So you have destruction of many lives compared to the vanity of a guy with too much money. Both are good things but not equivalent. This change is only possible because the rulers have the power and the people being dispossessed have no power to protect from this predation.

The class structure of modern society

More specifically, Western society is composed by three social classes:

  • The rulers. Financial powers like the Rothschild, the Rockefellers, and others. They rule in the shadow and are often hidden behind all kinds of non-profit and profit organizations (Bank of International Settlements, Blackrock, etc). The rulers decide the direction towards society should go.
  • The managers. This includes the intellectuals that create the ideas in universities. The journalists, teachers, professors and entertainers that transmit these ideas to the people. And the politicians, civil servants and white collars employees that enforce these in ideas in the public space and private companies.

Since «the Managerial Revolution» by James Burnham, it has been often claimed that the managers have replaced the wealthy people as a ruling class. I will believe it when I see the managers take decisions or define policies that go against the rulers. This was done in Communist countries, which were really managerial, but in our Capitalist system, financial powers rule and managers are only their assistants. The same way the clergy was assistant of the power during the Middle Ages.

This does not mean that managers are without powers. In fact, the upper layer of managers (say, the high officers in international institutions) have some power about how to implement the direction set by the rulers in society. The lower layer of managers have power how to transmit and enforce the directives of the managers in their companies, school, etc. Since the rulers are hidden, the population thinks that the managers (politicians, international organization) are the ones that rule societies.

The rulers and the managers are «the structure of power» in Western society.

  • The serfs. The ones that have no power about the direction of the society. An immigrant, a trucker driver, the owner of a small business, etc. They can be divided into good serfs (if they support leftism) and bad serfs (if they don’t support leftism)

We will call the managers and the good serfs as «the clients» (in a Roman sense). They are the ones that support the enslavement, impoverishment and mental health decline of the population through its support of leftism.

Leftism evolves to take more and more benefits (money, power and psychological benefits) from the population and to give more benefits to the rulers and (sometimes) to the clients.

In this exchange, the rulers are the main beneficiaries but the upper layer of the clients can also be benefitted if the benefits they receive is bigger than the benefits they give. For example, a high level officer of the European Commission receives more benefits (salary, status, power) that he gives (say, through taxes).

A feminist school teacher (the lower layer of the managers) receives less benefits (virtue signaling, moral justification) that she gives (taxes, loneliness because of feminism), but she doesn’t realize that leftism is the cause of her disempowerment (she attributes loneliness to patriarchy) so she supports leftism because of the benefits she perceives (virtue signaling, moral justification).

Leftism as a justification of the power grab

So each novelty in modern society can be explained as  taking benefits from the population to give benefits to the rulers and (sometimes) the clients. Leftism is only the ideology to justify this process.

For example, both massive immigration and the incorporation of woman to the workplace disempowered the population by reducing wages, increasing taxes, making people more unhappy and more dependent from the State, while increasing wealth, power and meaning for the rulers and the upper layer of the managers.

This disempowerment had to be justified so «feminism» and «multiculturalism» were created as a new «gods» or dogmas of the religion of leftism. From a logical point of view, importing masses of people from very patriarchal societies contradicts feminism, but the hidden logic is that both movements benefit the rulers and the upper layer of the managers. Leftism is an ideology to rationalize parasitism of these classes with respect to the general population.

The rulers of traditional societies could not do that so easily because the religion was established. Henry II could not define «the murdering of bishops such as Beckett» as a good thing, because he could not change the religion. But leftism has liberalism as a ultimate justification and, as we saw, liberalism can be used to justify anything (in this case, the alibi is «to increase the rights of women and poor foreigners»)  . So the powerful define the religion as they see fit and have no restriction in their behavior. The powerful control the religion instead of being restricted by it.

This explains the restlessness of leftism. Liberalism allows leftism to be always changing, because it can justify anything (unlike the dogmas of traditional societies). However, it does not force leftism to be always changing. If leftism is always changing is because the rulers benefit from each novelty and the rulers have the power to implement it. Each leftist novelty such as feminism, LGBTI or multiculturalism has ended up increasing the benefit of the rulers, of the powerful. The fact that it disempowers the population is a byproduct.

How people accept their own disempowerment

How do normal people accept and even promote leftism, which justifies their own disempowerment? There are multiple mechanisms.

The first mechanism is that the disempowerment is sold as an expansion of rights. Since each right is someone else’s obligations (again, the relativism of liberalism), new obligations are introduced into the population while claiming they are rights and concealing the obligations attached.

For example, rights of illegal immigrants to be given healthcare imply the obligation of everybody else to pay for this healthcare through taxes. By claiming «rights» are introduced, the impoverishment and enslavement of the population are concealed. Only the bright side is presented in a constant propaganda campaign. It is again a fallacy of omission («stacking the deck» fallacy).

The second mechanism consists in the rationalization of the disempowerment. When divorce and abortion were introduced in Spain, there were told that these were going to be very special cases for dramatic situations and there wouldn’t be masses of people divorcing or aborting ( “safe, legal, and rare”, as Bill Clinton would said). After this happened, divorce and abortion were redefined from «necessary evils» to «highest goods and rights».  So now families broken and children killed are rationalized saying that these are good things because, for example, women have the right not to be trapped in an unhappy marriage and own their body.

The third mechanism is that leftism blames all its failures to other people and to insufficient leftism. So, when people get impoverished because leftism, «the right» is to blame and the solution is more leftism. For example, when feminism fails, the answer is that feminism has not been sufficiently implemented (because of the evil «patriarchy») and the solution is more feminism.

A special case of this third mechanism is that leftism takes its victims and makes them soldiers. An example is the liberated woman who followed very well all the rules of feminism and, hence, ended up lonely and childless at her forties. This woman is hurting and admitting that she has committed mistakes that cannot be undone only adds to her misery. So her mind tries to rationalize these situations and leftism provides the perfect alibi: she has not married because men are sexist and only want a submissive slave instead of a strong independent woman like her. So she has to fight against the patriarchy by promoting feminism. This gives her meaning and something to live for. And it is a perfect excuse to try to convince young women to follow the same path she followed: «Misery wants company».

So each victim of leftism is converted into a fighter for leftism. Leftism feeds of its own failures: destroys lives of people and uses them to destroy more lives of people in a vicious circle that destroys society, like a cancer growing in a body.

Something to be explained

We have said that leftism evolves in direction towards more benefits for the rulers and (sometimes) for the clients. But why does this direction coincide with the direction consisting in getting farther and farther away from obvious reality and the natural law?

This requires a more detailed examination of the mechanism of leftism, which will be done in the next installment.

—–

If leftism is free to wander, we should expect that it wanders in random ways. There must be some mechanism for it to always go left. Explaining this mechanism is the objetive of this post.

Spiritual reality. Satan works with secondary causes so it does not reveal its existence.

We are interested in these secondary causes.

Why did the West go to Hell (Ib): The two religions

Why did the West go to Hell by Virapala

[Why did the West go to Hell attempts to be a logical and historical explanation of the genesis of today’s Absurdistan: a world where you are evil if you say that pigs cannot fly. You can contact the author on virapala.merdeta.com]

Part I.b.: The two religions

Introduction

We saw in the previous installment that the modern Western civilization is founded on a relativistic religion. This ideology is:

  • relativistic in theory with respect to the truth and morality, which are claimed to be relative (different for each person).
  • relativistic in practice because it uses concepts like freedom, equality and rights. These concepts are claimed to be absolute (the same for each person) but they are relative, because the freedom/equality/right of a person is, in reality, the lack of freedom/equality/right of another person.

We have seen that the relativism of Western civilization causes societal problems like anarchy, tyranny and atomized societies. For a better explanation, please read the previous installment.

However, the main problem of the relativism in Western civilization is the one will be explained in next.

Political systems cannot be based on relativism

The main problem of relativism is that it is impossible to implement in a society.

It is well known that the different relativistic concepts contradict each other.  As Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn said: «Human beings are born with different capacities. If they are free, they are not equal. And if they are equal, they are not free».

But there is something deeper than that. Each relativistic concept contradicts itself. Relativism is impossible to scale.

Every man can adopt relativism in an individual manner (and, as we saw, this produces conflict, which causes anarchy, tyranny and atomized societies). But it is impossible to apply relativism in a collective manner.

To be more specific, it is impossible for a political system to be based on relativism.

This is because each political system is based on laws. The law should allow some things and forbid other things. Which things should the law allow or forbid? It should allow things that are considered good and forbid things that are considered evil. Therefore, it needs a concept of good and evil that is publicly shared by the elite and authorities and, even better, by the entire population (even if they don’t feel this way in private, see Timur Kuran’s Private Truths, Public Lies).

This concept of the good and the evil upon which the law is based is the official ideology of the society, that is, its official religion, because we define religion as a moral system that distinguishes good from evil. In this sense, every country is a theocracy.

(Some of you will object to my use of the R word but, please, bear with me. This will be explained in another text and let’s not quarrel about names. If you have problems with this word, please replace it with moralistic ideology).

This official religion cannot be relativistic in theory (if there is no absolute truth and no absolute good, there is no reason to have laws that allow and forbid behaviors).

This official religion cannot be relativistic in practice either. For example the law cannot be founded on «freedom». It is common for politicians to say: «Our political system is founded on freedom», as if the relative concept of freedom was an absolute concept (the same for everybody). But there is no such thing as a political system founded on freedom because the freedom of somebody is the lack of freedom of somebody else.

My freedom to have private property is the lack of freedom of everybody else to use my property without my consent. Capitalist countries will allow the first freedom and will forbid the second one. Communist countries will do the opposite (in theory). But you cannot allow both freedoms at once. So there is not a political system based on freedom, the same way you cannot have a coin with one side.

In short, a political system  cannot be founded on relativist concepts, because the law is absolutist and not relativistic.

But we have said that the Western civilization is based on a relativistic ideology. So how is this possible? Are we contradicting ourselves?

The paradox of Western civilization

It is possible because relativism is the theoretical official religion of the Western civilization  but it is never put into practice in the political systems of this civilization. It is only used by the powers that be in a rhetorical, official and theoretical way  (in speeches, official documents  and,  more importantly, as a way of justifying policies and laws). But, as explained above, it cannot be applied in practice so it is not applied.

For example, in theory, all people in Western countries are free, equal and have the same rights. This statement is completely relativistic and completely theoretical.

But, in practice, some people are freer than others, some people are more equal than others and some people have more rights than others. So, for example, in a divorce, the person who wants out of the marriage has freedom and rights to divorce, but, the person who wants to remain in the marriage and his kids have no freedom or rights at all.  In an abortion, the woman is free to kill her child (it is her right) while the man and the fetus have no freedom or rights and nothing to say. And so on and so forth.

As we have seen, it would be impossible for a society to be based on freedom, because the freedom of a person is the lack of freedom of another person (the freedom to divorce of a woman is the lack of freedom of a man to see how their kids grow). So in the Western civilization, like in any other countries, some freedoms are guaranteed while other freedoms are restricted.  In a Muslim country, the woman has no freedom to divorce but the man has the freedom to see his kids grow. The late blogger Zippy Catholic used to hammer this point home once and again (we miss you, Mark).

Muslim countries don’t have less freedoms than Western countries. They have different freedoms. However, Muslim countries are coherent because they don’t claim to be based on freedom while Western countries do.

In short. relativisim is not workable and is completely absurd. It cannot be put into practice in a society.

Therefore, in fact, Western civilization has two official religions:

1. A relativistic religion in theory, for rhetorical uses. I will call this «liberalism». Its relative concepts (liberty, equality and rights) are presented as if they were absolute concepts and they are claimed to be the foundation of the society.

Of course, this is only a rhetorical trick (for speeches and, more importantly, to justify policies and laws). Relativism cannot be put into practice so liberalism is only a rhetorical ploy.

Liberalism is a very simple ideology (it only consists of some few words: liberty, equality, progress, rights, etc.) and has not substantially changed for the last 200 years.

2. There is a real official religion, which is codified in the laws and it is the base of public discourse and policies. I will call it «leftism».

This is an absolute religion with absolute goods and evils. For example, absolute evils are racism, sexism, homophobia, white nationalism. Absolute goods are the legalization of divorce and abortion, secularization, uncontrolled immigration, etc. These are absolute concepts and must be enforced as absolute by the law, the government and society in general.

Leftism is constantly changing and incorporating new absolute goods and evils (transphobia is the latest evil so far, but it won’t be the last).

Go to a workplace and say that you don’t think the new LGBTI program is a good idea, because everybody should have their opinion and freedom of thought, and you will see how long liberalism (relativism) goes (I did this and I was fired). You will see what the ideology being enforced in society is leftism, not liberalism.

Liberalism is only a rhetorical ploy to justify leftism.  It took me a lot to see this distinction and this article by Bonald was useful so I decided to use his terminology.

That article explains how both religions are used to justify leftism, for example, in a debate of  gay marriage. You attack the ideas of ideologies other than leftism by using liberalism («Christian marriage is a cultural construct that does not allow freedom and equality to gay couples. Live and let live») and you defend your own ideas by using leftism («You should bake the cake for a gay wedding, you bigot, you homophobe»). There is no freedom or live and let live for this last case.

In short, your ideas are relative (liberalism), my ideas are absolute (leftism). It is «relativism for thee but not for me»., which is a phenomenon constantly seen in the history of relativism, since its introduction in the Western civilization in the 16th century.

In short, Western civilization is based on what I call «a false relativism». Relativism (liberalism) is used in a rhetorical way as if it were the foundation of  society but  society is based on leftism, on an absolutist religion (like any other society is because it is impossible to do it another way).

How other societies work with ultimate justification

If Western society is really based on an absolutist ideology like other societies, why is so harmful that it uses relativism in a rhetorical function?

The problem is that relativism is used as an ultimate justification of changes in the culture and in the law. And relativism can justify anything, no matter how insane it is.

If we start asking: «Why is A true/false?», this will have an answer along the lines of «A is true/false because it is derived from B, which is true/false». Then we can repeat the question with B: «Why is B true/false». This will produce a C being true/false. We cannot go on infinitely with this chain of justification. This chain stops with Z being true/false, full stop. Z is an ultimate justification and we can call it «a reality dogma».

This is regarding the IS part of Hume’s IS-OUGHT  distinction. But it is the same about the OUGHT part. That is, morality works the same way. If we start asking: «Why is A good/evil?», this will have an answer along the lines of «A is good/evil because it produces B, which is good/evil». Then we can repeat the question with B: «Why is B good/evil». This will produce a C being good/evil. We cannot go on infinitely with this chain of justification. This chain stops with Z being good/evil, full stop. Z is an ultimate justification and we can call it «a morality dogma».

All civilizations have dogmas, which are the foundation of the civilization. In ancient societies, dogmas were collected in holy traditions or holy texts such as the Bible, the Qur’an or the Talmud, which were used as the ultimate justification in these other societies. Each chain of justification ended with «the Bible/Qur’an/Talmud says it so».

However, these holy texts are extensions of obvious reality («men are women are different») and of the natural law («don’t steal»), that is, the universal moral law that all sane societies follow, because it is biologically wired in humans and it is the only way to organize a society.  The natural law has dogmas like «don’t lie, don’t steal, don’t murder, respect your neighbor’s wife, etc.».

All traditional holy texts include the dogmas of obvious reality («men are women are different») and the natural law («don’t steal») with some exceptions. They also include some other dogmas in addition («the Trinity», «the obligation to pray», «Mohammed being the last prophet»). So the traditional holy texts can be seen as extensions of obvious reality and the natural law. See the appendix of The Abolition of Men by C.S.Lewis to see how all civilizations agree on the dogmas of the natural law (called «the Tao» by C.S.Lewis).

(The mechanism that makes all the holy texts to agree on obvious reality and the natural law is that societies that are not based on the natural law don’t survive long term , because the natural law is the minimum set of rules needed for a society to function, so the holy traditions of these societies die with them. This will be explored in another text)

Having the dogmas of a society derived from holy texts has as a benefit that its culture is not completely free. The culture is constantly changing but it does not get very far away from the dogmas of the holy texts, so it does not get very far away from obvious reality and the natural law. I imagine these cultures as a dog tied to a stick with a chain. The stick is obvious reality and the natural law. The dog (the culture) can move somewhat but he is not completely free, he must be somewhat close to the stick, even if the chain is long.

This seems outrageous to modern Western people, raised in a diet of false rationalism. How can you limit your freedom of thought? You should be able to question anything! Follow your reason when it leads you!.

In fact, human reason (aided by convincing fallacies and social pressure) can justify absolutely anything, The modern West is a society that prides itself in its rationalism and it has rationally justified that a man is a woman (see «the social construction of gender» and other sophistries).

The dogmas of the holy texts mean that ancient cultures are protected from insanity. They cannot say that there are 26 genders because «God created man in his own image, in the image of God created he him; male and female created he them. (Genesis 1:27). Or, if you are a Muslim, «O mankind, fear your Lord, who created you from one soul and created from it its mate and dispersed from both of them many men and women.» (Qur’an 4:1)

How the modern West works with ultimate justification

As we have said, the modern West has leftism as his real religion, but liberalism is his ultimate justification. Unlike ancient societies, whose dogmas were written in long texts, the dogmas of the modern West are surprisingly short: they are limited to a series of relativistic liberal concepts: freedom, equality, rights, and progress (with an additional implicit concept: tabula rasa or blank slate).  In the modern West, these concepts of liberalism play the same role than the Bible, the Qur’an or the Talmud in other societies, which are used as the ultimate justification in these societies.

Every ultimate justification of the leftist religion in Western society is done starting from liberalism (which is the rhetorical religion) and not from leftism (which is the real religion). So why is homophobia evil? Because it goes against the freedom, equality and rights of homosexual people. Why is secularization good? Because it goes in favor of the freedom and equality of people of non-Christian religions, and so on and so forth.

So why is having liberalism as justification so bad? And how it is possible than an absolutist ideology (leftism) is justified starting from a relativistic ideology (liberalism), when this is logically impossible?

It is bad because the dogmas of Western civilization (freedom, equality, rights) are completely relativistic. When applied to the collective, they are false dogmas that don’t mean anything. They are words to conceal the fact that the Western civilization has no dogmas at all. This means that this civilization is a free dog, with no chain. The civilization can move in any direction and there is no limit to the insanity it can accept.

Any direction the Western civilization moves can be justified as a new right, freedom or equality. Do we want to legalize divorce? We can say we are protecting the rights and freedoms of people unhappy in their marriage. Do we want to forbid divorce? We can say we are protecting the rights and freedoms of kids to have a stable family.

Do we want to enforce the identification of trannies as women? We can say we are protecting the rights of people trapped in the wrong body or are wanting the equality of these «women» with other women. Do we want to forbid identification of trannies as a women? We want to protect the rights of women to have private spaces (like restrooms) or the equality of women to have the same reward as men with the same effort in sports.

The sacred relativistic concepts (freedom, equality, rights) of our civilization are able to justify ANYTHING, no matter what. These are no dogmas when applied to collective but a series of empty words than don’t mean anything. They can justify anything and its opposite.

That is, there is no insanity big enough that cannot be justified by using relativistic concepts. And this is why our society has reached these levels of insanity: liberalism (relativism) as an ultimate justification allows it, while other societies are restricted by their holy texts, their absolute religions based on the natural law.

Liberalism for me but not for thee

But this produces another question. If liberalism can justify anything, why is it only used to justify leftism? Why isn’t liberalism used to justify the freedom of people not to bake a cake for a so-called «gay marriage»? Or the rights of kids to have a stable family?

More specifically, the fact that the relativistic liberalism allows insanity does not mean that it forces insanity. If liberalism concepts mean nothing, if liberal concepts give freedom to the society (to the dog) to go in any direction (because they are relativistic), we would expect for the Western society to go in random directions, but the direction is always the same: towards insanity and towards the opposite direction of obvious reality and the natural law.

In fact, if we speak accurately, liberalism is not properly an ultimate justification of leftism. It is an ultimate rationalization.

Leftism has its own dynamics and evolves in an completely independent way from liberalism. It has mechanisms in place that make leftism evolve in one direction. As Mencius Moldbug said “Cthulhu may swim slowly. But he only swims left. Isn’t that interesting?”

Once leftism has produced a cultural change because its own internal dynamics, liberalism is called to justify it, to rationalize it. A liberal justification is created which justifies the novelty as derived from the freedom/equality/right of someone (let’s say the freedom and right to be called by your favorite pronouns). The fact that the freedom/equality/rights of other people is restricted is completely omitted (the freedom/right of everybody to free expression).

That is, leftism is rationalized starting from liberalism using a fallacy of omission («stack the deck» fallacy). This is the only way to derive an absolute ideology (leftism) from a relativistic ideology (liberalism).

In other words, it is liberalism for me but not for thee. Relativism is never applied in a complete manner. It is applied in a partial way that justifies leftism and, when it contradicts leftism, it is not applied. Liberalism justifies leftist rights but other rights are never discussed. We constantly see this in the history of the modern West.

And this is all I wanted to say about the relativistic ideology of liberalism. However, the absolutist religion of leftism merits an additional explanation. More specifically, what are the mechanisms that make leftism always evolve in the same direction (the opposite direction from obvious reality and natural law)? This will be seen in the next installment of this text.