Mystery and Order; the right and left hemispheres

Richard Cooks. Taken from here.

In The Master and His Emissary, Iain McGilchrist writes that a creature like a bird needs two types of consciousness simultaneously. It needs to be able to focus on something specific, such as pecking at food, while it also needs to keep an eye out for predators which requires a more general awareness of environment.

These are quite different activities. The Left Hemisphere (LH) is adapted for a narrow focus. The Right Hemisphere (RH) for the broad. The brains of human beings have the same division of function.

The LH governs the right side of the body, the RH, the left side. With birds, the left eye (RH) looks for predators, the right eye (LH) focuses on food and specifics. Since danger can take many forms and is unpredictable, the RH has to be very open-minded.

The LH is for narrow focus, the explicit, the familiar, the literal, tools, mechanism/machines and the man-made. The broad focus of the RH is necessarily more vague and intuitive and handles the anomalous, novel, metaphorical, the living and organic. The LH is high resolution but narrow, the RH low resolution but broad.

Dido building Carthage by Turner

Dido Building Carthage – William Turner

The LH exhibits unrealistic optimism and self-belief. The RH has a tendency towards depression and is much more realistic about a person’s own abilities. LH has trouble following narratives because it has a poor sense of “wholes.” In art it favors flatness, abstract and conceptual art, black and white rather than color, simple geometric shapes and multiple perspectives all shoved together, e.g., cubism. Particularly RH paintings emphasize vistas with great depth of field and thus space and time,[1] emotion, figurative painting and scenes related to the life world. In music, LH likes simple, repetitive rhythms. The RH favors melody, harmony and complex rhythms.

A Muse by Picasso

A Muse – Pablo Picasso

One reason children’s art is typically so bad is that children and many adult non-artists tend to draw what they “know” (LH) rather than what they perceive (RH). The following picture of two tables illustrates the difference:

Tables

The non-artist knows the table is rectangular and so a rectangle is drawn with a couple of legs sticking out. The picture on the right is closer to what is actually seen.

It usually takes a lot of training and practice to draw or paint something resembling what is really experienced. The default is LH ugliness and two-dimensional flatness. Good figurative painting requires a sense of space and depth. Concerning colors, the LH tendency when attempting to paint a black velvet dress, for instance, would be to grab a tube of paint black paint and to apply it. The LH “knows” the dress is black. In reality, even black velvet dresses are made up of multiple shades of color. They are not black holes after all.

Black velvet

The LH picture of a table and the RH table make an excellent visual metaphor for the frequent crudity of LH theory and unreal abstract concept-driven thinking. Homo economicus, the perfectly rational and egoistic consumer invented by bad economists, or the notion that all human psychology is hedonistic and driven only by pleasure, or brains are information processing devices, are examples of the gross LH simplifications and distortions that actually make human behavior harder to understand and predict, and more, not less, inexplicable.

Patients with RH strokes, now dependent on their LH, tend to feel that their paralyzed left sides of their bodies do not belong to them. Patients have been known to throw their own (left) arm out of bed because they are convinced the arm is not theirs. Of course, they tend to throw the rest of themselves out of bed in the process. Patients with LH strokes are not similarly divorced from reality.

People dependent on the LH tend to be averse to accepting responsibility. The paralyzed portion of the body has nothing to do with them, they think. In one experiment a doctor injected saline solution into a patient’s paralyzed arm and told the patient the arm was now paralyzed as a result. Once the LH patient could blame someone else for the paralysis she was happy to acknowledge that the paralyzed arm was her own.

Schizophrenia is a disease of extreme LH emphasis. Since empathy is RH and the ability to notice emotional nuance facially, vocally and bodily expressed, schizophrenics tend to be paranoid and are often convinced that the real people they know have been replaced by robotic imposters. This is at least partly because they lose the ability to intuit what other people are thinking and feeling – hence they seem robotic and suspicious.

Spengler

Oswald Spengler

Oswald Spengler’s The Decline of the West as well as McGilchrist characterize the West as awash in phenomena associated with an extreme LH emphasis. Spengler argues that Western civilization was originally much more RH (to use McGilchrist’s categories) and that all its most significant artistic (in the broadest sense) achievements were triumphs of RH accentuation.

The RH is where novel experiences and the anomalous are processed and where mathematical, and other, problems are solved. The RH is involved with the natural, the unfamiliar, the unique, emotions, the embodied, music, humor, understanding intonation and emotional nuance of speech, the metaphorical, nuance, and social relations. It has very little speech, but the RH is necessary for processing all the nonlinguistic aspects of speaking, including body language. Understanding what someone means by vocal inflection and facial expressions is an intuitive RH process rather than explicit.

Though communication exists between the two hemispheres, there is a fairly high degree of independence and needs to be. Awareness of context or extraneous background sounds can interfere with focus. Getting lost in specifics can harm a sense of the big picture. Making RH intuitive processes explicit can actually harm, slow them down or even destroy them. A joke explained is no longer funny. A metaphor spelled out can no longer function. The gestural aspect of speech (RH) if made conscious is merely distracting. Self-consciousness (LH) interferes with “flow” and public speaking. Processes like going to sleep involve letting go. We fall asleep, but wake up, having control over, rising above your feelings. Having a name on the tip of your tongue is more likely to be recalled if you stop focusing on it. Shortly before executing a jump in figure skating, breaking a board in karate, shooting at a target, thinking must cease. Happiness is best achieved indirectly not explicitly.

RH is very much the center of lived experience; of the life world with all its depth and richness. The RH is “the master” from the title of McGilchrist’s book. The LH ought to be no more than the emissary; the valued servant of the RH. However, in the last few centuries, the LH, which has tyrannical tendencies, has tried to become the master. The LH is where the ego is predominantly located. In split brain patients where the LH and the RH are surgically divided (this is done sometimes in the case of epileptic patients) one hand will sometimes fight with the other. In one man’s case, one hand would reach out to hug his wife while the other pushed her away. One hand reached for one shirt, the other another shirt. Or a patient will be driving a car and one hand will try to turn the steering wheel in the opposite direction. In these cases, the “naughty” hand is usually the left hand (RH), while the patient tends to identify herself with the right hand governed by the LH. The two hemispheres have quite different personalities.

The connection between LH and ego can also be seen in the fact that the LH is competitive, contentious, and agonistic. It wants to win. It is the part of you that hates to lose arguments.

Using the metaphor of Mystery and Order, the RH deals with Mystery – the unknown, the unfamiliar, the implicit, the emotional, the dark, danger, the chaotic. The LH is connected with Order – the known, the familiar, the rule-driven, the explicit, and light of day. Learning something means to take something unfamiliar and making it familiar. Since the RH deals with the novel, it is the problem-solving part. Once understood, the results are dealt with by the LH. When learning a new piece on the piano, the RH is involved. Once mastered, the result becomes a LH affair. The muscle memory developed by repetition is processed by the LH. If errors are made, the activity returns to the RH to figure out what went wrong; the activity is repeated until the correct muscle memory is developed in which case it becomes part of the familiar LH.

Science is an attempt to find Order. It would not be necessary if people lived in an entirely orderly, explicit, known world. The lived context of science implies Mystery. Theories are reductive and simplifying and help to pick out salient features of a phenomenon. They are always partial truths, though some are more partial than others. The alternative to a certain level of reductionism or partialness would be to simply reproduce the world which of course would be both impossible and unproductive. The test for whether a theory is sufficiently non-partial is whether it is fit for purpose and whether it contributes to human flourishing.

Eye and the world

The LH looks for and finds order in the flux of experience. In reality, every person is slightly different and every experience is unique. The 100th time something is done is different from the 99th. In order not to just get lost in Mystery, the LH uses categories and applies them across experience. While focusing on the repetitive aspects of experience can be useful, too much LH and Order is boring – resulting in the feeling “been there, done that.”

Analytic philosophers pride themselves on trying to do away with vagueness. To do so, they tend to jettison context which cannot be brought into fine focus. However, in order to understand things and discern their meaning, it is necessary to have the big picture, the overview, as well as the details. There is no point in having details if the subject does not know what they are details of. Such philosophers also tend to leave themselves out of the picture even when what they are thinking about has reflexive implications. John Locke, for instance, tried to banish the RH from reality. All phenomena having to do with subjective experience he deemed unreal and once remarked about metaphors, a RH phenomenon, that they are “perfect cheats.” Analytic philosophers tend to check the logic of the words on the page and not to think about what those words might say about them. The trick is for them to recognize that they and their theories, which exist in minds, are part of reality too.

The RH test for whether someone actually believes something can be found by examining his actions. If he finds that he must regard his own actions as free, and, in order to get along with other people, must also attribute free will to them and treat them as free agents, then he effectively believes in free will – no matter his LH theoretical commitments.

By trying to emulate the explicit formulations of science, analytic philosophy effectively excludes from its purview and thus from its conception of reality, all RH phenomena. By focusing only on what can be made explicit and what can be put into words using them literally, they distort reality. This happens even in their discussion of consciousness.

The philosopher Martin Heidegger tried to describe the human condition, how humans are in the world, in a more RH way. He invented the term “Dasein,” which is described as Being-in-the-world.[2] We have a dim apprehension of the situations or contexts in which activities are undertaken. We are building a house, meeting a friend, sick of our lives, bored, relaxed, anxious, etc.. Each RH feeling or purpose reveals the world in different ways, foregrounding some things out of the infinite complexity of background. The RH determines what the LH sees. One person experiences X as a friend, another as a son, another as a student, another as a mechanic. Each experience is legitimate and none is comprehensive.

Heidegger

Martin Heidegger

Heidegger described people as always, already in the world. The World is the largest conception one might have of context. It is pre-theoretical and implicit. We find ourselves in the world and then try to make sense of it. We are in the world and then proceed to have theories about it. We do not and cannot prove the external world exists as a theoretical matter.

Most of our interaction with the world is precognitive. When we learn a skill (anomalous at the time it is learned) we have to learn it consciously (RH). Once acquired, the skill becomes LH – the known, the familiar, the routine. Colin Wilson calls this “the robot.” By that he means all activities that can be undertaken without the necessity of conscious thought, such as driving a car in non-difficult conditions. Driving a car is not entirely unconscious, but neither is it very conscious.

We demonstrate that we know what a hammer is, what it means, by stretching out a hand and hammering with it. Only if it breaks do we look at it and think about it. The hammer is “ready-at-hand,” and then “present-at-hand” if it breaks.

From a RH perspective, to understand a hammer is to understand what it means; its function. Since meaning is a matter of connections to context, the thing to be studied must be carefully placed in its appropriate context rather than being studied in isolation. Just analyzing the wood and metal used to construct the hammer, which would be a LH approach, is not to understand its meaning. The exact materials, so long as they are fit for purpose, do not really matter.

To understand the hammer it is necessary to look at in relation to the tool users who employ it, then to recognize that it points to nails and boards and then to the items constructed out of them. These matters of context are understood dimly via the RH and not at all by the LH. The ultimate meaning might be to build a house; to provide shelter for people.

Dasein is in the world concernfully. How the world is going for it, matters to Dasein. Dasein is not an object to be fully seen and understood. It reaches into the past and imagines alternative futures. It is a clearing in the forest where things get revealed. It is also “Being-toward-death.”

For Aristotle, passive nous (mind) is the great sweep of perceptions cascading over us. Active nous (LH) involves focusing on some elements and not others, partly to avoid confusion and partly to avoid sensory overload. We do not want to be constantly thinking about persistent but unimportant sensations like the feel of the shirt on our backs, etc..

Attempting to understand consciousness by focusing only on the LH will omit everything connected to the RH. All such accounts tend to say nothing about music, humor, intuition, context, the metaphorical, emotion, emotional nuance of language, the unique and individual, social connection, and meaning.

Having a stroke in the RH means having to make do with the LH. Without the ability to deal with gestalts, the LH is forced to identify a person by single attributes, like a nose, or mouth, or haircut. Normal people recognize someone using the RH which has a broader focus and can see wholes. RH also deals with the unique – which is necessary to tell one person from another. RH perception takes multiple factors into account, including how a person moves. It provides fewer details, but it can see the forest for the trees.

LH accounts of consciousness tend only to include what can be seen by the LH. Unless a person is autistic, these accounts will therefore not correspond very well to our actual experience of consciousness. They will be exceedingly partial and incomplete, focusing only on what is explicit and can be articulated clearly.

A lot of moving through the world is non-linguistic. Animals reason and problem-solve non-linguistically and we do too, much of the time.

It is possible in experiments to cause each hemisphere in turn to cease to function using magnetism – brains are electro-magnetic at some level and this can be manipulated. In one experiment, subjects were given the following syllogism:

All monkeys climb trees.
Porcupines are monkeys.
Therefore, porcupines climb trees.[3]

When the RH is functioning subjects reject the argument as unsound since the second premise is false. The argument is recognized as technically valid – the premises if true would guarantee the truth of the conclusion – but that is all.

When only the LH was working, subjects accepted the argument as legitimate. When asked – but what about the second premise?, subjects acknowledged that it was false, but accepted it anyway saying “but it says here…”

The LH tends to accept a coherence theory of truth and knowledge – do beliefs create a self-consistent system? The RH embraces a correspondence theory of truth and knowledge – do beliefs actually match reality? (lived experience). Since we tend to move in social circles that are not simply random cross-sections of society generalizations based in RH experience sometimes need to be corrected by LH empirically gathered data. On the other hand, LH theory can be heavily ideologically driven, such as ideas about men and women, that are contradicted by actual experience. That’s when the coherence theory of truth is so dangerous because it is immune to correction.

The trouble with system-creation is that intellectual systems try to provide an answer for everything. This is a power-grab by the LH – making theory primary and comprehensive. It effectively claims omniscience via self-referential abstractions. Reality, however, includes a high degree of flux and process. Heraclitus’ aphorisms capture this well. “It is not possible to step into the same river twice,” he wrote. This is because man is in a constant state of change and with its flowing water, so is the river. There is a Logos that provides order to things so that things are not merely chaotic, but that order is better captured by the metaphor of the organic and the organic is wet, flexible, goal-directed, growing and changing. And it is the RH that deals with living things.

Heraclitus

Heraclitus

In the past, the universe and the world were thought of as alive and ensouled. The word “cosmos” refers to a harmonious well-ordered whole which has pleasant home-like connotations. The tendency since the scientific revolution has been to substitute the organic metaphor for the mechanical and metaphors tend to determine what is perceived.[4]

A LH mode of thought concerning free will or the existence of telepathy might be to reject them both on the grounds that – “I don’t see how that is possible,” i.e., they might seem to contradict the thinker’s materialistic metaphysics. The RH response is to focus on the actual evidence and let the data determine the theory. The appropriate modus operandi is to start with RH perception, perhaps modify those perceptions after pondering them (LH), and then return to RH experience.

For instance, someone is looking into the distance. Another person comments that the lights are beautiful. The first person alters his attention and focus slightly and he notices the beauty of the lights. Beauty is perceived but perception can be modified by thought. Likewise little children and even some animals perceive injustice (RH) at least when it concerns themselves. This perception can be modified by thought and theory (LH) – not always for the better. The result can be a permanent alteration in perception. However, attempts to generate morality through moral theories like utilitarianism do not work. The LH is analytic, not generative.

We do not know the origin of life. We do not know how or even if consciousness can emerge from matter. We do not know the nature of 96% of the matter of the universe. Clearly all these things exist. They can provide the subject matter of theories but they continue to exist as theorizing ceases or theories change. Not knowing how something is possible is irrelevant to its actual existence. An inability to explain something is ultimately neither here nor there.

If thought begins and ends with the LH, then thinking has no content – content being provided by experience (RH), and skepticism and nihilism ensue. The LH spins its wheels self-referentially, never referring back to experience. Theory assumes such primacy that it will simply outlaw experiences and data inconsistent with it; a profoundly wrong-headed approach.

Zamyatin, Gödel, Turing and Keats

Gödel’s Theorem proves that not everything true can be proven to be true. This means there is an ineradicable role for faith, hope and intuition in every moderately complex human intellectual endeavor. There is no one set of consistent axioms from which all other truths can be derived.

Godel and Einstein

Gödel and Einstein

Alan Turing’s proof of the halting problem proves that there is no effective procedure for finding effective procedures. Without a mechanical decision procedure, (LH), when it comes to moderately complex matters, intuition and insight will be required. (RH)

Axioms must retain a tentative, provisional, hypothetical nature ready to be discarded if they are contradicted by further evidence.

What is very significant about Gödel and Turing is that they provide certainty about the irreducible nature of uncertainty. In other words, they provide definitive proof once and for all of the limitations of LH thinking. They demonstrate to what should be to the satisfaction of even the most die-hard LH rationalistic reductionist and skeptic that the RH cannot be dispensed with. It is simply not possible have everything in the clear light of day; dry, proven, known, and nailed down. Thinking is not merely computation.

Intuition, the context of lived experience, being always already in the world, emotion, metaphor, humor, irony, and all the other things associated with the right hemisphere of the human brain are here to stay. The left hemisphere’s love of logic, mechanism, clarity and certainty must be tempered by the right hemisphere’s tolerance for ambiguity, uncertainty, and the organic. The fantasy of an omniscient science should be extinct.

A liberating character in Yevgeny Zamyatin’s dystopian novel We, chastising the benighted LH dominated mathematician in a horrible LH culture, says “Oh come on – knowledge! This knowledge of yours is utter cowardice. Yes, that’s it – really. You just want to build a little wall around infinity – and you’re afraid to look behind it.”[5] The One State tames a wild zigzag into a straight line – “a great, divine, precise, wise, straight line – the wisest of lines.” The result of “integrating the grand equation of the universe.”[6] The main character, D-503, writes: “I personally do not see anything beautiful in flowers and the same goes for everything that belongs to the wild world…Only the rational and the useful are beautiful: machines, boots, formulas, food, etc..”[7] Zamyatin demonstrates an exact understanding of the LH attitude and its limitations.

The LH has a tendency to turn the known world; the comprehensible, into the world; outlawing the transcendent and infinite – that, as D-503 writes, which is incapable of being encompassed by an equation.

John Keats

John Keats

The Romantic poet John Keats became frustrated by fellow poet Samuel Coleridge’s desire for definitive answers and wrote in a letter to his brothers, George and Thomas;

Several things dovetailed in my mind, and at once it struck me, what quality went to form a Man of Achievement especially in Literature and which Shakespeare possessed so enormously — I mean Negative Capability, that is when man is capable of being in uncertainties, Mysteries, doubts, without any irritable reaching after fact & reason — Coleridge, for instance, would let go by a fine isolated verisimilitude caught from the Penetralium of mystery, from being incapable of remaining content with half knowledge. This pursued through Volumes would perhaps take us no further than this, that with a great poet the sense of Beauty overcomes every other consideration, or rather obliterates all consideration.

Facts are in a sense dead. Facts exist in the clear light of day. They are in the realm of Order which represents the familiar, the known, the robotic, and thus, the boring.

The point of intensest life and interest occurs at the dividing line between Mystery and Order. Creativity and discovery, philosophical, scientific and artistic, emerge from a state of wonder; neither being overwhelmed by infinity and the darkness of Mystery which would be fatal, nor insisting on the certainty of facts already known of Order. Scientific discoveries tend to come by accident. A scientist asks a question and in the process of trying to answer it, answers another question. Since practitioners do and theoreticians write, the role of theory and reason gets exaggerated in histories of discovery. Most scientific advances come through chance, and trial and error. Trial and error involve Keats’ description of negative capability. The experimenter can have tentative hypotheses or intuitions but if he imagines that he already knows the outcome or insists on particular and foreordained results his research ceases.

Creativity has a tentative quality with no guaranteed outcome. There is an understandable desire to find the formula for creativity – rote instructions for writing the perfect novel might seem nice – but formulas and rote instructions are the opposite of creativity. Certainty and creativity are simply incompatible. There can be no creation machine. Creativity is more aligned with the organic, living, and “wet.” It is permeated by mystery and the dark.

Data from Star Trek

“Data” from Star Trek Next Generation

It is hard not to fantasize about a Star Trek Next Generation future where all drugs, for instance, will be designer drugs and scientific discovery loses its haphazard guesswork and tentativeness.[8] Just one or two designer drugs, AZT being the prime example, have ever been created. The metaphor of Mystery and Order demonstrates why this will never change. Such “directed” research rests too heavily on what is already known or thought to be known; leaving no room for what is not already understood.

Jet engines, for instance, were developed by tinkering. The theory of how they work came later.

 

How to kill a research program

The following indicative story is from chapter four of John Gall’s The Systems Bible.[9] The story is fictional, but the scenario is all too familiar. It demonstrates how LH desires for clarity and explicitness in the name of accountability and efficiency, and the creation of complex systems can actually neutralize and ruin research programs.

Gall imagines Lionel Trillium, a shy young man whose questions about human reproduction went unanswered as a child and who developed instead an interest in the reproductive cycle of plants. He has been a moderately successful junior professor of biology with ongoing research programs.

His head of department, Baneberry, on the other hand, has been unproductive for years. He picks up a book about management and is struck with excitement. He will reorganize his department in a way calculated to boost productivity and efficiency. The administration greets this idea with enthusiasm. The plan is to get the other members of the department to write down their research objectives for the year. Their success or failure will then be judged according to the criteria that the faculty members themselves have provided. Baneberry will be able to hold them to account for any difference between what they said they were going to do and what they actually did.

A side effect of this approach is that any research that does not match the stated research objectives will be counted as a failure and the professor will get no credit for it.

The news of this new policy horrifies Lionel and has a depressing effect. If Lionel were going to write anything down about his Goals and Objectives it would be “I love botany. Let me keep studying it.” However, this is clearly unacceptable.

John Gall

John Gall

The results of science might be nicely clear, logical and explicit but the method of reaching these results necessarily involves delving into the unknown and mysterious. Generating hypotheses to be tested is a matter of imagination, intuition informed by experience and creativity. One is reaching into the realm of Mystery – what is currently unknown – and trying to find a hitherto undiscovered Order. To do that, inspiration and insight are required.

Inspiration and insight are likely to be the product of enthusiasm and interest. In fact, many seemingly intractable problems in various fields are solved by someone with no vested interest in the field; just a passing, but genuine curiosity.

Productive creativity in any area is likely to be a combination of expertise, skills, prior knowledge and crucially, a temporary enthusiasm. By definition, temporary enthusiasms do not last. So it is important that a thinker pursues the interest while it exists and is at its keenest. Enthusiasm provides the needed grit not to stop as soon as things get difficult, promotes a joyful attitude and bolsters effort. Boredom and frustration are unlikely to help, whereas a certain relaxed playfulness might well assist.

There are inevitably some boring aspects to mastering something. The goal-driven nature of temporary enthusiasms means that these elements are likely to be better tolerated; simply subsumed within the larger sense of purpose.

It is the very nature of research that it is not possible to list Goals and Objectives in advance. Or rather, one might have Goals and Objectives but they must be provisional and change as research progresses. If the outcome of research were known in advance no research would be necessary. By definition, what one will discover is a mystery.

Since temporary enthusiasms are not predictable or possible to artificially generate, nor to know in advance what one will find, it is not possible to know what direction research will go in. There is simply no point in forcing someone to think about a problem that he has no interest in; not if the goal is to be creative.

We

Inspiration, creativity and temporary enthusiasms are killed by trying to systematize them. A system is akin to bureaucracy and in this case it is supposed to promote productivity and efficiency. Ironically, such a system is guaranteed to do the opposite and this is the case with nearly all systems. Systems are LH affairs.

A system is akin to an algorithm – a set procedure for producing predictable results. Systems arise in response to problems. There are several problems with this. One is that the problem the system is designed to remedy may not be the problem at hand. Another issue is that any problem the system cannot “see” is typically deemed not to exist. And finally complex systems produce unpredictable new problems of their own – often in exact opposition to the stated goal of the system.

If authors and musicians were forced to follow systems the results would be predictably awful, and it is the same for scientists.

This is not the same as setting certain times of day aside for attempts at productive effort. There is nothing wrong with being organized – in fact, that will be very helpful. Writing music or novels in the morning hours, for instance, might be a very good idea. But no algorithm exists to guarantee the result. Algorithms are also known as “mechanical decision procedures” and they are literally a mechanical, rule-governed step-by-step method for achieving specific results. E.g., long division. They are tools, but they are no more creative than the chisel of a sculptor, although the chisel in this case is a crucial instrument for the creative process.

The National Institute of Health (NIH) takes nearly every productive scientist interested in cancer research and inserts them into a giant bureaucracy crammed filled with rules and regulations, research grant applications, Goals and Objectives, and effectively neutralizes these scientists by killing any spontaneity, such as temporary enthusiasms and unpredictable results. Research projects will have to be approved by committees and then funding for that goal and only that goal will be provided. Famously, the NIH tested 40,000 substances to see if they had any cancer fighting properties. None did. Zero. The amount of time and money wasted on this enterprise was stupefying. A machine-like uninspired mindless approach simply failed.

One reason that research in the private sphere is much more productive than government funded R & D is that companies are interested in making money. They are less filled with layers and layers of bureaucracy each one being accountable to the next. Viagra was discovered during research into blood pressure medicine. Erections were an unexpected side effect and initially treated as a problem. By remaining flexible and open-minded and not locked into stated Goals and Objectives, the company decided this side-effect could actually be the new product and Viagra was born. This kind of happy accident is actually the norm.

Lionel Trillium is in the impossible situation of trying to guess what he will be interested in in the future. He desperately does not want to write anything down. By getting Lionel to write down his Goals and Objectives, Baneberry is actually neutralizing Lionel and ensuring that only a pitiful trickle of probably uninspired research will result.

If the rather timorous Lionel dares try to complain to Baneberry or Baneberry’s superiors, Baneberry can respond that he, Baneberry, did not decide on the Goals and Objectives. It was Lionel himself who proposed them so Lionel has no right to complain. Lionel is not being forced to do anything that he did not want to do. Except this is a lie. Lionel was compelled to predict a future that is unpredictable and then compelled again to abide by what he wrote.

The European Union provides money for research and development. Scientists are supposed to outline research programs projected two years into the future. An engineer friend of mine told me that he would be asked to apply for such grants and then had to try to retrofit what he actually discovered or invented to what he said he was going to do. He now refuses to apply. Government funded R & D is immensely counterproductive for this reason; particularly because it tends to target previously successful scientists – the ones that had been doing just fine without government grants – and shut them down.

None of this contradicts the notion that innovation is 99% perspiration, 1% inspiration. Enthusiasm means someone is self-motivated and likely to work harder than could reasonably be expected by a supervisor. Supervision is expensive – supervisors are usually paid more than the people of whom they are in charge. A self-reliant employee is a cheaper and more productive one. A lot of hard work mastering aspects of a field of study is usually going to be required for any breakthrough of insight. However, when it comes to creativity, mere effort is insufficient. Scientists must come up with hypotheses to test and there is no algorithm for that.

Dan Ariely

Dan Ariely

Dan Ariely, who is particularly good at asking questions and then devising experimental methods for answering them, proved this in a series of experiments outlined in The Upside of Irrationality. He found that offering incentives such as paying someone more for an activity works best when the work being done is mechanical and involves sheer physical effort. If someone is asked to do as many jumping jacks as he can in one minute, paying him a hundred dollars might mean he squeezes out a couple more. If, however, someone is asked to paint a beautiful picture for one thousand dollars and then after it is completed, two thousand dollars is offered for a more beautiful picture, the chances are the artist will be unable to comply. Or, imagine a particular form of surgery has a 4% chance of complications – will paying the surgeon five million dollars above his usual fee for a successful outcome lower that percentage? Might his hands begin to shake, his forehead perspire and similarly unproductive things result? Would he not already being doing his best? Will asking someone to solve a puzzle faster by paying him more be likely to work? Unlike physical effort, these things are not directly in someone’s control. That is why paying a child to read a book makes more sense than paying him to get an “A” on an assignment, although such payments might have other unintended negative consequences.

[1] Oswald Spengler makes a connection between visual depth of field; space, and the spiritual and transcendent. Mystical experience is RH, as is experience in general. LH analysis can help make sense of the experience or parse its meaning, but there is a reason that excessive rationalism and the atheistic tend to go together.

[2] Calling Dasein “the human,” is misleading because it reduces what it is to be to biological terms. A human being is just one very limited way of referring to Dasein.

[3] The Russians who did this experiment did not know that some kinds of porcupines really do climb trees, so it is necessary to ignore this inconvenient fact!

[4] Interestingly, women scientists tend to gravitate to the living and organic; inclined to major in biology and veterinary science rather than physics.

[5] Zamyatin, Yevgeny, We, Modern Library, 2006, p. 37.

[6] Zamyatin, Yevgeny, We, Modern Library, 2006, p. 4.

[7] Ibid, p. 44.

[8]Although STNG contains elements of Order, the Enterprises’ mission is explicitly exploratory. The drama of the stories exists only through encountering the unknown and unexpected with the constant threat of annihilation. The figure of the android “Data” also centers around the mystery of what it is to be human.

[9] General Semantics Press, 2002.

20 thoughts on “Mystery and Order; the right and left hemispheres”

  1. Pingback: Chaos and Order; the right and left hemispheres | @the_arv
  2. Pingback: Chaos and Order; the right and left hemispheres | Reaction Times
  3. How familiar are you with the original research behind the claims of LH/RH brain activity emphasis and personality differences?

    It’s my understanding that they’re based on shoddy data and execrable methodology and have never managed to be replicated, but I admit freely it’s not my field.

    • Re: Rhetocrates: My understanding is that is not true. There was at one point some fluffy New Agey garbage on the topic, I think. But that situation has been rectified. Regardless of the biology, the different approaches to thinking and attitudes to life I am painfully aware of having multiple degrees in philosophy – one BA, two MAs and a PhD. I can confirm that what is being referred to as “LH” is a very real phenomenon, whether it turns out to be LH or not – unfortunately! My preference would be that it would be only the result of a fevered imagination! If you read the novel “We” you can get an idea of the flavor of autistic style thinking if you are lucky enough to be unfamiliar with it. Lucky you if you are.

  4. Odd that I’m left-handed but also seem to be one of the most “left hemisphere” of the Orthosphere writers. When I was a kid, I heard that left-handers were supposed to be creative but bad at math. (As you point out in your article, mathematics is itself a very creative enterprise, but this was not widely appreciated. Presumably they meant that lefties are bad at calculating.) I absolutely love math but admit that I’m not especially good at it; I’m still waiting for my creativity to manifest itself. I suppose it’s possible that the hemisphere that dominates in cognitive areas may not be the one that dominates in motor areas.

    Let’s take a poll. Any other lefties here?

    • Hi, Bonald: There is a good chance that your brain is organized the same as us righties or that it is just inverted (sideways, not upside down!). From “The Master and His Emissary:

      In the 11 per cent, who are broadly left-handed, there will be
      variable conformations, which logically must follow one of three patterns:
      the standard pattern, a simple inversion of the standard pattern, or some
      rearrangement. The majority (about 75 per cent) of this 11 per cent still
      have their speech centres in the left hemisphere, and would appear to
      follow broadly the standard pattern. It is, therefore, only about 5 per cent
      of the population overall who are known not to lateralise for speech in the
      left hemisphere. Of these some might have a simple inversion of the
      hemispheres, with everything that normally happens in the right
      hemisphere happening in the left, and vice versa; there is little significance
      in this, from the point of view of this book, except that throughout one would
      have to read ‘right’ for ‘left’, and ‘left’ for ‘right’. It is only the third group who,
      it has been posited, may be truly different in their cerebral organisation: a
      subset of left-handers, as well as some people with other conditions,
      irrespective of handedness, such as, probably, schizophrenia and
      dyslexia, and possibly conditions such as schizotypy, some forms of
      autism, Asperger’s syndrome and some ‘savant’ conditions, who may have
      a partial inversion of the standard pattern, leading to brain functions being
      lateralised in unconventional combinations. For them the normal
      partitioning of functions breaks down.

    • I’m not a lefty, but I’ve noticed that among the best engineers I’ve been acquainted with, a disproportionate number are lefties.

  5. Richard: Concerning your invocation of Oswald Spengler…

    In The Decline, Vol. II in the chapter on “Peoples, Races, and Tongues” (which I happen currently to be re-reading for the nth time), Spengler, as elsewhere, distinguishes between the “cosmic-plantlike side of life,” the “destiny [of which] is determined by… the bodily succession of parents and children, the bond of the blood,” and the “tendency to take root in a landscape,” from “waking -consciousness,” which expresses itself in language, such that there are “currents of being and linkages of waking-being.” The first, the “cosmic-plantlike side of life,” resembles Edmund Husserl’s Lebenswelt and Heidegger’s Dasein. It is the pre-given, the background-environment, against which, and only against which, the subject becomes aware of itself as, precisely, a thematic self-consciousness. The second, the “waking-consciousness,” would correspond to Heidegger’s “thrownness,” and it expresses itself, Spengler writes, through propositional language. From the parent-child succession and from living for generations in a particular place, arises “Race,” which is nearly synonymous with Lebenswelt or Dasein in Spengler’s usage. Spengler writes: “Race is something cosmic and psychic (Seelenhaft), periodic in some obscure way, and in its inner nature partly conditioned by major astronomical relations.” But “waking-consciousness,” on the other hand, expressing itself through the prescriptions of language, partakes in “causal forms,” that is, in syntax, grammar, and correct idiom. “To Race,” writes the Munich realist, “belong the deepest meanings of the words ‘time’ and ‘yearning’; to language those of the words ‘space’ and ‘fear.’”

    Spengler’s “cosmic-plantlike” seems to me to correspond with what your essay calls the Right Brain; his “waking-consciousness” with what your essay calls the Left Brain. Or at any rate the Right Brain is the organ — or faculty — that attunes the subject cosmically, and the Left Brain is the organ — or — faculty that puts the ego in rational communication with other egos.

    I could easily find other passages in The Decline apposite to your topic, especially in Vol. I, in the first three chapters, but the items that I quote above give the flavor of Spengler’s anticipation of the Right-Brain/Left-Brain idea.

  6. Pingback: Sam Harris: The Unconverted | S y d n e y T r a d s
  7. Profoundly interesting read. This idea of how the brain has evolved its two hemispheres to cope with the reality (or meta-reality) of chaos and order in the world is a fascinating concept.

    • Thanks, Nicolas Helssen. I should give credit, of course, to Iain McGilchrist and a bit to Jordan Peterson. But McGilchrist’s work, I find articulates some of the issues I had with my degrees in philosophy. I always had a sympathy and intuitive understanding of the RH that was simply rejected by my professors. To read such a good defense of the vague and hard to articulate aspects of human existence I found really rewarding.

  8. Pingback: AI and the Dehumanization of Man – The Orthosphere
  9. Pingback: Tit for Tat – The Orthosphere
  10. Thank you for your interesting article. It left me with a question. In process of left and right are we losing sight of the integrating the two parts, corpus callosum? Based on understanding we take action and that, I imagine, comes only after integration, or else we ponder and funnel! for ever seems to me.

    • Sorry forgot the click the notification email. I am curious as to your thoughts, please on the corpus callosum? Where it all happens, Thanks much for enlightening us.

    • Hi, Nader: Our consciousness will always be a fusion of the two hemispheres – unless there is some organic thing wrong involving surgery or a stroke, etc. I guess I’m less interested and not really knowledgeable about the physiological mechanics of how it is accomplished. More about the interplay between the two modes of relating the world and integrated they need to be. Sorry I can’t be more helpful.

  11. Pingback: Sam Harris: The Unconverted – Sydney Trads

Comment

This site uses Akismet to reduce spam. Learn how your comment data is processed.

Be Serious

Taken from https://meetingthemasters.blogspot.com/2021/04/be-serious.html

The modern world is fundamentally superficial. I am not simply talking about the childish obsession of many adults with an ever more degraded popular culture, and nor do I just refer to the ordinary person though I include him. I am talking about present day thinkers, the intellectual class, the movers and shakers in all areas of life. Hardly any of these people are really serious. They are just playing games, more concerned with power, fame, money and influence than truth.

A serious person thinks about life and death and grapples with what those might mean because the meaning of death is directly related to the meaning of life. If you say that death has no meaning, it’s just the end, curtains, goodbye, then you have washed your hands of spiritual responsibility. You have trivialised life because you have denied death, and, yes, you have denied it because you have reduced it to nothing and you can only do that by rejecting what it is to be human. For a human being is like an iceberg though with this important difference. It’s an upside down iceberg with the perceived part the lowest part and the hidden part, which nevertheless supports the whole, stretching up above and beyond what is seen and known. The boundary between the two can be melted occasionally in life but is only fully crossed at death.

Human beings come into this world because, unlike in the spiritual domain from whence we derive, we do not know God directly here. We have to find him. We have to choose him. Everything in nature obeys God’s laws automatically except man. We have a natural part which does obey as it must but a human being is also a person so there is necessity but there is also freedom. God has renounced his supreme power to give us some power and he has done so because of love in which there can be no compulsion.

There are fewer and fewer serious people these days, people really willing to think for themselves and look life squarely in the face. We are too distracted by phenomena and the shiny trinkets of modern technology to try to understand what a human being really is. Some people do seek a spiritual answer but the fact is not all forms of spirituality are equally valid. There are some forms that seek to reduce human beings purely to a kind of naked spirit, void of form and individuality. But this is a return to our origins without having learnt the lessons of creation and the material world, and if God had wanted this for us he would never have bothered sending us out into this world, separated from him in order to find him again and know him consciously for who and what he is. There is a higher form of spirituality which includes the spiritual and the individual and the fruits of this are love and creativity, something that pure spirit does not know. For the love that advocates of the pure spirit path talk of is not really this spiritual love at all. They have borrowed the concept from theistic religion while rejecting what makes it possible. Their love is impersonal but impersonal love is a contradiction in terms. God’s love is not impersonal and directed equally to everything. He loves more what opens itself more fully to his love and reflects it back.

As the world progresses further and further into what is effectively chaos it is critical that people become serious. Don’t accept what you are told by authority without submitting it to a thorough intuitive assessment. Even if everyone you know goes along with the agenda that is no reason for you to follow. Hold up everything you are told to the truth of Christ and see whether it stands or falls in that light. The time is coming when Christ will be the only serious thing left.

The double-negative morality of Leftism

The actuality of Leftist morality – and that it is inversion of the true, beautiful and virtuous – is revealed by describing the double-negative reality concealed by the pseudo-positive moral ‘principles’ used to justify Leftist evil.

Here is the way it works:

To be a ‘racist’ is = not to be anti-white

To be a sexist = not to be anti-men…

You see the way it works? Leftism is oppositional, being defined as ‘against’ various ‘evils’. Most of the Leftist ‘evils’ (often expressed as ‘-ist’ or ‘-phobic’) can accurately be described in a similar double-negative fashion:

Not to be anti-native inhabitants of a country…

Not to be opposed to biologically real, reproductively-adaptive sexuality…

Not to be anti-Christian… etc.

The double-negative formulation is a necessity for Leftism, since Leftism is indeed ultimately oppositional (opposing God and divine creation; opposing the true, beautiful and virtuous); thus its ‘positive’ content (i.e. what Leftists want) is protean and labile, self-contradicting and incoherent.

After all, there are an ‘infinite’ number of ways of opposing The Good.

To be morally excoriated by the Left, all that is required is to be against opposing the Good, in any particular respect.

Added – Double-negative denialism

For the sake of completeness, and to include two of the biggest recent double-negative global crusades. What do accusations of denialism amount to?

Climate denialism: Hatred of those people who do not regard carbon as the greatest threat to life on earth

Birdemic denialism: Terror of those who are not afraid of close proximity to human beings

 

Note: This idea was triggered by a post by William Wildblood, where he give a double negative definition of ‘racist’.

Explaining human altruism

Taken from here

Humans often behave altruistically towards strangers with no chance of reciprocation. From an evolutionary perspective, this is puzzling. The evolution of altruistic cooperative behavior—in which an organism’s action reduces its fitness and increases the fitness of another organism (e.g. by sharing food)—only makes sense when it is directed at genetically related organisms (kin selection) or when one can expect the favor to be returned (reciprocal altruism). Therefore, evolutionary theorists such as Sober and Wilson have argued that we should revise Neo-Darwininian evolutionary theory. They argue that human altruism evolved through group selection in which groups of altruists were naturally selected because they had a comparative advantage over other groups. Wilson and Sober’s hypothesis attracted followers but is rejected by most of their peers. The heated debate between advocates and critics of group selection often suffers from a lack of conceptual clarity. In response, I set out to clearly distinguish ‘genetic’ from ‘cultural’ group selection (developed by Boyd, Richerson & Henrich) and argue that the latter does not face the potentially debilitating problems plaguing the former. I defend the claim that human altruistic dispositions evolved through cultural group selection and gene-culture coevolution and offer empirical evidence in support. I also argue that actual altruistic behavior often goes beyond the kind of behavior humans have evolved to display. Conscious and voluntary reasoning processes, I show, have an important role in altruistic behavior. This is often overlooked in the scientific literature on human altruism.

Introduction

Humans often behave altruistically towards strangers with no chance of reciprocation. Many people donate blood and funds for the benefit of people they will never meet and often do so anonymously. In experimental settings, people often cooperate with strangers in one-shot prisoner’s dilemma’s (in which ‘defecting’ always yields a higher individual payoff) and offer something rather than nothing in dictator games to strangers (when they could have kept everything for themselves) (Camerer and Thaler 1995; Camerer 2003; Henrich et al. 2001; Fehr and Rockenbach 2004; Gächter and Herrmann 2009). Many people are also willing to incur costs to punish those who have harmed the group or others. This too is altruistic behavior. (Fehr and Gächter 2002a). While there is variation between cultures, altruistic behavior is a human universal (Gächter and Herrmann 2009; Vakoch 2013).

The question I pose in this paper is the following: why do humans often exhibit altruistic behavior towards non-kin with no chance of reciprocation? From an evolutionary perspective, this is puzzling. The evolution of altruistic cooperative behavior—in which an organism’s action reduces its fitness and increases the fitness of another organism (e.g. by sharing food) only makes sense when it is directed at genetically related organisms or when one can expect the favor to be returned. The first kind of altruism is referred to as ‘kin altruism’ and was elucidated by Fisher (1930), Haldane (1932) and Hamilton (1964) who understood that the altruistic organism was in fact increasing its evolutionary success since it was helping genetically related organisms. The second kind of altruism is known as ‘reciprocal altruism’ and was elucidated by Trivers (1971) who understood that the altruistic organism was in fact behaving in an ‘enlightened’ self-interested way since it could expect the favor to be returned in the future (Ruse 1979, p. 49).

Human altruism directed at non-kin with no chance of reciprocation cannot be satisfactorily explained in terms of ‘kin selection’ or ‘reciprocal altruism’. Behavioral and evolutionary scientists and philosophers of science have consequently looked for alternative explanations of human altruism. These explanations often invoke ‘group selection’. Influential scholars such as David Wilson (19752005) and Elliot Sober and Wilson (1998) have developed group selection accounts of human altruism and many have followed their lead. Group selection theories, however, remain very controversial and are strongly rejected by an important numbers of scientists and philosophers of science (e.g. Dawkins 1994; Dennett 1994; Maynard Smith 1998; Pinker 2012).

Amid the controversy, a promising account of the evolution of human altruism: cultural group selection and gene-culture coevolution, is often brushed aside for no good reason. Cultural group selection, however, does not face the problems associated with traditional group selection (henceforth: genetic group selection). Human altruistic dispositions, I will argue, evolved through a combination of cultural group selection leading to a highly cooperative niche characterized by prosocial norms and punishments and standard (individualistic) natural selection of (altruistic) psychological traits in this altered social environment (that rewards altruism and punishes free-riding and other anti-social behavior). Such an interaction between cultural and genetic evolutionary processes is referred to as ‘gene-culture coevolution’ by Boyd and Richerson (1985) and Richerson and Boyd (2005).

While this hypothesis provides us with a plausible and evidence-based explanation of the evolution of altruistic psychological dispositions, it cannot explain many instances of human altruism and moral behavior in general that evidently go beyond the kind of behavior for which these dispositions evolved. The evolutionary story only provides us with half of the story of why humans often behave altruistically towards non-kin with no chance of reciprocation. We must also consider the important role of conscious and voluntary reasoning processes in moral decision-making. This is often overlooked in the scientific literature on human altruism.

In this paper, I have three objectives. Firstly, I want to clearly distinguish between ‘genetic’ and ‘cultural’ group selection and argue that the latter does not face the potentially debilitating problems plaguing the former. This is important since many group selection accounts combine (and do not clearly distinguish between) genetic and cultural group selection. Secondly, I aim to provide a plausible account of the evolution of human altruistic dispositions in particular and human moral psychology in general and support my hypothesis with evidence. Finally, I aim to complete extant naturalistic explanations of human altruism that focus on its evolutionary underpinning, by showing and describing the important role of reasoning processes in altruistic behavior.

In Sect. 2, I elucidate the notion of altruism by distinguishing between biological and psychological altruism and discuss the proximate explanations of human biological altruism. In Sect. 3, I take on the ultimate explanation of human (biological) altruism: group selection. I distinguish between ‘genetic’ and ‘cultural’ group selection and argue that the latter—in conjunction with gene-culture coevolution—offers a theoretically satisfactory and empirically supported explanation for the evolution of human altruistic dispositions. In Sect. 4, I discuss the evidence for the existence of a highly cooperative cultural niche in which recent human evolution took place. In Sect. 5, I argue that evolutionary dynamics only provide us with a partial answer to the question why some humans behave altruistically towards strangers with no chance of reciprocation. When explaining altruistic human behavior (and norms) we must also take into account conscious and voluntary reasoning processes. In Sect. 6, I conclude.

Proximate explanations

Psychological versus biological altruism

What do I mean by altruism? In its vernacular sense, altruism refers to other-regarding and selfless acts and dispositions. Altruists (are predisposed to) engage in costly behavior aimed to benefit others without an ulterior selfish motive (such as enhancing one’s reputation or expecting the beneficiary to return the favor). In the scientific literature on altruism, however, altruism does not take on this vernacular sense but refers to either psychological or biological altruism. Psychological altruism is solely concerned with motives. It refers to the desire to benefit another. Biological (or evolutionary) altruism, on the other hand, is solely concerned with acts. It refers to acts that increase the fitness (the chances of survival and reproduction) of the recipient and decrease the fitness of the actor. The desire to share a candy bar is a matter of psychological altruism, while the act of sharing food qualifies as biological altruism (see Sober 1988; Sober and Wilson 1998; Ananth 2005).

Biological altruism is a common occurrence in the natural world. At all levels of complexity, organisms act in ways that reduce their own chances of survival and reproduction and increases the chances of survival and reproduction of other organisms. Most often, the beneficiaries of altruistic acts are offspring or genetically related organisms. This is referred to as ‘kin altruism’ and it makes good evolutionary sense. Enhancing the fitness of genetically related organisms enhances one’s own evolutionary success (i.e. the success an organism has in spreading its genetic material) since it helps organisms carrying similar genetic material to spread their genetic material. From a gene-centric perspective on natural selection (famously popularized by Dawkins 1976) kin altruism is readily understood: genes coding for altruistic behavior towards kin are great replicators (and can therefore be expected to spread), since they ‘help’ copies of themselves in other organisms (i.e. in those genetically related organisms).

Fisher (1930) and Haldane (1932) were the first to formalize this process of ‘kin selection’. It explains most instances of altruistic animal behavior, including its most extreme manifestations such as the sacrificing behavior of eusocial insects likes bees and ants for the hives and colonies (of genetically related organisms) they belong to. Later, Hamilton (1964) developed and formalized the concept of ‘inclusive fitness’. According to Hamilton, genes that underlie behavior that benefits a genetically related organism contribute to the inclusive fitness of that organism if the benefit is larger than the cost given the degree of relatedness. So, given that I share 50% of my genes with my brother (on average), my inclusive fitness goes up if my actions boost his fitness by a factor of 10 and reduce my fitness (the cost of my altruistic act) by less than 5.

Biological altruism towards non-kin is less prevalent, but it does occur. Some birds give warning calls when they spot a predator (thereby potentially attracting the attention of the predator), vampire bats share food with conspecifics that didn’t have a successful hunt, and meerkats routinely go on the lookout for danger (and also emit warning cries) while the others are foraging and feeding. In all of these cases, the immediate fitness (chances of survival and reproduction) of the actors decreases and the fitness of the recipient (and often non-related) group members goes up. Despite the fact that it decreases the (inclusive) fitness of the altruistic organism in the short term, such altruistic behavior evolved because it is reciprocal. The altruists are repaid the favor (and free-riders are denied future favors), so the altruist benefits in the long term (its fitness increases). Robert Trivers (1971) elucidated the concept of reciprocal altruism and showed that it is ‘enlightened self-interest’ (Ruse 1979, p. 49).

Humans, however, often engage in altruistic acts directed at strangers (non-kin) and with no chance of reciprocation. Evidence for this unique form of altruism (it has not been observed in any other species) can be found both in the field and in the lab. Many people donate blood and money, they offer their seat to unrelated pregnant ladies and help old people cross the street. All of these altruistic acts come with no expectation of reciprocation. In the lab, behavioral game-theoretic experiments—such as one-shot prisoner’s dilemma, public good games or dictator games played for real money—reveal that a sizable percentage of test subjects will indeed act altruistically towards total strangers. They forego a larger payoff to benefit the other player(s), even when they know that the recipients cannot repay the favor. Many participants will also give up part of their allocated sum in public good games to punish free-riders who do not contribute to the public good. (For an overview of these experiments and the results they yield: see Camerer and Thaler 1995; Camerer 2003; Fehr and Gächter 2002ab; Fehr and Rockenbach 2004; Gächter and Herrmann 2009).

Proximate explanations

What causes this peculiar behavior? Proximate explanations of human biological altruism—explanations in terms of the direct causes—are not hard to come by. Many people are endowed with psychological altruism or other-regarding preferences: they often desire to help another even if that comes at a personal cost. Furthermore, they possess a sense of fairness and a desire or a feeling of obligation to act fairly. Finally, they want to follow social norms that require them to act fairly and engage in altruistic acts or feel obligated to so. Evidence for these psychological preferences and their universality comes from diverse strands of research such as neurology, anthropology and developmental psychology.

Neuroimaging studies reveal that altruistic behavior activates brain regions that are associated with cognitive and emotional empathy and reward processing (Filkowski et al. 2016; Sonne and Gash 2018). Engaging in altruistic behavior stimulates the feel good hormones of the brain: dopamine, oxytocin and serotonin (Bruening 2016). In fact, in a clever experiment in which a large sample of people were randomly assigned to spend money on themselves or to spend it on others, Dunn and colleagues (2008) found that the group that was asked to spend it on others reported (significantly) greater happiness than the group that was asked to keep it for themselves. This evidence suggests that engaging in altruistic acts often follows from a genuine concern for others (emotional empathyFootnote1) and is inherently rewarding. This explains why many people behave altruistically (without expecting anything in return).

There is also good evidence that humans are endowed with an innate sense of fairness and a desire to act accordingly. Tomasello and colleagues found that young children possess a set of (innate) intuitions about distributive fairness. They tend to share spoils equally after having collaborated equally to obtain them—even if they could keep them for themselves (Warneken and Tomasello 2009; Warneken et al. 2011)—they understand and defend the entitlement of others (Schmidt et al. 2013), and give less to free-riders than to collaborators (Melis et al. 2013). According to Binmore (2005), a universal deep structure of fairness underlies human fairness considerations, analogically to Chomsky’s (1955) deep structure underlying natural language acquisition (the so-called ‘universal grammar’). In support of his claim, Binmore (2005) points at strong cross-cultural similarities in human fairness norms. This innate sense of fairness (present in very young children and in all cultures), explains why people would behave altruistically in certain contexts (such as proposing equal divisions in dictator games and cooperating in one-shot prisoner’s dilemma).

Finally, people tend to follow social norms. According to Bicchieri (2005, p. 42), they can be moved to do so for a number of reasons. Their compliance may be born out of fear of incurring reputation damage or of being punished (informally) by their peers for breaking the rules. People may also follow norms because they accord value to these norms or because they want to fulfill the legitimate expectations of others. Whatever the underlying reason, it stands beyond doubt that most humans have the inclination to follow social norms. As Bicchieri (2005, p. 55) rightly points out: if this were not the case, social norms could not exist. Interestingly, cross-cultural research with behavioral game-theoretic experiments gauging altruism and fairness in different societies, shows that the actions of participants in these games tend to mirror the patterns of interaction in their society (Gintis 2006, p. 26). In other words, participants often follow the social norms that govern the social interaction in their societies. The reason for many altruistic acts therefore may be that people follow social norms requiring them to act altruistically.

While these proximate explanations of human altruistic behavior—the underlying psychological features (and the neurological underpinnings)—are well documented and widely accepted, the same cannot be said for the ultimate explanation. Why did humans evolve such altruistic dispositions in the first place?

Group selection

Ultimate explanations of the evolution of altruistic dispositions, leading to behavior that benefits others in the group at the expense of the altruistic individual, often invoke group selection. The reasoning goes as follows: groups of altruists have a higher fitness than (and often outcompeted) groups of non-altruists. Therefore, altruistic individuals making up these successful groups, generously contributed to the genepool. Groups of non-altruists—on the other hand—eventually perished, so their members left no descendants. Darwin himself pointed this out:

When two tribes of primeval man, living in the same country, came into competition, if (other things being equal) the one tribe included a great number of courageous, sympathetic and faithful members, who were always ready to warn each other of danger, to aid and defend each other, this tribe would succeed better and conquer the other. (Darwin 1871, p. 166).

Ancestral human groups had much to gain with altruistic cooperation. Altruistic cooperation makes hunting more successful since it allowed ancestral humans to take down big game. It also reduces the risk of famine through food sharing. It provides a huge advantage when it comes to warfare: imagine a group of individuals willing to risk life and limb for the group facing a group of individuals not willing to do so (Bowles and Gintis 2011, pp. 3–4, Wilson 2005, p. 12). Finally, it allows for cooperative child rearing, in which ‘allo-parents’ share some of the long and arduous work to raise children. This raises the reproductive success of members in the group (Hrdy 2009). Given the large benefits produced by altruistic cooperation, it safe to assume that throughout human evolutionary history groups of altruistic cooperators would have thrived at the expense of groups of non-altruists.

However, any explanation that invokes the (natural) selection of traits that benefit the group at the expense of the individual faces an obvious challenge. The consensus among evolutionary biologists is that natural selection will retain traits in organisms that provide those organisms with an advantage in terms of survival and reproduction over conspecifics that do not possess these traits or possess them to a lesser extent. So how could altruistic traits have been selected? Free-riders would readily drive altruists to extinction within the group. They would profit from the altruism of others without bearing any of the costs of altruism and pass down their egotistical genes in greater numbers than the altruists would. Darwin (1871, p. 88) understood this too: “He who was ready to sacrifice his life, as many a savage has been, rather than betray his comrades, would often leave no offspring to inherit his noble nature.” So, how could such a trait evolve?

One possible explanation is that free-riding within groups is prevented and that natural selection driven by between group dynamics (selecting for group beneficial traits in individuals) offsets natural selection driven by within group dynamics (selecting for individually beneficial traits). This is Sober and Wilson’s (1998) view. They propose a so-called ‘multi-level selection’ account, claiming that not only genes and/or organisms are units of natural selection but also groups. While theoretically possible, this conjecture faces important and potentially debilitating problems (that I will mention below).

There is however another explanation for the evolution of altruistic dispositions in humans, which does not face these problems and is supported by extensive evidence. Between-group competition did not select directly for ‘altruistic genes’ in humans but selected (culturally not biologically) for strong prosocial norms in groups. These cultural features, in turn, have shaped a radically altered social environment in which altruistic traits are naturally selected because they boost the fitness of individuals. Such an explanation invokes cultural group selection (and gene-culture coevolution) rather than genetic group selection.

This distinction between ‘genetic’ and ‘cultural’ group selection is not always clearly made in the literature. Many accounts invoke both kinds of group selection. Sober and Wilson (1998, p. 147), for instance, argue that groups needed rules and regulations to become adaptive units (of natural selection). In other words, cultural group selection yielded rules and regulations, which then brought about a process of genetic group selection. Similarly mixed accounts have been proposed by others (e.g. Boehm 1997; Wilson and Kniffin 1999; Wilson 2005; Fehr and Gächter 2002b; Gintis et al. 2003; Bowles and Gintis 2011). This may have led sceptics (such as Pinker 2012) to dismiss any form of group selection, including cultural group selection, at the outset (while only offering arguments targeted at genetic group selection).

Genetic group selection

Sober and Wilson (1998, see also Wilson 2005) argue that individual natural selection cannot select for altruistic behavior because such behavior decreases the relative fitness of individuals within the group and would be selected against. Therefore, they conclude, it must have been naturally selected at the level of groups. The position they defend is often referred to as ‘multi-level selection’ (Sober and Wilson 1998; Okasha 2005): natural selection does not only act on the level of individuals, but also on the level of groups. Altruistic behavioral dispositions, by this rationale, evolved because natural selective pressure at the level of the group outweighed selective pressure at the level of the individual.

Simply put, advocates of explanations of altruism in terms of genetic group selection claim that altruistic dispositions evolved because altruistic individuals making up altruistic groups had greater reproductive success than less altruistic individuals making up less altruistic groups. Group selection in this explanation is acting directly on the genome. Such a position is not only championed by Sober and Wilson (1998), others followed in their wake (e.g. Okasha 2005; Fletcher and Doebeli 2009; Bravetti and Padilla 2018).

The obvious challenge to genetic group selection accounts of the evolution of human altruism is that individual selection is a prominent driver of evolution. It is hard to imagine that altruistic groups would not be invaded by free-riders outcompeting them and driving them to extinction. In response, genetic group selectionists invoke assortative interaction (Sober and Wilson 1998, p. 135) or correlated interaction (Okasha 2005). They rightly argue that if there are mechanisms in place so that altruists only interact with other altruists, they can avoid being ‘suckered’ and outcompeted by free-riders. Such altruistic clusters would then have a marked evolutionary advantage over less altruistic groups and their genetic endowment would spread in the human genepool. There is good evidence that humans did evolve cognitive faculties devoted to the detection of ‘cheaters’ (Cosmides and Tooby 2005) and to reputation tracking (Mealey et al. 1996; Oda 1997) together with altruistic dispositions. This would have protected altruists against the exploitation of free-riders and explains why reciprocal altruism occurs (not only in human groups but also in groups of other species such as certain bird species, vampire bats and meerkats, as pointed out above).

As critics have pointed out, however, postulating that there was genetic group selection of human traits requires us to make a series of additional assumptions that are problematic. First and foremost, it assumes that there was substantial genetic variation between human groupsand that there was limited migration between groups (which is necessary to sustain genetic variation between groups). Moreover, it assumes that there was a considerable rate of group extinction and that successful groups split up to form more groups (reproducing or replicating as organisms and genes do) (Maynard Smith 1976; Pinker 2012; Richerson et al 2016). Therefore, the majority of evolutionary scientists are highly skeptical of theories advocating genetic group selection of human traits. When the famous biologist Edward Wilson (not to be confused with David Wilson mentioned above) wrote an article in which he defended genetic group selection with colleagues Nowak et al. (2010), 137 scientists responded in a joint paper strongly contesting their views (Abbot et al. 2011).Footnote2 Reviewing the arguments and counter-arguments is beyond the scope of this paper. For our purposes, it suffices to say that—while the jury is still out—the majority of evolutionary scientists reject explanations of human altruism in terms of genetic group selection. What I will argue below is that we do not need to invoke this controversial evolutionary mechanism to explain human altruism.

Sober and Wilson (1998) are right—I believe—in claiming that between-group dynamics are the architect of certain remarkable human altruistic dispositions. We cannot explain the evolution of human altruistic dispositions solely in terms of inclusive individual fitness (given that it is often directed at non-kin) and reciprocity (given that it is often directed at people who cannot reciprocate). This, however, does not entail that we need to go up a level of natural selection (the group level). Contra Sober and Wilson (1998), I will argue that it is standard individual natural selection that selected for altruistic dispositions in humans. How is this possible? Doesn’t altruism reduce individual fitness and shouldn’t it therefore be selected against at the individual level? To answer this question, we must insert culture and cultural evolution into the equation.

Cultural group selection (and gene-culture coevolution)

Evolutionary processes do not only shape the genome of organisms, they also shape features of human cultures (such as beliefs, customs and norms). In previous work (Vlerick 20162020ab), I have developed a model of cultural evolution in which I identify within and between group dynamics as the main drivers of cultural selection. Within group dynamics select for cultural features that are psychologically attractive (or beliefs that are memorable) and are therefore taken up and transmitted by group members. Between group dynamics select for cultural features that provide the group with an advantage over other groups that do not possess these cultural features (or possess them to a lesser extent).

Between group dynamics select—among other things—for prosocial norms and punishments. This enhances the (altruistic) cooperation within the group (Vlerick 2020ab). In particular, competition between groups selects for norms (and punishments) that reduce conflict and enable and protect altruistic cooperation within groups (Aviles 2002; Boyd et al 2003; West et al. 2007; Puurtinen and Mappes 2009). The selective pressure arising from group competition is what Boyd, Richerson, Henrich and others refer to as ‘cultural group selection’ (Boyd and Richerson 19852002; Richerson and Boyd 1999; Henrich 2004; Richerson et al. 2016).

Several important factors underlie the cultural selection or proliferation of group beneficial social norms and punishments. In direct conflict between groups, other things being equal, the most cooperative group is more likely to be victorious and conquer the other group. In competition between groups over scarce resources, cooperative groups are likely to outcompete less cooperative groups (and survive while the other groups perish). More cooperative groups are also more likely to produce more wealth which throughout human history (until very recently) correlated with demographic expansion and can lead to the demographic swamping of less successful groups. Finally, individuals from less wealthy groups often migrate to wealthier groups and the customs and norms of successful groups are often imitated by less successful neighboring groups (Bowles and Gintis 2011, p. 50).

For all of these reasons, social norms underlying extensive (and altruistic) in-group cooperation are likely to proliferate. Ethnographic analogues suggest that Pleistocene hunter-gatherer groups possessed such complex sets of rules regulating the interaction of individuals within the group, that there were substantial differences (with respect to these sets of rules) between different groups and that there was frequent (competitive) interaction between groups (Hill et al. 2014; Richerson et al. 2016). In such a context, between group dynamics must have been a prominent driver of cultural evolution.

Because of this cultural evolutionary process driven by between group competition, societies emerged that were increasingly governed by prosocial norms and punishments. Such a social environment did in turn have a strong effect on the biological evolution of ancestral humans. It (naturally) selected for cooperative, norm-abiding and altruistic individuals. Prosocial norms and punishment in ancestral societies did not only ensure that free-riders did not get away with their cooperation eroding behavior (they are being punished) and that consequently altruism could be sustained within groups (Vlerick 20162020a), over time they also shaped the genome of the individuals inhabiting those societies. Because with such a normative framework in place, the egoists and the sociopaths are reliably punished (which included banishment and murder) for their anti-social behavior and would be less likely than norm abiding altruists to spread their (antisocial) genes.

In short, a culturally evolved highly cooperative niche radically changed the social environment in which human genetic evolution took place. It produced what Henrich (2016, p. 185) refers to as a process of ‘self-domestication’. Humans did not only domesticate animal species (e.g. turning wolves into dogs by selectively breeding with the most docile animals), they inadvertently did something similar to themselves. By consequently punishing egotistical, unruly and overly aggressive individuals and preventing them from spreading their sociopathic genes, humans were selectively ‘bred’ with those individuals that happened to have an inclination to follow social norms and behave altruistically.

This process is an instance of what Richerson and Boyd (19852005) call ‘culture-led gene-culture coevolution’. A culturally evolved social environment steered human genetic evolution. Human culture and biology co-evolved, leading to ever more altruistic humans. The key to explaining the strong altruistic dispositions of many people—inciting to them to behave altruistically towards strangers without expecting anything in return—lies in the uniqueness of this behavior in the animal kingdom. It evolved in response to an equally unique feature of human life: complex culture with prosocial norms and punishments, which in turn had the power to shape the human genome. Any account of the evolution of human altruism and human moral psychology in general that doesn’t take into account the cultural context in which this evolution took place—such as explanations solely in terms of genetic group selection—misses the central cause.

A culturally evolved highly cooperative niche

Human altruistic dispositions, I have argued, were naturally selected in social environments characterized by ever more stringent prosocial norms, extensive monitoring of group members and harsh punishment of those not abiding by these norms (harsh enough to decrease their reproductive success). In this culturally evolved context, norm abiding altruists had an evolutionary advantage over their more selfish and unruly peers. Any attempt to reverse engineer the environmental context in which traits evolved, however, invites the criticism of being ‘just-so-stories’. Therefore, in this section, I will discuss the evidence supporting my hypothesis.

Evidence

‘Sanctions for crimes against the collectivity’ features on Brown’s (1991) famous list of human universals. All current human societies have such (formal and/or informal) sanctions, including the few remaining hunter-gatherer societies. While anthropological evidence for the universality of prosocial punishment is of course no guarantee that ancestral human (hunter-gatherer) societies would have possessed such prosocial punishments, it is nevertheless a good indication that they had. According to Boehm (1997) and Bowles and Gintis (2011, p. 5), such prosocial punishments were facilitated by the possession of projectile weapons which enabled groups of people to collectively punish norm violators (e.g. by banishing or murdering them) at relatively low risk to each individual punisher.

However, as Henrich (2010, pp. 187–188) points out, punishment of norm violators in small-scale societies doesn’t typically take on this harsh form. It often starts with gossip and ridicule and—if the norm violator doesn’t redeem him or herself—punishment is ramped up leading to exclusion from marital prospects and from trading partners. Only as a last resort does it escalate to banishment, physical violence and coordinated group executions. Henrich (2010) finds support for the universality of such prosocial punishments in small-scale societies in studies on a wide range of different ethnic groups (see Boehm 1993; Chudek and Henrich 2011; Bowles et al. 2012; Mathew and Boyd 2011; and Wiessner 2005).

This is not surprising. Developmental research has brought to light that children are prone to punish rule breakers and free-riders at a very young age (Melis et al. 2013). This points at an innate human desire to punish rule breakers. Moreover, in all cultures people are socially reprimanded for violations of rules of conduct that do not actually harm anybody (such as violating a dietary taboo or ignoring a social convention). Demanding that others conform to the social rules and punishing (often in subtle ways) those who do not, seems to be deeply ingrained in human nature. The prevalence of such punishments combined with effective monitoring of social behavior would have reliably disadvantaged individuals less prone to follow social norms and individuals who repeatedly put their own interests before those of others.

Effective monitoring, in turn, is facilitated by reputation tracking and by exchanging social information. There is equally good evidence for the prevalence of these activities in all human societies. According to Trivers (1971) and Panchanathan and Boyd (2004), reputation tracking is another human universal. It is a common occurrence in all human societies and there is no reason to believe that it wasn’t equally prevalent in pre-agricultural societies inhabited by biologically modern human beings. According to Dunbar (1996) language evolved (gradually) in the human lineage for this very purpose. He proposes a so-called ‘gossip theory’ of the evolution of language, in which he argues that language evolved for social bonding and to exchange social information. Language enabled our ancestors to form close ties with a relatively large number of individuals (about 150 individuals according to Dunbar) and enabled them to acquire and transmit information to others. This protected them against the exploitation of free-riders (see also Enquist and Leimar 1993). In support of his hypothesis, Dunbar points out that ‘gossiping’ (exchanging social information) is still language’s most prominent function. A whopping sixty percent of casual human conversations are about other people (Dunbar et al. 1995).

From these strands of evidence emerges a picture of the societal context in which our recent evolutionary history took place: a context characterized by demanding (pro)social norms, incessant monitoring whether or not individuals abide by these norms and hard to escape punishments for those breaking the rules.

Maladaptive in modern contexts?

Tooby and Cosmides (1996, p. 122) and Dawkins (1976, p. 220) have argued that there is a mismatch between our ancestral social context—in which most interactions took place between genetically related individuals or closely acquainted, reciprocating individuals—and our modern social context, characterized by its many interactions between total strangers. Therefore, they argue, human altruistic dispositions were adaptive in our ancestral context (which is why they evolved), but are actually maladaptive in the modern context. They no longer increase the (long-term, inclusive) fitness of the individuals engaging in altruistic behavior but decrease it, since they lead people to behave altruistically towards total strangers with no chance of reciprocation.

By this rationale, people donate blood and funds to strangers and behave altruistically in one-shot prisoner’s dilemma and dictator games, because natural selection has hardwired them to behave altruistically (see proximate explanations of human altruism—Sect. 2). While this was adaptive in ancestral times, it is maladaptive in modern times. In other words, the reason why humans engage in these peculiar (and allegedly maladaptive) forms of altruistic behavior, is because their evolved social nature ‘misfires’ in a modern context. Compare it with our craving for sweet tasting food and drinks. These cravings were adaptive in ancestral times, where they motivated humans to consume ripe fruit containing the necessary carbohydrates and vitamin C, but are maladaptive in modern environments filled with cheap and unhealthy candy and soft drinks.

Under scrutiny, however, the mismatch hypothesis to explain human altruism does not hold up. Firstly, as Hill and colleagues (20112014) have pointed out, hunter-gatherer societies are relatively open social systems. In all likelihood, our ancestors would have interacted with an important number of people outside of their tribe (e.g. to trade). In other words, (paleo) anthropological evidence seems to refute the premise that our ancestors only interacted with kin and people to whom they were closely acquainted.

Moreover, I discern two important problems with Tooby and Cosmides (1996, p. 122) and Dawkins’ (1976, p. 220) mismatch hypothesis to explain human altruism. The first is that it seems to assume that people evolved to be indiscriminate altruists (leading them to behave altruistically towards non-reciprocating strangers today). This is not the case. As pointed out above, humans have evolved a range of cognitive skills and dispositions—such as a ‘cheater detection module’, the ability and desire to track the reputation of others and to exchange social information with others—precisely to be discriminate altruists. When people behave altruistically towards total strangers, they are not ‘fooled’ by a confusing modern context. They typically do so because they empathize with these strangers and decide it is the morally right thing to do.

This brings me to the second problem with the mismatch hypothesis (and most other evolutionary explanations of human altruism). It assumes that altruistic behavior is solely the result of evolved, ‘hardwired’ psychological mechanisms adapted to the ancestral social environment. As I will argue in the next section, underlying actual altruistic behavior are not merely evolved intuition and emotion-based dispositions but also conscious and voluntary reasoning processes. Many scientific accounts of human altruism ignoreFootnote3 the important role of these reasoning processes (or at least, the causal role of these reasoning processes remains underdeveloped in said accounts). They often look no further than the evolutionary rationale underlying altruistic behavior and miss a very important piece of the puzzle.

The role of reasoning

Moral decisions—such as the decision to cooperate in one-shot prisoner’s dilemma, propose fair divisions in dictator games and donate blood—are not merely the outcome of hard-wired emotion and intuition-based processes. They also involve reasoning processes. In a landmark experimental study subjecting participants to brain scans while presenting them with moral dilemmas, Greene and colleagues (2001) found that next to an emotional cognitive subsystem, we employ a reason-based cognitive subsystem in moral evaluation and decision-making. Whereas the emotional system often floods our moral thinking automatically and subconsciously, the reasoning system can in some cases override its output and generally takes over when presented with moral problems for which we have no ready-made, automatic, intuition or emotion-based response (see also Greene 2013 and Vlerick 2017).

Therefore, if we want to explain human altruistic behavior we should not only take into account the evolution of the intuition and emotion-based psychological dispositions (which I have described in Sect. 2 on ‘proximate explanations’). We must also take into account conscious and voluntary reasoning processes involved in moral decision-making. These reasoning processes, I will argue below, have a major impact on moral behavior in general and altruism towards out-group strangers in particular.

The ‘escalator’ effect of reasoning on morality

The moral behavior some people engage in is far-removed from the kind of behavior we would expect given the adaptive rationale of the psychological dispositions underlying this behavior. Our moral psychology, as argued above, evolved as an adaptation to a highly cooperative niche characterized by strong prosocial norms and punishments that orchestrated in-group interaction. In other words, our moral psychology evolved for altruistic cooperation within the groups in which we live. Yet humans routinely engage in altruistic acts directed at obvious out-group members (and even go so far as to behave altruistically towards non-human animals and future, unborn generations). This is puzzling.

Tooby and Cosmides (1996) and Dawkins’ (1976) attempt to explain this by arguing that our moral psychology ‘misfires’ in modern multicultural contexts is—as argued above—problematic. Western people who donate funds to starving Africans know very well that they are doing so for the benefit of ‘out-group’ individuals. They are not fooled by a confusing modern context, but consciously decide to help those in need, regardless of their culture or ethnicity (Vlerick 2017). This kind of moral behavior is not rooted in (intuition or emotion-based) psychological mechanisms which evolved for in-group (altruistic) cooperation. It is the outcome of conscious reasoning processes.

Peter Singer (1995, p. 226) refers to this as the ‘escalator of reason’. Reasoning about morality can lead to behavior and moral norms that are far-removed from the behavior for which our moral psychology evolved. Altruism towards strangers with no chance of reciprocation in the absence of any social expectation or potential reputation gain—such as anonymous charity donations, anonymous (and unadvertised) blood donations, cooperating in anonymous single shot prisoner dilemma’s with strangers and anonymous fair offerings in dictator games—is an instance of such behavior. These moral actions are not merely the output of hardwired psychological dispositions (which explains why many people do not engage in these altruistic acts). They often involve moral reasoning. Interestingly in this regard, a study has brought to light that altruistic behavior correlates with level of education (Westlake et al. 2019). The authors of the study surmise that people who benefited from a higher level of education might be better at internalizing prosocial norms. I would add that people who benefited from a higher level of education might also be better trained in reasoning about moral issues and reflecting on their moral behavior.

Norm abidance or reasoning?

A rival explanation for altruistic behavior that goes beyond the kind of behavior we would expect from an evolutionary perspective is that people just follow social norms that happen to impose or at least encourage this kind of altruistic behavior. So, rather than behaving altruistically after autonomous moral reasoning or reflection, people could simply be abiding by social norms or social expectations. This is a valid point. Norm abidance is indeed a major cause of altruistic behavior (see Sect. 2 on proximate explanations). As pointed out, data gathered from behavioral game-theoretic experiments in different cultural contexts shows that people tend to follow the social norms that govern their societies in these experiments (Gintis 2006).

However, social norm following does not explain all altruistic deeds. There is no social norm that requires people to donate blood in contemporary societies (people are not socially reprimanded for not donating blood), yet some people regularly volunteer to do so. While they might do so for a variety of reasons—including virtue signaling—moral reasoning is likely to be an important factor. Campaigns for blood donation typically try to persuade people to donate by presenting the public with arguments (e.g. ‘you can save lives’). In other words, these campaigns trigger moral reasoning processes in potential donators, hoping they will make a conscious moral decision to donate.

Moreover, even if many people engage in altruistic acts directed at non-kin with no chance of reciprocation because they abide by social norms or expectations, conscious reasoning processes are still part of the explanation of these altruistic acts. Most of these norms saw the light because individuals challenged the status quo through moral reasoning and because (many) others accepted the new moral imperative after evaluating the reasons offered in support of this imperative. It is only once a social norm is ‘established’ that people abide by it without reflection. Even in cases of social norm following, reasoning processes (albeit of others) are therefore still part of the picture. They explain why these norms arose in the first place.

An evolved moral compass powered by reason

So, in answering the question why humans routinely engage in altruistic behavior towards non-kin and with no chance of reciprocation, the evolution of altruistic dispositions only provides us with half of the explanation. In addition to evolved moral intuitions and emotions (such as empathy and norm abidance), we must take into account reasoning processes that underlie moral decisions and behavior. This however does not diminish the importance of the evolution of these altruistic dispositions in explanations of human altruism. Reasoning processes—which are content-free—will not lead to moral behavior by themselves. They must latch onto ‘moral’ and ‘altruistic’ psychological dispositions such as a sense of fairness (Binmore 2005) and empathy.Footnote4

These evolved psychological dispositions provide our moral reasoning processes with a direction. They provide us with what I have called ‘an evolved moral compass’ in previous work (Vlerick 2017). Such a moral compass powered by reason—I have argued—is the driver of moral progress. Without reasoning processes there would be no way to challenge the moral status quo. Singer’s ‘escalator’ would disappear. Without an innate (intuition and emotion-based) moral compass, reasoning would not lead to moral or altruistic behavior. In the absence of these prosocial dispositions, it is safe to assume that we would apply our reasoning processes in our self-interest and the interest of close kin. What explains the uniqueness of human altruism—the fact that it is often directed at non-kin with no chance of reciprocation—is precisely this powerful combination of a highly prosocial nature (adapted to a highly cooperative social context) and our ability to take our prosocial behavior to the next level by reflecting on moral norms, decisions and behavior.

Conclusion

Human altruism is exceptional in the animal kingdom. In no other species has widespread (biological) altruism directed at non-kin, with no chance of reciprocation, been observed. This remarkable behavior has puzzled evolutionists since Darwin and attempts to explain human altruism have created a lot of confusion and debate. It has led many scholars to develop group selection theories, which in turn have been heavily criticized. Explanations of human altruism are still the subject of much (and heated) debate today, but often the debate suffers from a lack of clarity. It is not always clear what exactly ‘group selection’ refers to and different scholars use it in different ways. As Maynard Smith (1998) rightly points out in his review of Sober and Wilson’s (1998) ‘Unto others’—in which they develop their group selection account of human altruism—the discussion has often turned semantic, with quarreling parties mainly disagreeing on the appropriate terminology rather than the underlying processes they describe.

In response, I set out to create some much needed clarity to this incendiary debate by clearly distinguishing genetic from cultural group selection. The latter does not face the difficulties associated with the former and (together with gene-culture coevolution) provides us with an empirically supported hypothesis of the evolution of the strong altruistic dispositions of humans. Evolved psychological dispositions, however, do not suffice to explain many instances of actual human altruistic behavior. The final aim of this paper, therefore, was to complete extant scientific explanations of human altruism that have focused solely on its evolutionary underpinning. If we want to make sense of human altruism, we must take into account conscious and voluntary reasoning processes, creating—as Singer (1995) has called it—an ‘escalator’ effect on moral behavior and norms. Underlying the uniqueness of human altruism are two equally unique human attributes: the social norms and punishments that govern our societies and the reasoning processes we unleash on the evaluation of moral norms and decisions.

Notes

  1. 1.

    See Bateson (2011) for an extensive account of how empathic concern produces altruistic motivation.

  2. 2.

    The response paper by Abbot et al. (2011) is situated in the debate about the evolution of eusociality. Nowak et al. (2010) argued against Hamilton (1964) that the evolution of eusociality (for instance among bees and ants belonging to the same hive or colony— see above) cannot be satisfactorily explained by invoking kin-selection and inclusive fitness. They believe that eusociality evolved primarily through genetic group selection. Abbot and colleagues (2011) respond that Hamilton’s (1964) theory stands and that the evolution of eusociality can and should be explained in terms of inclusive fitness.

  3. 3.

    With the notable exception of Darwin (1871, p. 185–186) who identifies the following causes of the advance of morality: “the approbations of our fellow men-the strengthening of our sympathies by habit—example and imitation—reason—experience, and even self-interest—instruction during youth, and religious feelings” (my italics).

  4. 4.

    Tomasello and colleagues (2005) argue that human empathy (rooted in a theory of mind) leads to ‘self-other equivalence’. In contrast to other primates, humans view their conspecifics as ‘other selves’ which are fundamentally no different than oneself, rather than viewing them as mere elements of the social environment.

References

  1. Abbot, P., et al. (2011). Inclusive fitness theory and eusociality. Nature, 471(7339), E1–E4.

    Article Google Scholar

  2. Ananth, M. (2005). Psychological altruism vs. biological altruism: Narrowing the gap with the Baldwin effect. Acta Biotheoretica, 53, 217–239.

    Article Google Scholar

  3. Aviles, L. (2002). “Solving the freeloaders paradox: Genetic associations and frequency dependent selection in the evolution of cooperation among nonrelatives. PNAS, 99(22), 14268–14273.

    Article Google Scholar

  4. Bateson, C. D. (2011). Altruism in humans. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar

  5. Bicchieri, C. (2005). The grammar of society: The nature and dynamics of social norms. New York: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar

  6. Binmore, K. (2005). Natural justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar

  7. Boehm, C. (1993). Egalitarian behavior and reverse dominance hierarchy. Current Anthropology, 34(3), 227–254.

    Article Google Scholar

  8. Boehm, C. (1997). Impact of the human egalitarian syndrome on Darwinian selection mechanics. The American Naturalist, 150(Suppl.), 100–121.

    Article Google Scholar

  9. Bowles, S., Boyd, R., Mathew, S., & Richerson, P. J. (2012). The punishment that sustains cooperation is often coordinated and costly. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 35(1), 20–21.

    Article Google Scholar

  10. Bowles, S., & Gintis, H. (2011). A cooperative species: Human reciprocity and its evolution. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

    Google Scholar

  11. Boyd, R., Gintis, H., Bowles, S., & Richerson, P. (2003). The evolution of altruistic punishment. PNAS, 100(6), 3531–3535.

    Article Google Scholar

  12. Boyd, R., & Richerson, P. (1985). Culture and the evolutionary process. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

    Google Scholar

  13. Boyd, R., & Richerson, P. (2002). Group beneficial norms can spread rapidly in a structured population. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 215, 287–296.

    Article Google Scholar

  14. Bravetti, A., & Padilla, P. (2018). An optimal strategy to solve the Prisoner’s Dilemma. Nature, Scientific reports, 8, 1948.

    Article Google Scholar

  15. Bruening, L. (2016). Habits of a happy brain: Retrain your brain to boost your serotonin, dopamine, oxytocin and endorphin levels. Avon, MA: Adams Media.

    Google Scholar

  16. Brown, D. (1991). Human universals. New York: McGraw-Hill.

    Google Scholar

  17. Camerer, C. (2003). Behavioral game theory: Experiments in strategic interaction. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

    Google Scholar

  18. Camerer, C., & Thaler, R. (1995). Anomalies: Ultimatums, dictators and manners. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 9(2), 209–219.

    Article Google Scholar

  19. Chomsky, N. (1955). Logical syntax and semantics: Their linguistic relevance. Language, 31(1), 36–45.

    Article Google Scholar

  20. Chudek, M., & Henrich, J. (2011). Culture-gene coevolution, norm-psychology and the emergence of human prosociality. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 15(5), 218–226.

    Article Google Scholar

  21. Cosmides, L., & Tooby, J. (2005). Neurocognitive adaptations designed for social exchange. In D. M. Buss (Ed.), Handbook of evolutionary psychology (pp. 584–627). Hoboken, NJ: Wiley.

    Google Scholar

  22. Darwin, C. (1871). The descent of man and selection in relation to sex. London: John Murray.

    Google Scholar

  23. Dawkins, R. (1976). The selfish gene. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar

  24. Dawkins, R. (1994). Burying the vehicle commentary on Wilson & Sober: Group selection. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 17(4), 616–617.

    Article Google Scholar

  25. Dennett, D. C. (1994). E Pluribus Unum? Commentary on Wilson & Sober: Group selection». Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 17(4), 617–618.

    Article Google Scholar

  26. Dunbar, R. (1996). Grooming, gossip and the evolution of language. London: Faber and Faber.

    Google Scholar

  27. Dunbar, R. I. M., Duncan, N. D. C., & Nettle, D. (1995). Size and structure of freely forming conversational groups. Human Nature, 6, 67–78.

    Article Google Scholar

  28. Dunn, E., Aknin, L., & Norton, M. (2008). Spending money on other promotes happiness. Science, 319, 1687.

    Article Google Scholar

  29. Enquist, M., & Leimar, O. (1993). The evolution of cooperation in mobile organisms. Animal Behaviour, 45(4), 747–757.

    Article Google Scholar

  30. Fehr, E., & Gächter, S. (2002a). Altruistic punishment in humans. Nature, 415, 137–140.

    Article Google Scholar

  31. Fehr, E., & Gächter, S. (2002b). Strong reciprocity, human cooperation, and the enforcement of social norms. Human Nature, 13(1), 1–25.

    Article Google Scholar

  32. Fehr, E., & Rockenbach, B. (2004). Human altruism: economic, neural, and evolutionary perspectives. Current Opinion in Neurobiology, 14, 784–790.

    Article Google Scholar

  33. Filkowski, M. M., Cochran, R. N., & Haas, B. W. (2016). Altruistic behavior: Mapping responses in the brain. Neuroscience and Neuroeconomics, 5, 65–75.

    Article Google Scholar

  34. Fisher, R. A. (1930). The genetical theory of natural selection. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

    Google Scholar

  35. Fletcher, J., & Doebeli, M. (2009). A simple and general explanation for the evolution of altruism. Proceedings of the Royal Society B, 276, 13–19.

    Article Google Scholar

  36. Gächter, S., & Herrmann, B. (2009). Reciprocity, culture and human cooperation: Previous insights and a new cross-cultural experiment. Proceedings of the Royal Society B, 364, 791–806.

    Google Scholar

  37. Gintis, H. (2006). Behavioral game theory and sociology. Retrieved from: https://www.umass.edu/preferen/gintis/behavi~1.pdf

  38. Gintis, H., Bowls, S., Boyd, R., & Fehr, E. (2003). Explaining altruistic behavior in humans. Evolution and Human Behavior, 24, 153–172.

    Article Google Scholar

  39. Greene, J. (2013). Moral tribes: Emotions, reason, and the gap between us and them. New York: Penguin Press.

    Google Scholar

  40. Green, J., Sommersville, R., Nystrom, L., Darley, J., & Cohen, J. (2001). An fMRI investigation of emotional engagement in moral judgment. Science, 293(5537), 2105–2108.

    Article Google Scholar

  41. Haldane, J. B. S. (1932). The causes of evolution. London: Longmans, Green & Co.

    Google Scholar

  42. Hamilton, W. (1964). The Genetical evolution of social behaviour I and II. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 7, p. 1–16, and p. 17–52.

  43. Henrich, J. (2004). Cultural group selection, coevolutionary processes and large-scale cooperation. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 53(1), 3–35.

    Article Google Scholar

  44. Henrich, J. (2010). The secret of our success: How culture is driving human evolution, domesticating our species and making us smarter. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

    Google Scholar

  45. Henrich, J. (2016). The secret of our success: How culture is driving human evolution, domesticating our species, and making us smarter. Princeton University Press.

  46. Henrich, J., Boyd, R., Bowles, S., Gintis, H., Camerer, C., Fehr, E., et al. (2001). In search of Homo economicus: Experiments in 15 small-scale societies. American Economic Review, 91, 73–78.

    Article Google Scholar

  47. Hill, K. R., Walker, R., Božičević, M., Eder, J., Headland, T., Hewlett, B., et al. (2011). Co-residence patterns in Hunter-Gatherer societies show unique human social structure. Science, 331(6022), 1286–1289.

    Article Google Scholar

  48. Hill, K. R., Wood, B. M., Baggio, J., Hurtado, A. M., & Boyd, R. T. (2014). Hunter-gatherer inter-band interaction rates: Implications for cumulative culture. PLoS ONE, 9(7), e102806.

    Article Google Scholar

  49. Hrdy, S. (2009). Mothers and others: The evolutionary origins of mutual understanding. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar

  50. Mathew, S., & Boyd, R. (2011). Punishment sustains large-scale cooperation in prestate warfare. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, USA, 108(28), 11375–11380.

    Article Google Scholar

  51. Maynard Smith, J. (1976). Group selection. Quarterly Review of Biology, 51(2), 277–283.

    Article Google Scholar

  52. Maynard Smith, J. (1998). Book review: Sober, E., Wilson, D. (1998). Unto others: The evolution and psychology of unselfish behavior Harvard University Press: 1998. Nature, 393, p. 639–640.

  53. Mealey, L., Daood, C., & Krage, M. (1996). Enhanced memory for faces of cheaters. Ethology and Sociobiology, 17, 119–128.

    Article Google Scholar

  54. Melis, A., Altricher, A., Schneider, A., & Tomasello, M. (2013). Allocation of resources to collaborators and free-riders by 3-years-old. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 114, 364–370.

    Article Google Scholar

  55. Nowak, M. A., Tarnita, C. E., & Wilson, E. O. (2010). The evolution of eusociality. Nature, 466(7310), 1057–1062.

    Article Google Scholar

  56. Oda, R. (1997). Biased face recognition in the prisoner’s dilemma games. Evolution and Human Behavior, 18, 309–315.

    Article Google Scholar

  57. Okasha, S. (2005). Altruism, group selection and correlated interaction. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 56(4), 703–725.

  58. Panchanathan, K., & Boyd, R. (2004). Indirect reciprocity can stabilize cooperation without the second-order free-rider problem. Nature, 432, 499–502.

    Article Google Scholar

  59. Pinker, S. (2012). The false allure of group selection. Edge June 19, 2012. Retrieved from: https://www.edge.org/conversation/steven_pinker-the-false-allure-of-group-selection

  60. Puurtinen, N., & Mappes, T. (2009). Between-group competition and human cooperation. Proceedings of the Royal Society B, 276, 355–360.

    Article Google Scholar

  61. Richerson, P., & Boyd, R. (1999). Complex societies: The evolutionary origins of a crude superorganism. Human Nature, 10(3), 253–289.

    Article Google Scholar

  62. Richerson, P., & Boyd, R. (2005). Not by genes alone: How culture transformed human evolution. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

    Google Scholar

  63. Richerson, P., et al. (2016). Cultural group selection plays an essential role in explaining human cooperation: A sketch of the evidence. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 39, e30.

    Article Google Scholar

  64. Ruse, M. (1979). Sociobiology: Sense or nonsense?. Dordrecht: Reidel.

    Google Scholar

  65. Schmidt, M., Rakoczy, H., & Tomasello, M. (2013). Young children understand and defend the entitlements of others. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 116(4), 930–944.

    Article Google Scholar

  66. Singer, P. (1995). How are we to live? Ethics in an age of self-interest. New York: Prometheus Books.

    Google Scholar

  67. Sober, E. (1988). What Is Evolutionary Altruism? In B. Linsky and M. Matthen (eds.), New Essays on Philosophy and Biology, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, supplementary volume 14, p. 75–99.

  68. Sober, E., & Wilson, D. (1998). Unto others: The evolution and psychology of unselfish behavior. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar

  69. Sonne, J., & Gash, D. (2018). Psychopathy to altruism: Neurobiology of the selfish–selfless spectrum. Frontiers in Psychology, 9, 575.

    Article Google Scholar

  70. Tomasello, M., Carpenter, M., Call, J., Behne, T., & Moll, H. (2005). Understanding and sharing intentions: The origins of cultural cognition. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 28, 675–735.

    Article Google Scholar

  71. Tooby, J., & Cosmides, L. (1996). Friendship and the banker’s paradox: Other pathways to the evolution of adaptations for altruism. In W. G. Runciman, J. Maynard Smith, & R. I. M. Dunbar (Eds.), Evolution of social behaviour patterns in primates and man (Vol. 88, pp. 119–143). Proceedings of the British Academy.

  72. Trivers, R. (1971). The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism. Quarterly Review of Biology, 46, 35–57.

    Article Google Scholar

  73. Vakoch, D. A. (Ed.). (2013). International and cultural psychology. Altruism in cross-cultural perspective. Berlin: Springer.

    Google Scholar

  74. Vlerick, M. (2016). Explaining universal social institutions: A game-theoretic approach. Topoi, 35(1), 291–300.

    Article Google Scholar

  75. Vlerick, M. (2017). ‘Better than our nature? Evolution and moral realism, justification, and progress’. In M. In Ruse & R. Richards (Eds.), Handbook of evolutionary ethics (pp. 226–239). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar

  76. Vlerick, M. (2020a). The evolution of social contracts. Journal of Social Ontology, 5(2), 181–203.

    Article Google Scholar

  77. Vlerick, M. (2020b). The cultural evolution of institutional religions. Religion, Brain & Behavior, 10(1), 18–34.

    Article Google Scholar

  78. Warneken, F., Lohse, K., Melis, A., & Tomasello, M. (2011). Young children share the spoils after collaboration. Psychological Science, 22, 267–273.

    Article Google Scholar

  79. Warneken, F., & Tomasello, M. (2009). Varieties of altruism in children and Chimpanzees. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 13(9), 397–402.

    Article Google Scholar

  80. West, S., Griffin, A., & Gardner, A. (2007). Social semantics: Altruism, cooperation, mutualism, strong reciprocity and group selection. Journal of Evolutionary Biology, 20(2), 415–432.

    Article Google Scholar

  81. Westlake, G., Coall, D., & Grueter, C. (2019). Educational attainment is associated with unconditional helping behaviour. Evolutionary Human Sciences, 1, E15.

    Article Google Scholar

  82. Wiessner, P. (2005). Norm enforcement among the Ju/’hoansi Bushmen—A case of strong reciprocity? Human Nature, 16(2), 115–145.

    Article Google Scholar

  83. Wilson, D. S. (1975). A theory of group selection. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (USA), 72(1), 143–146.

    Article Google Scholar

  84. Wilson, D. S. (2005). Does altruism exist? Culture, genes, and the welfare of others. New Haven: Yale University Press.

    Google Scholar

  85. Wilson, D. S., & Kniffin, K. M. (1999). Multilevel selection and the social transmission of behavior. Human Nature, 10(3), 291–310.

    Article Google Scholar

Download references

Author information

Affiliations

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Michael Vlerick.

Additional information

Publisher’s Note

Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

Rights and permissions

Open Access This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License, which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence, and indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party material in this article are included in the article’s Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the article’s Creative Commons licence and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder. To view a copy of this licence, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/.

Reprints and Permissions

About this article

Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this article

Vlerick, M. Explaining human altruism. Synthese (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-020-02890-y

Download citation

Share this article

Anyone you share the following link with will be able to read this content:

Provided by the Springer Nature SharedIt content-sharing initiative

Keywords

  • Human altruism
  • Behavioral game-theory
  • Group selection
  • Genetic group selection
  • Cultural group selection
  • Moral reasoning

The double-negative morality of Leftism

https://charltonteaching.blogspot.com/2021/04/the-double-negative-morality-of-leftism.html

The actuality of Leftist morality – and that it is inversion of the true, beautiful and virtuous – is revealed by describing the double-negative reality concealed by the pseudo-positive moral ‘principles’ used to justify Leftist evil.

Here is the way it works:

To be a ‘racist’ is = not to be anti-white

To be a sexist = not to be anti-men…

You see the way it works? Leftism is oppositional, being defined as ‘against’ various ‘evils’. Most of the Leftist ‘evils’ (often expressed as ‘-ist’ or ‘-phobic’) can accurately be described in a similar double-negative fashion:

Not to be anti-native inhabitants of a country…

Not to be opposed to biologically real, reproductively-adaptive sexuality…

Not to be anti-Christian… etc.

The double-negative formulation is a necessity for Leftism, since Leftism is indeed ultimately oppositional (opposing God and divine creation; opposing the true, beautiful and virtuous); thus its ‘positive’ content (i.e. what Leftists want) is protean and labile, self-contradicting and incoherent.

After all, there are an ‘infinite’ number of ways of opposing The Good.

To be morally excoriated by the Left, all that is required is to be against opposing the Good, in any particular respect.

¿Porqué ahora? ¿Por qué 2020 tuvo que esperar hasta 2020?

[Traducido y abreviado de https://charltonteaching.blogspot.com/2021/04/why-now-why-did-2020-have-to-wait-until.html]

¿Por qué el Poder Global esperó hasta 2020 para lanzar su golpe e implementar un gobierno totalitario global? La respuesta está en el tremendo éxito del golpe; y el hecho de que muy pocas personas lo hayan notado. La clave es no darse cuenta.

Algunos analistas hablan de que se trata de un totalitarismo «suave», porque se basa en la propaganda y la manipulación de la opinión pública más que en la violencia y el terror; pero esto es ver el asunto al revés. Lo que tenemos ahora no es un totalitarismo «suave», sino exitoso, y la necesidad de violencia y terror fue una señal del fracaso de los sistemas [totalitarios] anteriores.

Anteriormente en la historia, la visión del mundo de las personas se basaba en la religión (Dios o dioses) y en fuera de esta vida terrenal-mortal; lo que les daba una raíz, un foco y una coherencia de observación y pensamiento que ahora está completamente ausente. Ahora, los hombres están desarraigados, a la deriva e incoherentes, sin ser conscientes de ello.

Además, las personas del pasado vivieron en la «vida real» arraigadas en su propia experiencia y razonamiento de sentido común. Ahora la gente vive ‘virtualmente’ y obtienen su información e interpretaciones del Sistema; porque (careciendo de religión, negando lo espiritual) no saben nada, no experimentan nada que esté fuera del Sistema.

[Nota del traductor: Un ejemplo sería que la gente del pasado veía como algo obvio que los hombres y las mujeres eran diferentes, pues se suponía que nos podíamos fiar de los ojos y la razón, pues estos habían sido creados por Dios. Hoy en día, el Sistema nos enseña a desconfiar de nuestros poderes de observación y nos dice que confiemos en «expertos», los cuales piensan por nosotros, y que nos dicen que los hombres y las mujeres son iguales]

Los hombres ahora viven virtualmente dentro del Sistema, y ​​el Sistema incluye todo el discurso y la actividad públicos: la política, el gobierno, el derecho, la economía, los medios de comunicación, la policía y el ejército, las iglesias, la ciencia, las artes, la educación … controlado burocráticamente y a través del sistema de información de los medios.

En el pasado, un gobierno totalitario del mundo habría sido demasiado difícil, más allá del alcance de cualquier autoridad; sobre todo porque habría sido obvio y habría provocado una resistencia vehemente y generalizada.

Pero ahora se ignora lo obvio; y se acepta lo falso que es respaldado por el Sistema, en contra de la experiencia personal y el conocimiento común.

Y (especialmente en el mundo desarrollado) las masas, la clase ‘experta’, la población en general, han sido tan degradadas y desmotivadas por varias generaciones de adolescentes cínicos que no han madurado, que no tienen coraje (porque el coraje requiere principios y los hombres sin Dios no tienen ninguna fundamento para los principios). [Como no existe Dios ni la otra vida, lo único que existe es el bienestar personal en esta vida, lo que hace que seamos cobardes e ignoremos cualquier principio si va contra nuestro bienestar personal. Al fin y al cabo, si todo es material, no existen principios.]

Entonces, esta vez, en 2020, el gobierno mundial se implementó con éxito y sin resistencia, porque el Sistema no se lo ha dicho explícitamente a la gente, por lo tanto, no lo saben.

E incluso si las personas piensan por sí mismas por un rato y, en consecuencia, comienzan a darse cuenta de lo que ha sucedido, su falta de principios y coraje significa que pronto se darán cuenta de que es más conveniente aceptar el Sistema porque. .. ¿Por qué no? ¿Qué otra cosa hay?

El totalitarismo moderno es, por lo tanto, tan efectivo porque la gente moderna ha subcontratado su pensamiento al Sistema.

Si la gente moderna pensara, realmente pensara; entonces el totalitarismo actual no sería posible; porque la gente observaría por sí misma, evaluaría por sí misma, se daría cuenta.

Serían libres en pensamiento porque se mantendrían firmes respecto al Sistema en su pensamiento.

Y ese pensamiento, ese tipo de pensamiento, simplemente hace una diferencia, objetivamente; porque con él participamos en la creación divina.

 

Las creencias de lujo

Las ‘creencias de lujo’ son el último símbolo de estatus para los estadounidenses ricos

Por Rob Henderson

[Tomado de https://nypost.com/2019/08/17/luxury-beliefs-are-the-latest-status-symbol-for-rich-americans/]

New York Post. 17 de agosto de 2019

Una ex compañera de clase de Yale me dijo recientemente que “la monogamia está un poco pasada de moda” y no es buena para la sociedad. Así que le pregunté cuál era su historia y si pensaba casarse.

Me dijo que provenía de una familia acomodada y trabajaba en una reconocida empresa de tecnología. Dijo que sí, que, personalmente, ella tenía la intención de tener un matrimonio monógamo, pero rápidamente agregó que el matrimonio no tiene por qué ser para todo el mundo.

Ella fue criada por una familia tradicional y planeaba tener una familia tradicional. Pero sostuvo que las familias tradicionales están pasadas de moda y que la sociedad debería «evolucionar» más allá de ellas.

¿Qué podría explicar esto?

En el pasado, los estadounidenses de clase alta solían mostrar su estatus social con artículos de lujo. Hoy lo hacen con creencias de lujo.

La gente se preocupa mucho por el estatus social. De hecho, las investigaciones indican que el respeto y la admiración de nuestros compañeros son incluso más importantes que el dinero para nuestra sensación de bienestar.

Sentimos la presión de mostrar nuestro estatus en formas nuevas. Es por eso que la ropa de moda siempre cambia. Pero a medida que la ropa de moda y otros productos se vuelven más accesibles y asequibles, cada vez hay menos estatus asociado a esos artículos de lujo.

Las clases altas han encontrado una solución inteligente a este problema: creencias de lujo. Estas son ideas y opiniones que confieren estatus a los ricos a muy bajo costo, mientras que afectan a la clase baja.

Un ejemplo de creencia de lujo es que todas las estructuras familiares son iguales. Esto no es verdad. La evidencia es clara de que las familias con dos padres casados ​​son las más beneficiosas para los niños pequeños. Y, sin embargo, las personas adineradas y educadas que han sido criadas por dos padres casados ​​tienen más probabilidades que otras de creer que la monogamia está pasada de moda, que el matrimonio es una farsa o que todas las familias son iguales.

‘La gente de clase alta se pone una creencia de lujo para separarse de la clase baja’

Estas actitudes relajadas con respecto al matrimonio se filtran hacia la clase trabajadora y los pobres. En la década de los años sesenta, las tasas de matrimonio entre estadounidenses de clase alta y baja eran casi idénticas. Pero durante este tiempo, los estadounidenses adinerados relajando las normas sociales, expresando escepticismo sobre el matrimonio y la monogamia.

Esta creencia de lujo contribuyó a la erosión de la familia. Hoy en día, las tasas de matrimonio de los estadounidenses ricos son casi las mismas que en la década de los años sesenta. Pero la gente de clase trabajadora tiene muchas menos probabilidades de casarse. Además, las tasas de natalidad fuera del matrimonio son más de 10 veces más altas que en 1960, principalmente entre los pobres y la clase trabajadora. Las personas adineradas rara vez tienen hijos fuera del matrimonio, pero son más propensas que otras a expresar la creencia de lujo de que no tiene consecuencia tener hijos fuera del matrimonio.

Otra creencia de lujo es que la religión es irracional o dañina. Es más probable que los miembros de la clase alta sean ateos o no religiosos. Pero tienen los recursos y el acceso para prosperar sin el edificio social unificador de la religión.

Los lugares de culto suelen ser esenciales para el tejido social de las comunidades pobres. Denigrar la importancia de la religión perjudica a los pobres. Si bien las personas adineradas a menudo encuentran sentido [de la vida] en su trabajo, la mayoría de los estadounidenses no pueden darse el lujo de tener una «profesión» o una «carrera». Tienen trabajos. Registran su entrada y su salida. Sin una familia o una comunidad a la que cuidar, un trabajo así puede parecer insignificante.

Luego está la creencia de lujo de que las decisiones individuales no importan mucho en comparación con las fuerzas sociales aleatorias, incluida la suerte. Esta creencia es más común entre muchos de mis compañeros en Yale y Cambridge que entre los niños con los que crecí en hogares de acogida o las mujeres y hombres con los que serví en el ejército. El mensaje clave es que los resultados de su vida están fuera de su control. Esta idea beneficia a la clase alta y perjudica a la gente corriente.

Es común ver a estudiantes de universidades de prestigio trabajar sin descanso y luego restar importancia a la tenacidad. Suelen decir «qué pena» para sugerir que simplemente tuvieron suerte en lugar de aceptar el crédito por sus esfuerzos. Este mensaje es perjudicial. Si las personas desfavorecidas creen que el azar es el factor clave para el éxito, será menos probable que se esfuercen.

‘El mensaje clave es que los resultados de su vida están fuera de su control’

El privilegio de los blancos es la creencia de lujo que me tomó más tiempo comprender, porque crecí rodeado de blancos pobres. A menudo, los miembros de la clase alta afirman que las disparidades raciales se derivan de las ventajas inherentes de los blancos. Sin embargo, los estadounidenses de origen asiático tienen más educación, ingresos más altos y viven más que los blancos. Los blancos ricos son los más entusiastas con la idea del privilegio de los blancos, sin embargo, son los menos propensos a incurrir en costos por promover esa creencia. Más bien, elevan su posición social hablando de su privilegio.

En otras palabras, los blancos de clase alta ganan estatus hablando de su alto estatus. Cuando se promulguen leyes para combatir el privilegio de los blancos, no serán los blancos privilegiados los que resulten perjudicados. Los blancos pobres llevarán la peor parte.

Es posible que los blancos ricos no siempre estén de acuerdo con sus propias creencias de lujo, o al menos tengan dudas. Tal vez no les guste el abrigo de piel ideológico que llevan. Pero si sus compañeros los castigan por no lucirlo por toda la ciudad, nunca volverán a salir de casa sin él.

Porque, al igual que con los anillos de diamantes o la ropa de diseñador de los viejos, la gente de la clase alta se pone una creencia de lujo para separarse de la clase baja. Estas creencias, a su vez, producen consecuencias reales y tangibles para las personas desfavorecidas, ampliando aún más la brecha. Así como la ropa de moda pronto quedará obsoleta, también lo serán las creencias de moda de hoy. En el futuro, espere que la clase alta difame aún más valores, incluidos los que aprecian, en su búsqueda por obtener el estatus de líder.

Rob Henderson ( @robkhenderson) (Links to an external site.) , quien sirvió en la Fuerza Aérea, es un candidato de doctorado en la Universidad de Cambridge.

 

Después del suicidio

[Original en francés aquí]

[Traducción: «Entonces, por supuesto, nos dimos cuenta de que no teníamos otra opción que renunciar a nuestra libertad, prosperidad y dignidad»

«Simplemente no valía la pena arriesgarse»]

Se registra el suicidio de Occidente. Incluso si la covidemencia se detuviera de inmediato, el daño ya es histórico.

Sin embargo, la covidemencia no se detendrá, es interminable, ya que hemos admitido que la libertad se puede sacrificar por una enfermedad trivial. El más mínimo resfriado será, por tanto, suficiente para justificar cualquier cosa liberticida.

La tiranía de la salud se instala, la vacunación obligatoria de facto y las estúpidas restricciones adicionales están listas. Hemos abandonado nuestra cultura de la libertad y nuestro prometeísmo.

Somos culpables, somos ridículos: el miedo a una enfermedad que mata al anciano frágil, cuando ha superado su esperanza de vida al nacer, es suficiente para hacernos renunciar a la vida. Hace mucho tiempo que estábamos acostumbrados a tener miedo de todo y los jóvenes no son los menos grotescos en esta cobardía generalizada (el niño-rey más la televisión más la fábrica del idiota).

Ni siquiera perecemos en las llamas de una batalla perdida con el emperador en las murallas. Estamos muriendo como viejos desaliñados que solo pueden hablar de sus enfermedades y de sus pastillas. El vocabulario que me viene a la mente es el del carnaval, el guiñol, la Commedia Del’Arte.

¿Y después?

Hoy China y el Islam son las dos fuerzas que progresan.

El Islam no puede con la libertad occidental. Al renunciar a ésta, una de sus contradicciones se resolverá automáticamente. Pasar de la máscara al velo es bastante natural.

Prefiero la dominación china. Pero China no nos molestará. Estará contenta de asegurarse de que los ayatolás que nos dirigen no desafíen su supremacía.

No se engañe a sí mismo: la esclavitud no es cómoda. Habrá llanto y crujir de dientes. Y los muertos que no se levantarán al final de la obra.

Los planes de China para hacerse con el control del orden global

Los líderes del Partido Comunista de China creen que están en medio de una ‘intensa lucha ideológica’ por la supervivencia y que para ganar deben derrotar a Occidente.

TANNER GREER

17 DE MAYO DE 2020

[Tomado de https://www.tabletmag.com/sections/news/articles/china-plans-global-order ]

La República Popular de China ahora controla la población más grande del mundo, su segunda economía más grande y un complejo militar-industrial y un sector de alta tecnología solo superados por los de Estados Unidos. Detrás de esta gran masa de hombres y material se encuentra Xi Jinping, secretario general del Partido Comunista de China. Xi, apoyado por la clase de comunistas chinos que gobiernan junto con él, cree que su papel es guiar a China, y al resto del mundo, hacia una nueva era. La expansión militar de China, la inversión económica masiva en el control de las rutas comerciales globales y la escalada de las operaciones de información apuntan a una lucha por el dominio que la pone en conflicto directo con Occidente.

En sus discursos internos y documentos de planificación, los líderes del partido comunista de China  describen sus percepciones de esta lucha de manera  bastante abierta : como lo ve Pekín, el éxito de China depende de desacreditar los principios del capitalismo liberal para que nociones como la libertad individual y la democracia constitucional lleguen a considerarse como las reliquias de un sistema obsoleto[…]

A pesar de las concesiones hechas a los mecanismos de […] mercado que han ayudado a impulsar el reciente auge económico de China, los comunistas chinos creen que lideran un sistema político-ideológico distinto y en oposición al del mundo capitalista. Las circunstancias obligan a la cooperación temporal con los capitalistas que tienen sus propios intereses, pero estos dos sistemas no pueden reconciliarse permanentemente. […]

De los fracasos de la era maoísta, los comunistas chinos  aprendieron que la modernización económica y tecnológica no puede ocurrir en el vacío . En muchas mentes chinas, el estancamiento tecnológico de la República Popular China bajo Mao se combina con el desafortunado descubrimiento de la dinastía Qing de que los avances científicos en Occidente habían dejado obsoletos a sus militares. La lección en ambos casos es la misma: si China quiere fortalecerse, debe integrarse con el mundo exterior.

Pero existen peligros de «abrirse» al mundo exterior. Ésta es la lección que los comunistas chinos extraen  del  extenso  estudio  del  fracaso soviético . La explicación oficial del partido sobre el colapso de la Unión Soviética […] es que su desaparición no tuvo nada que ver con las debilidades de su economía planificada o las tensiones inherentes a un imperio multinacional disfrazado de república popular [es decir, república comunista]. En el relato del Partido Comunista Chino, la Unión Soviética comenzó a morir el día en que Nikita Khrushchev denunció el culto a la personalidad que rodeaba a Joseph Stalin. Aunque las políticas reformistas de destalinización solo tenían como objetivo fortalecer el sistema comunista eliminando sus errores y excesos, terminaron erosionando los cimientos del sistema de valores que hacía coherente a la Unión Soviética. Una vez que fue posible cuestionar la dirección del partido, los [políticos] soviéticos perdieron la capacidad de apuntalar la «seguridad ideológica» de su régimen. [Es decir, los políticos soviéticos dejaron de poder transmitir a la población la idea de que el sistema soviético era el mejor y que la ideología sobre la que estaba fundado el sistema era la mejor] En estas circunstancias, los comunistas chinos que estudian la disolución de la URSS ahora concluyen: La decisión de Gorbachov de «abrir» el sistema y exponer a los pueblos soviéticos (que habían estado en cuarentena cultural) a las tentaciones del mundo occidental fue una acción suicida.

Xi Jinping apoyó esta explicación del colapso soviético  en un discurso de 2013  a los cuadros del partido .  «¿Por qué se desintegró la Unión Soviética?» preguntó a su audiencia. «¡Una razón importante es que en el ámbito ideológico, la competencia es feroz!» La dirección del partido está decidida a evitar el error soviético.  Una directiva interna del partido filtrada de 2013 describe «la amenaza muy real de las fuerzas occidentales anti-China y su intento de llevar a cabo la occidentalización» dentro de China. La directiva describe al partido como en medio de una “intensa lucha ideológica” por la supervivencia. Según la directiva, las ideas que amenazan a China con un «desorden mayor» incluyen conceptos como «separación de poderes», «poderes judiciales independientes», «derechos humanos universales», «libertad occidental», «sociedad civil», «liberalismo económico, “privatización total ”,“ libertad de prensa ”y“ libre circulación de información en Internet ”. Permitir que el pueblo chino contemple estos conceptos «desmantelaría la base social de [nuestro] partido» y pondría en peligro el objetivo del partido de construir un futuro socialista moderno. […]

Los comunistas chinos creen que la mayor amenaza para la seguridad de su partido, la estabilidad de su país y el regreso de China al lugar que le corresponde en el centro de la civilización humana, es ideológica. No les gustan las máquinas militares que el Comando del Pacífico de los Estados Unidos ha colocado contra ellos, pero lo que los asusta más que las armas y los soldados estadounidenses son las  ideas.—Ideas hostiles que creen que Estados Unidos ha incrustado en el discurso y las instituciones del orden global existente. “Las fuerzas hostiles internacionales [buscan] occidentalizar y dividir a China”, advirtió el exsecretario general del PCCh, Jiang Zemin, hace más de una década […] Xi Jinping ha respaldado este punto de vista, argumentando que “desde el final de la Guerra Fría, los países afectados por los valores occidentales han sido destrozados por la guerra o afligidos por el caos. Si adaptamos nuestras prácticas a los valores occidentales … Las consecuencias serán devastadoras «.

Pero, ¿cómo se hace exactamente para combatir un sistema de valores? Se podría silenciar a quienes la defienden. Esta es la lógica represiva detrás del vasto sistema de censura y vigilancia que ha construido el partido para controlar el tráfico de ideas entre el pueblo chino. A medida que las ansiedades comunistas se han intensificado durante la última década, este sistema se vuelve cada vez más espeluznante: el Internet chino se ha  inundado de desinformación ; destacados  disidentes ,  periodistas ,  abogados ,  historiadores ,  académicos ,  empresarios y  activistas  que se han opuesto al programa de Xi han sido censurados, encarcelados y “desaparecidos”;  universidades y las  corporaciones  han tenido células partidarias insertadas dentro de ellas; miles de  iglesias  y  mezquitas  en China han sido demolidas; y  cerca de un millón de  uigures » infectados por el extremismo » han sido enviados a campos de concentración.  […] [Nota del traductor: vean que esto sigue la idea de Gramsci que los intelectuales y las instituciones dominan la cultura y que la cultura es la que apoya el sistema]

En su impulso por controlar el mundo exterior, el estado chino no ha dudado en  amenazar a las empresas extranjeras con ataques cibernéticos o tomar como rehenes a sus empleados , aislar a  celebridades ,  corporaciones ,  industrias e incluso  países enteros   del mercado chino. Sobornan en el extranjero  a los funcionarios públicos ,  compran medios extranjeros  ,  organizan protestas que fingen ser populares , incitan a  multitudes de Internet  o envian matones para intimidar personalmente a destacados investigadores ,  activistas o  personalidades de los medios de comunicación extranjeros  .  Las comunidades de la diáspora china  han sido especialmente vulnerables a estas tácticas. Un cóctel de  vigilancia ,  chantaje ,  acoso ,  intimidación ,  soborno y  amenazas  a los  miembros de la familia  que viven en  China  ha  silenciado a los críticos  y ha  llevado a las  publicaciones en idioma chino con sede en Occidente  a seguir la línea del partido. una tras otra .  […]

Para el partido, la censura de las ideas hostiles y la intimidación de quienes las expresan es solo una solución provisional. Para asegurar su victoria, los valores liberales no solo necesitan ser silenciados. Deben ser  desacreditados.

Los planes de los comunistas chinos para desacreditar y desmantelar los valores liberales incorporados en la arquitectura global existente son increíblemente ambiciosos. Se imaginan un futuro en la que incluso la idea de que China podría ser más exitosa, rica o poderosa si fuera libre sonaría demasiado ridícula para tomarla en serio. Xi Jinping le ha dado un nombre a este mundo futuro. Él  llama a esta visión «Una comunidad de destino común para la humanidad». Esta futura comunidad de naciones le daría al comunismo chino el reconocimiento moral que ahora se le niega. […] Ningún país se vería obligado a cambiar su régimen al modelo chino en este escenario, pero la mayoría reconocería que el sistema social y político chino ha «demostrado la superioridad del socialismo». Muchos adoptarían con gusto las herramientas que Pekín ha perfeccionado para gestionar los problemas económicos y políticos y dar forma a sus propias sociedades. La democratización, mercados libres,y los derechos humanos universales ya no se consagrarán como la piedra angular de las instituciones internacionales más importantes del mundo ni se considerarán los estándares predeterminados de la buena gobernanza. En cambio, se reducirían a una tradición local peculiar de un puñado de naciones occidentales marginadas. […]

Los miles de millones de inversores chinos que han invertido en infraestructura en los países en desarrollo bajo la “Iniciativa de la Franja y la Ruta” de Xi son una parte clave de este plan. El Partido Comunista Chino espera que cada proyecto de esta iniciativa acerque a la humanidad hacia un nuevo orden global basado en la asociación económica con Pekín. En palabras de Xi, cada proyecto es una oportunidad para «dar la bienvenida a [otros países] a bordo de  nuestro  tren de desarrollo».

La grandilocuencia de China a favor del comercio y contra el proteccionismo está motivada de manera similar. Al aumentar la integración económica de China con el mundo, ha argumentado Xi, «el mundo también profundizó su dependencia de China». Como el mayor socio comercial de la mayor parte del mundo, Xi cree que China finalmente está posicionada para comenzar a «transformar el sistema de gobernanza global» y dar forma a los «nuevos mecanismos y reglas» que determinarán «el arreglo sistémico a largo plazo del orden internacional». . »

Xi no espera que esta disputa sobre el futuro orden mundial se resuelva rápidamente. En 2013 advirtió a los cuadros que «durante bastante tiempo aún, el socialismo en su etapa primaria existirá junto con un sistema capitalista más productivo y desarrollado … [Y habrá] un largo período de cooperación y conflicto entre estos dos sistemas sociales». antes de que China tenga «la posición dominante». […] Para hacer ese futuro una realidad requiere convencer al mundo de que,  en palabras de Yang Jiechi, «Los conceptos, sistemas y modelos de gobernanza occidentales [ya no] captan la nueva situación internacional ni se mantienen al día». Solo cuando el mundo esté convencido de que Yang tiene razón, de que los ideales liberales como el pluralismo, los derechos individuales y el gobierno constitucional son anacronismos de una época pasada incapaces de resolver los problemas del siglo XXI, los comunistas chinos ya no temerán que su intento de restaurar China a la grandeza será descarrilada por los complots ideológicos de sus enemigos.

Desde este contexto, muchas acciones tomadas por el partido-estado chino de repente cobran más sentido. La decisión de la República Popular China de permitir que los relatos de propaganda y diplomáticos chinos  difundan conspiraciones contra el coronavirus estadounidense , por ejemplo, es difícil de entender hasta que uno se da cuenta de que las personas que difunden estas conspiraciones creen que están inmersas en una «lucha ideológica» con los valores de un orden liberal global. Lo que está en juego en esta lucha no podría ser más alto: creen que está en juego el futuro del orden global y la supervivencia de su régimen. Los estadounidenses no deberían sorprenderse cuando actúan así.

China’s Plans to Win Control of the Global Order

The Chinese Communist Party leadership believe they are in the midst of an ‘intense, ideological struggle’ for survival and that to win they must defeat the West

TANNER GREER

MAY 17, 2020

[Taken from https://www.tabletmag.com/sections/news/articles/china-plans-global-order ]

The People’s Republic of China now commands the world’s largest population, its second-largest economy, and a military-industrial complex and high technology sector second only to America’s. Behind this great mass of men and material stands Xi Jinping, General Secretary of the Communist Party of China. Xi, supported by the class of Chinese communists who rule along with him, believe it is their role to guide China—and the rest of the world—into a new age. China’s military expansion, massive economic investment in controlling global trade routes, and escalating information operations all point to a struggle for dominance that puts it in direct conflict with the West.

In their internal speeches and planning documents, China’s communist party leaders describe their perceptions of this struggle quite openly: As Beijing sees it, China’s success depends on discrediting the tenets of liberal capitalism so that notions like individual freedom and constitutional democracy come to be seen as the relics of an obsolete system. […]

Despite the concessions made to market-price mechanisms that have helped drive China’s recent economic boom, Chinese communists believe that they lead an ideological-political system distinct from and in opposition to those of the capitalist world. Circumstance forces temporary cooperation with the self-interested capitalists, but these two systems cannot be permanently reconciled. […]

As proud self-declared Marxists, the Beijing leadership has carefully studied the failures of past attempts to “construct a socialism superior to capitalism.” From the failings of the Maoist era, the Chinese communists learned that economic and technological modernization cannot happen in a vacuum. In many Chinese minds the People’s Republic of China’s technological stagnation under Mao blends together with the Qing dynasty’s unfortunate discovery that scientific advances in the West had left their military obsolete. The lesson in both cases is the same: If China is to grow strong, it must be integrated with the world outside it.

But there are dangers to “opening up” to the outer world. This is the lesson Chinese communists draw from extensive study of the Soviet failure. The party’s official explanation for the collapse of the Soviet Union—which has been communicated to party cadres through speeches, party school education, and even a full-length documentary—is that its demise had nothing to do with the weaknesses of its planned economy or the tensions inherent in a multinational empire masquerading as a people’s republic. In the telling of the Chinese Communist Party, the Soviet Union began to die the day Nikita Khrushchev denounced the cult of personality surrounding Joseph Stalin. Though the reformist policies of destalinization were only intended to strengthen the communist system by eliminating its errant and excessive aspects, it ended up eroding the foundation of the value system that made the USSR cohere. Once it became possible to question the party leadership, the Soviets lost the ability to shore up the “ideological security” of their regime. In these circumstances, Chinese communists studying the USSR’s dissolution now conclude, Gorbachev’s decision to “open” the system and expose formerly culturally quarantined Soviet peoples to the enticements of the Western order was a suicide pact.

Xi Jinping endorsed this explanation for the Soviet collapse in a 2013 address to party cadres. “Why did the Soviet Union disintegrate?” he asked his audience. “An important reason is that in the ideological domain, competition is fierce!” The party leadership is determined to avoid the Soviet mistake. A leaked internal party directive from 2013 describes “the very real threat of Western anti-China forces and their attempt at carrying out westernization” within China. The directive describes the party as being in the midst of an “intense, ideological struggle” for survival. According to the directive, the ideas that threaten China with “major disorder” include concepts such as “separation of powers,” “independent judiciaries,” “universal human rights,” “Western freedom,” “civil society,” “economic liberalism,” “total privatization,” “freedom of the press,” and “free flow of information on the internet.” To allow the Chinese people to contemplate these concepts would “dismantle [our] party’s social foundation” and jeopardize the party’s aim to build a modern, socialist future.

Westerners asked to think about competition with China—a minority until fairly recently, as many envisioned a China liberalized by economic integration—tend to see it through a geopolitical or military lens. But Chinese communists believe that the greatest threat to the security of their party, the stability of their country, and China’s return to its rightful place at the center of human civilization, is ideological. They are not fond of the military machines United States Pacific Command has arrayed against them, but what spooks them more than American weapons and soldiers are ideas—hostile ideas they believe America has embedded in the discourse and institutions of the existing global order. “International hostile forces [seek to] westernize and divide China” warned former CPC General Secretary Jiang Zemin more than a decade ago […] Xi Jinping has endorsed this view, arguing that “since the end of the Cold War countries affected by Western values have been torn apart by war or afflicted with chaos. If we tailor our practices to Western values … The consequences will be devastating.”

But how exactly does one go about combating a values system? One could silence those who champion it. This is the repressive logic behind the vast system of censorship and surveillance the party has built to control the traffic of ideas among the Chinese people. As communist anxieties have intensified over the last decade this system grows more blood curdling: The Chinese internet has been flooded with disinformation; prominent dissidentsjournalistslawyershistoriansacademicsbusinessmen, and activists who have voiced opposition to Xi’s program have been censored, imprisoned, and “disappeared”; universities and corporations have had party cells inserted within them; thousands of churches and mosques across China have been demolished; and somewhere close to a million Uighurs “infected with extremism” have been placed in concentration camps. […]

Though surprising to most Americans, the truth is that this was just an especially prominent example of a practice the party has long used to silence those who speak against it—be they living inside or outside of China. In its drive to control the outside world, the Chinese state has not hesitated to threaten foreign companies with cyber attacks or hold their employees hostage, cut celebritiescorporationsindustries, and even entire countries off from the Chinese market. They bribe foreign government officialsbuy foreign media organizationsastroturf protests, stir up online mobs against or send goons to personally intimidate prominent foreign researchersactivists, or media personalitiesChinese diaspora communities have been especially vulnerable to these tactics. A cocktail of surveillanceblackmailharassmentintimidationbribery, and threats to family members in China have silenced critics and brought one Western-based Chinese-language publication to toe the party line after another. When the party has enough leverage to win the contest of ideas by silencing them at their source, they do so. […]

For the party, censorship of hostile ideas and intimidation of those who voice them is only a stopgap solution. To secure their victory, liberal values do not just need to be silenced. They must be discredited.

The Chinese communists’ plans to discredit and dismantle the liberal values baked into the existing global architecture are incredibly ambitious. They imagine a future reality where even the notion that China could be more successful, wealthy, or powerful if it were free would sound too ridiculous to take seriously. Xi Jinping has given a name to this future world. He calls this vision “a community of common destiny for mankind.” This future community of nations would give Chinese communism the moral recognition it is now denied. The party-state would be lauded, in Xi’s words, as a new “contribution to political civilization” and a new chapter in “the history of the development of human society.” Power blocs and existing military alliances would soon melt away as the various nations of the Earth are drawn into China’s economic orbit. No country would be compelled to shift their regime to the Chinese model in this scenario, but most would recognize that the Chinese social and political system has “demonstrated socialism’s superiority.” Many would gladly adopt the tools Beijing has perfected to manage economic and political problems to shape their own societies. Democratization, free markets, and universal human rights would no longer be enshrined as the bedrock of the world’s most important international institutions or be seen as the default standards of good governance. They would instead be reduced to a parochial tradition peculiar to a smattering of outcast Western nations. […]

The billions Chinese investors have plowed into infrastructure in developing countries under Xi’s “Belt and Road Initiative” are a key part of this plan. Each BRI-branded project, the party hopes, moves humankind another step closer to a new global order organized around economic partnership with Beijing. In Xi’s words, each is a chance to “welcome [other countries] aboard our development train.”

China’s grandstanding in favor of trade and against protectionism is similarly motivated. By increasing China’s economic integration with the world, Xi has argued, “the world also deepened its dependence on China.” As the largest trading partner of most the globe, Xi believes that China is finally positioned to begin to “transform the global governance system” and shape the “new mechanisms and rules” that will determine “the long-term systemic arrangement of the international order.”

Xi does not expect this contest over the future world order to be resolved quickly. In 2013 he warned cadres that “for a fairly long time yet, socialism in its primary stage will exist alongside a more productive and developed capitalist system … [And there will be a] long period of cooperation and of conflict between these two social systems” before China has “the dominant position.” […] To make that future a reality requires convincing the world that, in the words of Yang Jiechi, “Western governance concepts, systems, and models [no longer] grasp the new international situation or keep up with the times.” Only when the world is persuaded that Yang is correct—that liberal ideals like pluralism, individual rights, and constitutional government are anachronisms of a past age incapable of solving 21st-century problems—will Chinese communists no longer fear that their bid to restore China to greatness will be derailed by the ideological plots of their enemies.

From this context many actions taken by the Chinese party-state suddenly make more sense. The PRC’s decision to allow Chinese diplomats and propaganda accounts to spread anti-American coronavirus conspiracies, for example, are hard to understand until you realize that the people spreading these conspiracies believe they are engaged in an “ideological struggle” with the values of a hostile liberal order. The stakes of this struggle could not be higher: They believe that the future of the global order and the survival of their regime is at stake. Americans should not be surprised when they act like it.