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Psychoanalyzing the sexual revolutionary

Original in https://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2019/07/psychoanalyzing-sexual-revolutionary.html

When someone makes a claim or presents an argument and you pretend to refute it by calling attention to some purported personal shortcoming of his (such as a bad character or a suspect motive), then you’ve committed an ad hominem fallacy.  The reason this is a fallacy is that what is at issue in such a case is the truth of the claimor the cogency of the argument, and you’ve changed the subject by talking about something else, namely the person making the claim or argument.  But as I explained in a post from a few years ago, not every criticism of a person making a claim or argument is an ad hominem fallacy, because sometimes the topic just is the person himself.  For instance, when a person is prone to committing ad hominem fallacies and persists in them despite gentle correction, it is perfectly legitimate to note that he is irrational and maybe even morally defective in certain ways – for example, that he is in thrall to the vice of wrath, or has a willful personality, or is guilty of a lack of charity toward his opponents.

Or that he is in thrall to sins of lust.  I noted in a recent post the tendency of critics of traditional sexual morality to demonize its defenders and attack their motives rather than address their arguments.  The tendency has become more widespread and relentless as the sexual revolution has gone to ever greater extremes.  (Read Rod Dreher’s blog to keep up to date on the latest permutations.)  When I was a teenager, people with looser morals in the area of sex tended to characterize those with more conservative attitudes as prudes or killjoys.  The attitude was that of the frat boy who pities the nerd or bookworm who doesn’t know how to have a good time.  Nowadays the mentality is instead like that of a Bizarro-world Cotton Mather, or perhaps a mashup of Hugh Hefner and Mao Zedong.  Critics of the sexual revolution are treated as agents of the devil or enemies of the people – bigots, haters, oppressors who must be hounded and silenced.

What accounts for this weird transformation?  Of course, the sexual revolutionaries in question would claim that it reflects deepening moral understanding on their part.  But that presupposes that traditional sexual morality is mistaken, which it is not.  But this post is not about defending traditional sexual morality, because I have done that in many other places.  What I am asking is: What accounts for this weird transformation, given the truth of traditional sexual morality?

There is a kind of Stockholm Syndrome among conservative religious believers of a certain mindset, which treats these developments as the regrettable but understandable excesses of well-meaning wounded souls who’ve been done wrong by overzealous and insensitive defenders of traditional morality.  In my opinion, this is delusional.  If it were true, you’d expect that the shrillness of the revolutionaries would decrease as the rhetoric of tolerance, compassion, and respectful coexistence with those who reject traditional sexual morality has become more prevalent among conservatives and religious believers.  Instead, the shrillness has also increased, and dramatically.  The more ass-kissing that religious conservatives do, the more what they get in return is ass-kicking.

An analysis of the situation informed by the traditions of natural law ethics and Christian theology – by Plato and Aristotle, St. Paul and St. Augustine, St. Peter Damian and St. Thomas Aquinas, et al. – will reveal that there is something much more sinister going on.  I would argue that there are at least three psychological factors underlying the increasing extremism and nastiness of those with “progressive” views on matters of sex:

1. The daughters of lust: InSumma TheologiaeII-II.153.5, Aquinas identifies eight “daughters of lust” or malign effects on the intellect and will that tend to follow upon sexual vice.  For our purposes, the most important are what he calls blindness of mind and hatred of God. As Aquinas notes in another context, “lust…is about the greatest of pleasures; and these absorb the mind more than any others.”  Sexual pleasure is like the pleasure of alcohol use in being perfectly innocent in itself, but also very easy to abuse.  Hence, even in someone with otherwise normal sexual desires, a preoccupation with matters of sex has a tendency to cause him to act foolishly in various ways – to exaggerate the importance of sex, to pursue it in ways that are detrimental to his own well-being and that of people who depend on him, to construct rationalizations for such foolish pursuit, and so forth.

In someone with abnormal sexual desires, the effect is even worse.  For what determines the good use of a human faculty is the end or purpose toward which it is directed by nature.  Hence a healthy moral psychology requires a firm intuitive grasp of what is natural and what is contrary to nature’s purposes.  Repeatedly taking sexual pleasure in activity that is directly contrary to nature’s ends dulls the intellect’s perception of nature, to the point that the very idea that some things are contrary to the natural order loses its hold upon the mind.  The intellect thereby loses its grip on moral reality.

Suppose that some people had a strange psychological deformation that led them to take intense pleasure in entertaining the thought that 2 + 2 = 5.  Repeated indulgence of the desire to contemplate this proposition would make such contemplation addictive, and the very idea that there is such a thing as an objective arithmetical truth to the effect that 2 + 2 = 4 would lose its hold on such a person.  He might judge that it is objectively true instead that 2 + 2 = 5, or he might reject altogether the idea that there is such a thing as objective truth where arithmetic is concerned.  Either way, his intellect will have been blinded.  That is analogous to the blindness of mind that can follow upon ingrained sexual vice.

Such a person is also likely to become hostile to those who try to convince him that 2 + 2 = 4 and that he is simply in the grip of a delusion to think otherwise.  He might take this as a personal attack onhim, on what he is.  “I can’t help but believe that 2 + 2 = 5!  That’s just the way nature made me!  Why are you so hateful?”  Other people might pity him and start to think it cruel to teach arithmetic as it has always been understood, since it will seem to be an implicit marginalization of those who have the odd predilection in question.  They might go along with schemes to alter the mathematics curriculum so that it affirms the legitimacy of such alternative arithmetical beliefs, encourage people to affirm and even celebrate the predilection, and so forth.

The conception of God as having created the natural order according to eternal and immutable mathematical truths would also come to seem odious, as would any religion that incorporated this conception. Indeed, the entire cultural tradition that had incorporated traditional mathematics would appear oppressive and something to be torn down. All of this is analogous to the hatred of God, as author of the moral order, that Aquinas says follows upon ingrained sexual vice.  Religion comes to be either rejected altogether, or replaced by an idolatrous ersatz more hospitable to the vice.

It gets worse.  In Summa Theologiae II-II.53.6, Aquinas teaches that disordered sexual desire is the chief source of sins against the cardinal virtue of prudence, which governs practical reason in general.  Similarly, in Summa Theologiae II-II.46.3 he says that foolishness as a general moral vice arises chiefly from sexual sin.  He isn’t saying that sexual sins are of themselves the worst sins – obviously there are worse sins, such as murder – but rather that they have a special tendency to dull general moral understanding, like the first domino that knocks down the others.  A person or society which has become highly corrupted in matters of sex is especially likely to become morally corrupt full stop.

Hence, return once again to my arithmetic analogy.  In a person or society which started to think in terms of a revisionist arithmetic that made space for the legitimacy of holding that 2 + 2 = 5, the corruption of the intellect would not be confined to arithmetic alone.  Generalcapacity for sound reasoning could not survive such a deformation of the intellect, because it would implicitly undermine the most basic logical principles (such as the law of non-contradiction).

Similarly, in a person or society dominated by sexual vice, it isn’t just moral understanding in matters of sex that would be undermined, butmoral understanding in general.  For the general idea of human faculties having natural purposes is unlikely to survive when the natural purposes of our sexual faculties, specifically (which are about as obvious as natural purposes can be), are obscured.  And the capacity for a coolly dispassionate critical evaluation of our contingent desires in light of nature’s purposes cannot survive in minds that are in thrall to sexual passions, which are the most intense of passions.  But an awareness of natural purposes, and the capacity for dispassionate and critical evaluation of desire, are prerequisites to morality in general.

The infection is bound to leap from the individual, to the culture at large, to the political sphere.  In the Republic, Plato suggests that egalitarian societies tend to become dominated by lust, and have a tendency to degenerate into tyrannies.  For souls dominated by lust are least able to restrain their appetites or to tolerate disapproval of them, which leads to general moral breakdown and an increase in the number of individuals with especially disordered and ruthless temperaments. Tyranny results when such individuals take advantage of the social chaos and impose their wills on the rest.  In Plato’s view, nothing locks you into the allegorical Cave and its world of illusions, fanatically held on to, like sexual immorality.

I have discussed the daughters of lust at greater length in several earlier posts (here, here, and here), and have discussed the way that sexual sins can destroy prudence at greater length in a lecture on cooperation with sins against prudence.  The point to emphasize for present purposes is that the analysis of the effects of disordered sexual desire offered by thinkers like Plato and Aquinas suggests that we should expect such desire to become ever more extreme in its manifestations, and that those in thrall to it will become ever more shrill and hateful toward those who resist them.  And that is exactly what we are seeing today.

2. It takes a morality to beat a morality: People are naturally reluctant to talk about even the most normal and healthy of their sexual desires and activities, given the deeply personal nature of sex.The subject is simply embarrassing, even for the average person with liberal attitudes about it.  He wouldn’t dream of casually discussing his predilections with a stranger, or with his mother, or at a dinner party.  This goes double for sexual desires and activities that one takes in some way to be aberrant.  A special sense of shame attaches to them, both because of their perverse nature and because of the way the pull of sexual desire can subvert what is most distinctively human, namely our reason and will.  Sexual vice is experienced as dragging one down to the animal level, and when it involves what is contra naturam it is experienced as something even worse.

Or at any rate, it is experienced that way to the extent that at least a general and inchoate sense of the natural order of things endures in one’s consciousness.  Even a person who comes to embrace sexual desires traditionally regarded as disordered, and publicly to define his identity in terms of them, will often feel a residual sense of shame and guilt – and this despite the fact that attitudes about sex have liberalized, and the fact that many sympathize with him and are keen to reassure him of his virtue and status as a victim of prejudice.  An Augustine or Aquinas would attribute this to the voice of conscience. Knowledge of the natural law, they would say, is never entirely destroyed even in the person most in thrall to vice.  It is only ever papered over with layer upon layer of rationalizations.  And sometimes the truth still shines through, albeit dimly.

The sexually “liberated” person refuses to accept that, and not only because he is in love with his vices.  He has dug himself into a hole.  If he initially felt shame about those vices, the shame will only be worse if he decides to embrace them, openly proclaims his attachment to them and even defines himself in terms of them – and then, after all that, later has a re-think and comes to acknowledge that they really were vicious and shameful after all.  The prospect is utterly humiliating, so that it is psychologically that much more difficult to turn back from the path of embracing sexual vice once one has taken it.

Now, nothing counteracts lingering feelings of shame and moral failure the way that feelings of pride and self-righteousness can.  The former can be masked if one can work oneself into the latter.  One can tell oneself: “It is those who call what I do shameful who should be ashamed.  They are the bad people – they are bigots, haters, oppressors.  And I am doing something noble in rejecting their opinions and fighting against them!  Yes, that’s it!”  By a kind of psychological alchemy, vice is transformed into virtue and virtue into vice, and one’s self-esteem is thereby salvaged and even enhanced.

It may seem odd for the natural law theorist to recruit Nietzsche to this analysis, but he is, of course, the great diagnostician of egalitarian transvaluations of values.  Moralistic egalitarian rhetoric is, on Nietzsche’s analysis, a mask for resentment and envy – a way that those with a deep sense of failure and weakness can secure revenge against those who uphold the virtues they can’t measure up to.  Of course, the way Nietzsche develops this sort of analysis is problematic.  For example, he applies it to a critique of Christian morality, but his target is really a caricature of Christian morality.  But the basic idea that transvaluations of values can reflect envy, resentment, and the desire for revenge is plausible, and it is as plausibly applied to liberationist views in the sexual context as it is to the kinds of egalitarianism Nietzsche himself had in mind.

It is also worth noting that as the sexual revolution has progressed, it has led to claims ever more bizarre and manifestly preposterous – such as the claim that the biological distinction between male and female is bogus and an expression of mere bigotry.  How could anyone seriously believe such nonsense?  The motive for wanting to believe it is not mysterious, since one might have gotten oneself locked into sexual vices so extreme that their rationalization requires such an absurd thesis.  But how could one fool oneself into actually believing it?  Here too a kind of Bizarro-world moralism rides to the rescue.  If one can whip oneself up into a self-righteous frenzy that directs attention away from the absurdity of one’s belief and onto the purported bigotry of those who deny it, then the belief can (perhaps just barely) be sustained.  And the more manifestly absurd the belief, the more moralistically shrill will be the rhetorical defense of it, because rhetorical force has to make up for the lack of any rational basis.

We might call this the law of compensatory moralism: The more manifestly shameful or absurd one’s sexual vices, the more shrilly moralistic one will tend to be in attacking those who object to them, so as to compensate psychologically for one’s own deep-down awareness of this shamefulness and absurdity.

3. Counter-Pharisaism: But why do so many people who do not share such vices go along with this compensatory moralism?Why do even many people whose personal sexual behavior is relatively conservative nevertheless strongly object to any insistence that such conservatism ought to be normative?

In part this is simply a consequence of the lazy relativism and sentimentalism that tend to prevail in egalitarian societies.  The very idea that any one way of life is better than another, and the prospect of someone’s feelings being hurt if one were to suggest otherwise, become intolerable.  (Again, see Plato’s analysis of democracy in the Republic.) Hence even those who prefer to live more conservative lives often won’t let themselves commit the thought-crime of believing that it ismorally better to do so.

But I would suggest that there is more to it than that.  Consider the following analogy.  The Pharisees are often described as having built a “fence” around the Mosaic Law, so as to make it as unlikely as possible that anyone will violate it.  The fence consisted of a set of secondary prohibitions, respect for which was meant to ensure that one wouldn’t even get close to offending against the primary ones.  For example, if you do not allow yourself even to pick grain on the Sabbath, then you will be sure to avoid anything that might more clearly constituteworking on the Sabbath.

Now, what I am suggesting is that tolerance of more recherché sexual vices allows those whose vices are more humdrum to build a “fence” ofpermissibility around them.  It’s a kind of Bizarro-world parody of Pharisaism.  If even really extreme things are not prohibited, then it is less likely that more mundane things will be prohibited.  For example, traditional sexual morality condemns fornication as well as transsexualism, but it regards the latter as more directly contrary to nature than the former.  Hence if even the latter comes to be seen as permissible, it will be that much easier to justify the former.

So, Pharisaism expands the boundaries of what is impermissible so as to safeguard the prohibitions that the devout person really cares most about.  And the counter-Pharisaism of the “bourgeois bohemian” progressive expands the boundaries of what is permissible to safeguard the milder sexual vices that are what he really cares about.

* * *

I am not saying that the three psychological tendencies I’ve identified – the daughters of lust, the law of compensatory moralism, and Bizarro-world Pharisaism – are at work in absolutely everyone with more liberal views about sexual morality, or that they are equally strong in everyone in whom they are at work.  But they are a big part of the story, and an increasingly big part as the sexual revolution metastasizes.

Nor, of course, am I saying for a moment that identifying these psychological factors suffices to refute the claims or arguments of those with liberal views about sexual morality.  That would be an ad hominemfallacy.  Those claims and arguments need to be (and can be) answered on their own terms, entirely independently of the motivations of or psychological influences on those who make them.

Still, it is important to consider these psychological influences.  For one thing, bad ideas and arguments often have a hold over people even when the logical problems with them are laid bare.  It can be useful for someone in thrall to such errors to consider the non-rational influences that might be leading him to give them more credence or consideration than they deserve.

For another thing, those who would defend traditional sexual morality need to have a realistic understanding of the cultural situation.  As I have said, some conservative religious believers lack this.  For example, even contemporary Catholic churchmen, on the rare occasions when they talk about sexual morality at all, often do so only in the vaguest and most inoffensive way.  They will bend over backwards to attribute good motives to their opponents and to concede the alleged injustice and insensitivity of past upholders of Christian morality, even though such courtesies are never reciprocated by the liberal side.  And they will deemphasize the importance of sexual morality relative to, say, questions of social justice.

The great churchmen and saints of the past would regard all of this as breathtakingly delusional.  In reality, there cannot possibly be true social justice without sound sexual morals, because the family is the foundation of social order and the family cannot be healthy without sound sexual morals.  The sexual revolution is the cause of millions of children being left fatherless, with the intergenerational poverty and social disorder that that entails.  Nor is there any greater manifestation of the deep selfishness that makes social justice impossible than the callous willingness of millions to murder their own children in the womb.  Talk about social injustice that ignores the fundamental role of the sexual revolution in fostering such injustice is mere chatter – unserious, sentimental, and prone to make modern people comfortable in their sins rather than telling them what they really need to hear.  The warrior for true social justice must be an uncompromising reactionary in matters of sex.

And not the least of the reasons for this is the role that sexual immorality plays in undermining moral understanding in general, as Aquinas teaches us.  We are not dealing with a mere intellectual mistake made by well-meaning people but nothing less than a culture-wide psychosis.  As the twelve-steppers say, the first step is to admit the problem.

1) Correlation does not imply causation. Sweden (and similar countries) is not healthier because it has more immorality. Saudi Arabia is not more unhealthy because it has less immorality. You haven’t established the causation. You could say that White countries are more healthy or Germanic languages cause the lack of diseases.

2) Frequency of diseases is not the only way to measure the good of a society. Let alone «religious freedom» or «equality of women».

3)Besides this, Saudi Arabia would claim that these are not goods but evils. Of course, Sweden is better according to the Western criteria than Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia is better according to the Muslim criteria than Sweden. You need to argue what set of values is better. But you didn’t argue. You just ASSUMED that your values are better. You are a fundamentalist that you can’t conceive that people have different ways of seeing life than yours.

The argument for egalitarianism based on a pre-existing soul choosing the laws of society is one of the most inept philosophical arguments I have ever seen. It is an example of the bankruptcy of modern philosophy, that decides beforehand the conclusions and, then, it looks for arguments to support these conclusions, no matter how insane those arguments are. I am feeling sick and English is not my mother tongue. My powers of communication are greatly reduced, but I couldn’t resist saying that.

1) Basing a society in the self-interest of people is completely debatable. Utilitarianism is assumed in this argument as a fact without arguing for it. In fact, it is false (but this is a different debate).

2) In addition, self-interest is used in a contrived situation like not knowing your station in life but being able to decide the laws of society. The fact that such an unrealistic situation has to be made up to find an argument for egalitarianism is only an example of the difficulty of finding good arguments for egalitarianism and the gullibility of people when they find an excuse that support their pre-existing views.

3) In addition, the argument assumes that most people in this contrived situation would choose egalitarian laws. This is claimed but not proved or argued for. It is «because I say so!»

4) Even if you accept 1), 2) and 3), this mental experiment would only prove that most people are selfish and, in this contrived situation, they THINK that they will get the better deal with egalitarian laws. This does not mean that they would get a better deal (in fact, they would get a worse deal but I digress).

5) Even if you accept 1), 2), 3) and 4), this does not mean that having people individually making the best gamble of laws for their life would result in the best society, because society is not a sum of atomized individuals. You can’t ignore effects like the Tragedy of the Commons or similar.

The argument is fallacy over fallacy over fallacy. But, hey, it is in favor of egalitarianism. So let’s disconnect the brain!
And now for the personal part.

«If you were a pre-existing soul who couldn’t choose which station in society»

When you say «you», please don’t include me or most people here. Maybe replace «you» by «people that think like me». You can’t decide the opinions of other people.

Since pre-existing souls are not equal and they don’t have the same properties, I, as a pre-existing soul, would choose a society where each person has different station in life. Even if there are better people than me that have better station in life, I will get benefits because the society will be better. Even if I don’t get benefits about the society being better, I am not that self-centered that I think that the society has to adapt to my selfishness and self-interest.

I am not an envious person (envy being the thing that is beneath egalitarianism). When I see people having better station in life than me, I am happy for them. I don’t call to a complete redesign of society so there are no people above me.

And now back to bed.

Saint Thomas Aquinas said: «Man cannot live without joy; therefore when he is deprived of true spiritual joys it is necessary that he become addicted to carnal pleasures». Of course, taking up one’s cross is part of the deal, but this has to be complemented by spiritual joys that make life bearable. And spiritual joys are gifts from God and are not equally distributed. There are people like me that only get tiny spiritual joys, no matter how much you try.

As a Roman Catholic (your church’s mileage may vary), you have two options: you follow the Gospel of Platitudes: you go to Mass, listen to a bland sermon telling you that you must be good or you must fight for peace and the poor (while boring to death) and then forget about God the rest of the week and live like a non-Christian, freely sinning without guilt. This is the Church of Vatican II.

But if this does not seem real Christianity to you, you can go with people that are more serious. Then, you start a path of self-renunciation and sheer masochism. Your faith becomes a duty. You have to give up any world pleasure but you don’t get anything from it (at least in this life). You have a God-to-do list and you follow all the rules. It’s hard work (besides your job). When you sin, you feel awful and go to confession. But when you do things right, you don’t feel specially well: it’s only your duty. You spend a big part of your mental energy to keep yourself away from sin and then you don’t get anything that is perceivable.

But, when you read the New Testament, you find out that first Christians lived a live of joy. For example, «always be happy» (1 Thessalonians 5:16).Where is the abundant life that we were promised? (John 10:10). Is it only after death?

I am afraid most people don’t have enough faith to live a life devoid of any happiness while waiting for the death to come and this is one of the causes of people leaving the Church or following the Gospel of Platitudes. Some of our ancestors lived a Christian life of self-renunciation and wrote wonderful books about that («The Imitation of Christ» by Kempis) but they had more faith than us (not having had contact with worldviews different from Christianity). And they lived very hard lives. It is easy to renounce the world when you don’t renounce anything because the world does not give you anything.

I stumbled upon a Christian book that deals with these issues. It is called «Journey of Desire» by John Eldredge. The author says that desire has been suppressed in our Christian life because it is deemed evil. But this is not a Christian message but a Buddhist message. The goal of Christianity is the satisfaction of desire and God uses desire in us to sanctify us. I cannot recommend this book yet, because I have not finished it so I don’t know what its final message is. But their first chapters have moved me to tears and resonated very deeply in me.

Es la consequència inevitable del nostre sistema que, quan més alt estiga la gent, més fill de puta siga.

Entre una persona moral i immoral, a l’hora de trepar, la immoral té avantatge.
La persona moral només té estratègies de promoció morals. La persona immoral té estratègies de promoció morals i immorals.  Té més opcions i és més efectiva a l’hora de trepar.

Per exemple, si el jefe li demana involucrar-se en la corrupció per promoure’l, la persona moral es nega mentre que la persona immoral accepta. L’immoral puja mentre el moral es queda on està. La merda flota.

Tot això és consequencia de que la nostra societat no creu en una moral objectiva, independent i superior de les persones, perquè ja no creu en Déu. Sense res superior a l’home, creu que cada persona ha de tindre «la seua pròpia moral» (relativisme moral).

Per tant, cada persona és jutge i acusat de la seua conducta i el veredicte sempre és el mateix: «Innocent!». Un s’absolveix a ell mateix, no importa lo immoral que siga la seua conducta. Un sempre troba excuses per fer el que li dona la gana, sense remordiments de conciència. Abans un deia: «Pobre pero honrado», perquè hi havia eixe sentit de la moral. Ara diu: «Maricó l’últim».

Fa temps, les èlits ens van convéncer que no hi havia res després de la vida i, per tant, 1) l’objectiu de la vida és el plaer (i, per tant els diners) 2) que si fas algo i ningú et pilla, no hi ha problema, perquè no hi ha Déu que et mire

Cadascú vol tindre un tros més gran del pastís i la societat degenera en una lluita de tots contra tots. En esta lluita, els poderosos i els immorals tenen avantatge.

I perdoneu el rotllo. Però no es pot plantar un om (olmo) i demanar que done peres.

1) L’antiga religió posava una sèrie de límits als diners i al plaer (valga la redundància)

2) Una sèrie d’activistes als qui no agradaven estos límits (burgesos, comunistes, degenerats sexuals) van aconseguir remplaçar-la per una religió de l’egoisme i el nihilisme (no existeix res espiritual)

3) L’egoisme i el nihilisme es reforcen mutuament. Si vols fer el que et dona la gana, Deu no ha d’existir, perque ell et posa normes que limiten el q has de fer.

4) Nihilisme produeix egoisme. «Si Dios no existe, todo está permitido», diu Dostoyevsky.  «Bebamos y comamos que mañana moriremos», Sant Pau

Si no existeix més que esta vida , l’objectiu de la vida es obtindre el major plaer possible amb el mínim esforç abans que desaparegues.

No importen els valors ni els demés, perquè ningú et castigará en l’altra vida i la tomba t’espera

(Totes les accions que explicava la teua amiga es redueixen a això. La gent vol el màxim plaer amb el minim esforc i als valors i als demés q li donen pel cul)

5) La societat degenera en una lluita de tots contra tots en què cada un lluita per obtindre el major plaer

6) Els mecanismes que sostenen la societat, que requereixen renunciar al plaer propi en benefici de la societat funcionen cada vegada menys. La societat decau i es conquistada per les veïnes

Too long don’t read: la religió és el pegament que uneix una societat. Sense ella, la societat es desfà.

Este es un element, però falta l’arc general.

La religió de l’egoisme no té per on agafar-la: és incoherent a tots els nivells. Es contradiu a ella mateixa de moltes maneres.

En lògica es demostra que, a partir d’un sistema incoherent, pots demostrar qualsevol cosa. Pots demostrar A i no A. Eixe és el gran avantatge de la religió de l’egoisme respecte cap a unes altres religions com a eina de poder.

Pots usar-la per a justificar qualsevol cosa que el poder vulga. Així, per exemple, la religió de l’egoisme ha justificat durant segles que calia que els Estats-nacions foren forts, que la gent tinguera una identitat nacional forta. Ara es justifica tot el contrari. Cal trencar les fronteres i imposar un sistema de gobernació globalista. Inmigració, etc.

La religió de l’egoisme serveix per justificar el patriotisme i el globalisme. Depén del que vulguen les classes dominants.  Justificar el feminisme, el moviment gai i la tolerància a l’Islam, al mateix temps.

Es un arma de unes classes socials (altes i mitjanes altes) contra unes altres (mitges i baixes)

D’això no us parle massa, perquè com a «sacerdot» (dissident de la religió oficial), tinc tendència a parlar d’idees, però el tema social és molt important. També el tema tecnològic, que no us he parlat mai.

Inclús «assenyalar virtut» és una eina de poder. S’usa per augmentar el teu estatus en la comunitat i disminuir l’estatus dels altres. Tu eres més bo que els altres.

Això produeix «una carrera d’armaments», la qual cosa es coneix com «espirals de santedat» (holiness spirals). Primer, assenyales virtut sent feminista. Quan tot el món ho fa (perquè tot el món vol més estatus), has d’assenyalar virtut sent pro-gai. I així fins que acabes dient que els transsexuals deuen pixar en el bany de les dones. Darrere d’això no hi ha una ànsia per ajudar a les dones, gais o trans, sinó per augmentar el teu estatus.

La correcció política, a nivell social, és una lluita de blancs contra blancs, d’occidentals contra occidentals. Una aliança entre els burgesos i els sacerdots en les classes altes i mitjana-alta de la societat contra les classes mitges, mitges-baixes i baixes natives.

Burgesos = els rics que van prendre el poder després de la Revolució Francesa. Sacerdots = la gent educada que treballa amb idees: professors, funcionaris, gestors d’empreses multinacionals, artistes, escritors, etc.

Es recupera l’aliança que es va trencar amb el comunisme.

Els burgesos i sacerdots (de la religió de l’egoisme) van fer les revolucions burgeses contra els aristòcrates i els sacerdots (cristians).

Quan van guanyar, els sacerdots van voler traure el poder de les mans dels burgesos, per tindre’l ells sols. Això va ser el comunisme, que va fracasar. Els líders comunistes són sacerdots que volen poder: des de Marx a Pablo Iglesias. Sacerdots = gent educada que treballa en les idees

Per tant, després del fracàs del comunisme, els sacerdots van intentar tornar a aliar-se als burgesos: això va ser la socialdemocràcia i la correcció política.

En la correcció política, es lleva poder de les classes inferiors natives per donar-les als burgesos (que cada vegada són més rics) i als sacerdots (que cada vegada tenen més llocs de treball xuplant del pressupost públic i més poder de dir-te com has de fer la teua vida)

Per a això, s’usa una maniobra que De Jouvenel ja va descriure just després de la Segona Guerra Mundial i que jo anomene «la pinça». Les classes altes s’alien amb les classes baixes per treure poder als del mig.

En l’Edat Mitjana, el rei s’aliava amb els burgesos per traure poder als aristòcrates. Ara, els burgesos i els sacerdots s’alien amb els immigrants per traure poder (i diners) a les classes natives mitges i baixes que estan en el mig. Dins de la població nativa, la immigració concentra els diners i el poder en els burgesos i els sacerdots, llevant-lo a tots els altres.

Los costos ocultos de la inmigración

Es per això que la correcció política és primàriament, una lluita entre «blancs». Els immigrants són només peons en esta lluita.

Probablemente, el progresismo es la mejor religión para los blancos. Es la que mejor se adapta a su vanidad, su búsqueda de estatus, su necesidad constante de sentirse superior a aquellos de clases inferiores, su necesidad de sentirse virtuoso sin ningún esfuerzo real, su preferencia de las apariencias sobre la realidad, su preferencia de amabilidad falsa sobre calidez real, amistad y sentido de comunidad, su superficialidad, su falta de sentido de hermandad con otros blancos, su falta de libertad real de pensamiento, su necesidad aparente de seguir ciegamente la última moda o ideología (normalmente creada por los judíos), su total incapacidad de lidiar con psicópatas y estafadores charlatanes, su aceptación borreguil de todo lo que es popular o se considera correcto por los poderes (desde «multiculturalismo» a «matrimonio gay»), su ignorancia total de cómo piensan otras tribus or razas, su creencia constante de que todos son como ellos y que todo lo que se necesita es «educación» o «asimilación», su paternalismo, su feminismo, todos sus ismos.

El cristianismo intentó arreglar a los blancos durante dos mil años, pero fracasó. El neopaganismo nietzschiano-darwinista también fracasó, en un tiempo más corto (aproximadamente 100 años). El progresismo es la mejor religión para los blancos, es la religión que les hace más felices. Probablemente les convertirá en una minoría muy pequeña pero a quién le importa. Es lo que quieren: «blancos menos numerosos pero más progres».

 

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“Progressivism” is probably the best religion for whites. It is the one that best accommodate their vanity, their status-mongering, their constant need to feel superior to those in the lower classes, their need to feel virtuous without any actual effort, their preference for appearances over reality, for fake politeness over actual warmth, friendship and a sense community, their shallowness, their lack of feeling of brotherhood with other whites, their lack of actual freedom of thought (not speech, thought), their apparent need to blindly follow the latest fashion or ideology (usually created by Jews), their total incapacity to deal with psychopaths and snake-oil salesmen, their sheep-like acceptance of anything that is popular or considered right by the powers that be from “multiculturalism” to “gay marriage”, their total ignorance of how other tribes or races think, their constant assumption that everyone is just like them and all they need is “education” or “assimilation”, their paternalism, their feminism, all their isms.

Christianity tried to fix whites for two thousand years, but it failed. Nietzschean-Darwinian neo-paganism also failed, in an even shorter time (~100 years). Progressivism is the best religion for Whites, it’s the religion that makes them happier. It will probably turn them into a very small minority, but who cares. It’s what they want. “Fewer but better whites.”

 

La visión progre es la de la de la religión políticamente correcta, es decir, de aquellas personas que los chinos llaman «baizuo».

La visión tradicional es la de todas las culturas humanas hasta la Ilustración y la cultura occidental desde la Ilustración hasta el surgimiento de la corrección política. Este es uno de los pocos aspectos en que la religión de la Ilustración (o del egoísmo) coincide con el cristianismo hasta hace unas pocas décadas.

La visión tradicional parte de que existe una moral absoluta (aunque haya desacuerdos sobre qué es esa moral absoluta). Puede haber debates sobre moralidad para determinar cuál es esta moralidad. También puede haber debates sobre hechos, que son independientes de la moralidad. Por lo tanto, se guarda la distinción entre el SER y el DEBER SER de Hume. En estos debates, lo importante son las ideas y los argumentos (factuales y morales) y no las personas.

La visión progre es que existe una moral absoluta también, pero esta cambia frecuentemente, siguiendo el ritmo del progreso (en realidad, siguiendo las consignas del poder). Así, lo que hace veinte años era normal, hoy es una maldad aberrante. Los debates no son sobre ideas sino son para establecer qué personas son superiores moralmente. Cuáles son los buenos. La lógica y los hechos no tiene nada que ver y, se niegan si se consideran contrarios a la moral. Una vez una persona se establece como inferior moralmente (racista, sexista, etc.), todo lo que diga no sirve para nada, porque son los motivos de un malvado. El «superior moral» tiene derecho a establecer qué es lo cierto y lo moral, en un ejercicio de poder.

La izquierda, por medio del dominio que tiene de los medios de comunicación, impone los temas a debatir. Y los escoge en función de que permitan descender de la categoría a la anécdota para así apartar las ideas y poder apelar a los sentimientos. De esta forma se ponen del lado bueno, acusan a los otros de estar en el lado malo y el debate siempre estará ganado. La reacción habitual de la derecha no es denunciar el maniqueísmo y centrar el debate en lo ideológico, sino solicitar humildemente que los buenos la acepten en su bando. Rajoy fue un titán de esta vil forma de sumisión.

https://www.libertaddigital.com/opinion/emilio-campmany/madrid-central-es-capital-88243/

• They are factual relativists.
• They believe that there is exactly one set of moral laws, which human beings have gradually discovered in a historical climb towards ethical perfection (or degeneration). Certain people are ethically better or worse based not only on what they do, but also on what they believe. They believe that different ethical systems exist, but they can be ranked from ethically worst to ethically best based on a sort of meta-ethics whereby they can be tested for degree of compliance with the one absolute set of ethics that underlies reality. They are moral absolutists.
• They believe that the goal of debate is to establish what is morally better, and what everyone should do. They argue about what is right.
• They believe that debates are a competitive process between two people, who each have the goal of establishing their views about right and wrong by attaining a state of moral ascendancy over the other person. They believe that anyone who changes their views in revealing a flaw in their moral character (because their previous views were not morally correct), and must thereafter relinquish the moral high ground and submit their actions to the moral judgement of others (usually the person who won the debate). They believe debates occur between people, not ideas, for the precise purpose of establishing who should be allowed to set standards for the behavior of others (because they are morally superior). STATUS. Thus, questioning someone’s character is not only relevant, it’s the whole point.

“The Believers” vs. The Empiricists